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84 Social Justice Vol. 37, Nos. 2–3 (2010–2011)

The Future of Security? Surveillance Operations at Homeland Security Fusion Centers

Torin Monahan*

The U.S. “war on Terror” haS fUeled reMarkable developMenTS in STaTe surveillance. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the country witnessed a rise in domestic spying programs, including warrant- less wiretaps of the communications of citizens, investigations into the borrowing habits of library patrons, infiltration of peace-activist groups by government agents, and the establishment of tip hotlines to encourage people to report suspicious others (Monahan, 2010). Rather than interpret these and similar developments as originating with the “war on terror,” scholars in the field of surveillance studies have correctly noted that the events of September 11 provided an impetus for a surge in many preexisting, but perhaps dormant, forms of state surveillance (Wood, Konvitz, and Ball, 2003). Similarly, such domestic surveillance practices neither began nor ended with the George W. Bush administration; instead, state surveil- lance has grown and mutated in response to changing perceptions of the nature of terrorist threats and the predilections of the Obama administration.

In particular, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has renewed its com- mitment to creating a robust, nationwide network of “fusion centers” to share and analyze data on citizens and others. As of 2010, at least 72 fusion centers existed at the state and regional levels throughout the United States, with many of them listed as “intelligence centers” or “information analysis centers.” Officially, such centers prioritize counterterrorism activities, such as conducting “threat assessments” for events and linking “suspicious activities reports” to other data to create profiles of individuals or groups that might present terrorist risks. In this capacity, fusion centers engage in a form of “intelligence-led policing” that targets individuals who match certain profiles and singles them out for further monitoring or preemptive intervention (Ratcliffe, 2003; Wilson and Weber, 2008).

* Torin Monahan is Associate Professor of Human and Organizational Development and Medicine at Vanderbilt University (e-mail: [email protected]). He is a member of the International Surveillance Studies Network. Among his books are Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity (Rutgers University Press, 2010), Schools under Surveillance: Cultures of Control in Public Education (Rutgers University Press, 2010), Surveillance and Security: Technological Politics and Power in Everyday Life (Routledge, 2006), and Globalization, Technological Change, and Public Education (Routledge, 2005).

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Most fusion centers are located within state and local police departments. Police, FBI, and DHS analysts, whose salaries are usually funded by their respec- tive organizations, typically staff the centers. A common exception is when police representatives are funded in part or completely by DHS grants for the centers. In addition to conducting threat assessments and compiling suspicious-activities reports, fusion center analysts routinely respond to requests for information from state and local police, other fusion centers, or government agencies and organiza- tions such as the FBI, DHS, the Secret Service, or the Department of Defense. When seen as pertinent, fusion centers also share information with private companies, such as those operating public utilities or managing other critical infrastructures (Electronic Privacy Information Center, 2008; Monahan, 2009).

Although the Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning Center, established in 1996, is often credited as being the first fusion center (German and Stanley, 2008), most were formed after the release of the September 11 Commission Report in 2004. The early fusion centers built upon and often incorporated the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s “Joint Terrorism Task Force” (JTTF) program, thereby hardwiring FBI connections into fusion centers, but allowing for greater information sharing than JTTFs afforded (German and Stanley, 2007). Since their inception, the orientation of many fusion centers has expanded to include “all hazards” and “all threats,” such as responding to environmental catastrophes or investigating non-terrorist criminal gangs (Rollins, 2008). One likely reason for this expansion is that the police departments housing fusion centers are trying to translate DHS priorities and apply DHS funds to address local needs (Monahan and Palmer, 2009).

Fusion centers are rapidly becoming a hallmark of the Obama administration’s domestic security apparatus. Since 2009, 14 more fusion centers have come on line and the DHS and the Department of Justice have pledged more funding sup- port for fusion centers (Burdeau, 2010; Geiger, 2009). On the surface, the increase in financial and political support for fusion centers should not be that surprising since DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano was a vocal advocate of the well-regarded Arizona-based fusion center, which she helped to create when she was governor of that state (Hylton, 2009). As DHS Secretary, Napolitano (2009) has reaffirmed this support: “I believe that Fusion Centers will be the centerpiece of state, local, federal intelligence-sharing for the future and that the Department of Homeland Security will be working and aiming its programs to underlie Fusion Centers.” Attorney General Eric Holder (2010) has also affirmed fusion centers as vital to the ongoing “war on terror”: “We are at war. This is the reality in which we live. And our fusion centers are on the frontlines of America’s best, and most effective, efforts to fight back.”

On a deeper level, fusion centers are probably aligned better with the politics of the Obama administration because its surveillance practices appear to be pas- sive, disembodied, and objective. For instance, it has profoundly increased the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) internationally and domestically (Wall and

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Monahan, 2011; Walters and Weber, 2010). Barring instances of obvious abuse, the fusion and analysis of abstract forms of disparate data do not, in themselves, seem particularly egregious. Indeed, the stated purposes of fusion centers, at least in principle, sound innocuous and rational: “The [fusion] centers’ goals are to blend law enforcement and intelligence information, and coordinate security measures to reduce threats in local communities” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Analysts at fusion centers could be thought of as engaging in types of “soft surveillance” (Marx, 2006) that are minimally invasive, at least for most people, and therefore are not nearly as objectionable to the general public as the more invasive articulations of police or state surveillance, such as physical searches, mandatory DNA collection, or telecommunication wiretaps.

Although fusion centers were formed under the Bush administration, largely in response to criticism from the September 11 Commission over intelligence failures leading up to the September 11 attacks, politically speaking this finding of failure was a sore point for President Bush and the relevant security agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Moreover, whereas DHS was established rapidly in 2002, DHS-sponsored fusion centers did not substantially take off until 2005. A case could be made that the supposedly objective, intelligence-led orientation of fusion centers was actually in tension with the general timbre of aggressive, masculinist intervention that characterized many aspects of the “war on terror” under the Bush administration. In contradistinction, the patient police work done by analysts in fusion centers could be viewed as being much smarter and more reflective, and therefore somewhat feminized compared to other modalities of the “war on terror.” DHS officials have explicitly referred to fusion centers as engaging in “thoughtful analysis” (Riegle, 2009) and have implemented workshops and classes to teach fusion center analysts “critical thinking, analytic tools, techniques, and writing” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008: 16). These articulations are a far cry from the action-oriented counterterrorism myths circulated by entertainment shows like 24, which were embraced by former White House deputy chief of staff Karl Rove and former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, among others (Monahan, 2010). In this light, the operations and concept of fusion centers resonate better with the crafted image of President Obama as a thoughtful, measured, and intelligent leader.

Surveillance of abstract data—or “dataveillance” (Clarke, 2001)—may be per- ceived as being less intrusive and less threatening than are video cameras, wiretaps, or other technologies that are traditionally associated with surveillance (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Marx, 2006). Provided that the data do not involve informa- tion considered sensitive, such as pharmacy or bank records, people definitely do not find dataveillance to be as intrusive as physical searches of individuals or individual property (Slobogin, 2008). Nonetheless, these viewpoints neglect the extent to which personal data are constantly being generated, captured, and circu- lated by the many information systems and technologies with which people come

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in contact (e.g., cell phones, credit cards, the Internet). When “fused,” whether by a marketing firm or a state entity, these data can paint a disturbingly fine-grained representation of individuals, their associations, preferences, and risks. Anyone who has access to such “data doubles” (Haggerty and Ericson, 2006) is in a position to know and act on a great deal of information that might otherwise be considered personal and private. It is perhaps much more personal and private than that which could be gleaned from more traditional surveillance techniques. Even more dis- concerting for individuals is the fact that although the data generated by our many information systems are always partial and sometimes grossly inaccurate, they can still negatively affect one’s life experiences and chances (e.g., through one’s credit score or one’s terrorist-risk score).

Therefore, the phenomenon of fusion centers must be situated within the context of surveillance societies. Broadly speaking, surveillance societies operate upon imperatives of data gathering and data monitoring, often through technological systems, for purposes of governance and control (Lyon, 2001; Monahan, 2010; Murakami Wood et al., 2006). These particular logics of surveillance were not invented by U.S. national security agencies in response to the September 11 at- tacks. Instead, fusion centers and other surveillance-oriented security organizations draw upon existing practices of voracious data collection and fluid information exchange, as exemplified by social networking sites such as Facebook or private- sector data aggregators such as Entersect, a company that actively partners with fusion centers to share its purported “12 billion records on about 98 per cent of Americans” (O’Harrow, Jr., 2008).

Thus, there is also a neoliberal dimension to fusion centers, in that they purchase data from the private sector, sometimes hire private data analysts, and share infor- mation with industry partners (Monahan, 2009). By forming information-sharing partnerships, analysts at fusion centers seek to “connect the dots” to prevent future terrorist attacks. Meanwhile, government officials are very interested in figuring out ways in which DHS in general and fusion centers in particular can assist the private sector, presumably by enabling and protecting the ability of companies to profit financially (Monahan, 2010). As DHS Under Secretary Caryn Wagner stated in her 2010 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Homeland Security:

I&A [DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis] will continue to advocate for sustained funding for the fusion centers as the linchpin of the evolving homeland security enterprise. While I&A’s support to state, local and tribal partners is steadily improving, there is still work to be done in how best to support the private sector. We intend to explore ways to extend our efforts in this area beyond the established relationships with the critical infrastructure sectors (Wagner, 2010; emphasis added).

In some respects, fusion centers suffer from a mandate that is too open-ended and from guidelines that are too ambiguous. The task of fusing data to produce

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“intelligence” that can be used to prevent terrorist acts or respond to “all crimes” or “all hazards” amounts to an invitation for individuals at these centers to engage in almost any surveillance practices that make sense to them. As noted, this flex- ibility could have the redeeming value of allowing police departments to use DHS and other resources for needs that are perceived as being meaningful for particular jurisdictions (Monahan and Palmer, 2009). However, evidence suggests that people at some fusion centers are also exploiting the significant leeway granted to them to engage in racial profiling, political profiling, illegal data mining, and illegal data collection. The surveillance capabilities of fusion centers enable and invite “mis- sion creep” or “function creep,” whereby analysts draw upon the resources at their disposal to exceed the policies and laws that are intended to govern their activities (Ibid.). Moreover, the guidelines for fusion centers are quite ambiguous and there is a general absence of oversight regarding their activities (German and Stanley, 2007). In the following sections, I will review in detail a few cases of abuse by fusion centers and discuss the issues raised by such examples.

Fusion Center Abuses

Given the secretive nature of fusion centers, including their resistance to freedom of information requests (German and Stanley, 2008; Stokes, 2008), the primary way in which the public has learned about their activities is through leaked or unin- tentionally disseminated documents. For instance, a “terrorism threat assessment” produced by Virginia’s fusion center surfaced in 2009 and sparked outrage because it identified students at colleges and universities—especially at historically black universities—as posing a potential terrorist threat (Sizemore, 2009). In the report, universities were targeted because of their diversity, which is seen as threatening because it might inspire “radicalization.” The report says: “Richmond’s history as the capital city of the Confederacy, combined with the city’s current demographic concentration of African-American residents, contributes to the continued presence of race-based extremist groups…[and student groups] are recognized as a radicaliza- tion node for almost every type of extremist group” (Virginia Fusion Center, 2009: 9). Although the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and others have rightly decried the racial-profiling implications of such biased claims being codified in an official document, the report itself supports the interpretation that minority students will be and probably have been targeted for surveillance. The report argues: “In order to detect and deter terrorist attacks, it is essential that information regarding suspected terrorists and suspicious activity in Virginia be closely monitored and reported in a timely manner” (Ibid: 4). Other groups identified as potential threats by the Virginia fusion center were environmentalists, militia members, and students at Regent University, the Christian university founded by evangelical preacher Pat Robertson (Sizemore, 2009).

Another threat-assessment report, compiled by the Missouri Information Analysis Center (MIAC), found “the modern militia movement” to be worthy of

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focused investigation. The 2009 report predicted a resurgence in right-wing mi- litia activities because of high levels of unemployment and anger at the election of the nation’s first black president, Barack Obama, who many right-wing militia members might view as illegitimate and/or in favor of stronger gun-control laws (Missouri Information Analysis Center, 2009). The greatest stir caused by the report was its claim that “militia members most commonly associate with 3rd party political groups…. These members are usually supporters of former Presi- dential Candidate: Ron Paul, Chuck Baldwin, and Bob Barr” (Ibid.: 7). When the report circulated, many libertarians and “Tea Party” members took great offense, thinking the document argued that supporters of third-party political groups were more likely to be dangerous militia members or terrorists. In response, libertarian activists formed a national network called “Operation Defuse,” which is devoted to uncovering and criticizing the activities of fusion centers and is actively filing open-records requests and attempting to conduct tours of fusion centers. Operation Defuse could be construed as a “counter-surveillance” group (Monahan, 2006) that arose largely because of outrage over the probability of political profiling by state-surveillance agents.

Fusion centers have also been implicated in scandals involving covert infiltrations of nonviolent groups, including peace-activist groups, anti-death penalty groups, animal-rights groups, Green Party groups, and others. The most astonishing of the known cases involved the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC). In response to an ACLU freedom of information lawsuit, it came to light in 2008 that the Maryland State Police had conducted covert investigations of at least 53 peace activists and anti-death penalty activists for a period of 14 months. The investigation proceeded despite admissions by the covert agent that she saw no indication of violent activities or violent intentions on the part of group members (Newkirk, 2010). Nonetheless, in the federal database used by the police and ac- cessed by MCAC, activists were listed as being suspected of the “primary crime” of “Terrorism—anti-government” (German and Stanley, 2008: 8). Although it is unclear exactly what role the fusion center played in these activities, they were most likely involved in and aware of the investigation. After all, as Mike German and Jay Stanley (2008: 8) explain:

Fusion centers are clearly intended to be the central focal point for shar- ing terrorism-related information. If the MCAC was not aware of the information the state police collected over the 14 months of this supposed terrorism investigation, this fact would call into question whether the MCAC is accomplishing its mission.

Police spying of this sort, besides being illegal absent “reasonable suspicion” of wrongdoing, could have a “chilling effect” on free speech and freedom of as- sociation. The fact that individuals were wrongly labeled as terrorists in these

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systems and may still be identified as such could also have negative ramifications for them far into the future.

Another dimension of troubling partnerships between fusion centers and law enforcement was revealed with the 2007 arrest of Kenneth Krayeske, a Green Party member in Connecticut. On January 3, 2007, Krayeske was taking photographs of Connecticut Governor M. Jodi Rell at her inaugural parade. He was not engaged in protest at the time. While serving as the manager of the Green Party’s gubernatorial candidate, he had publicly challenged Governor Rell over the issue of why she would not debate his candidate (Levine, 2007). At the parade, police promptly arrested Krayeske (after he took 23 photographs) and later charged him with “Breach of Peace” and “Interfering with Police” (Ibid.). Connecticut’s fusion center, the Connecticut Intelligence Center (CTIC), had conducted a threat assessment for the event and had circulated photographs of Krayeske and others to police in advance (Krayeske, 2007). The police report reads: “The Connecticut Intelligence Center and the Connecticut State Police Central Intelligence Unit had briefed us [the police] on possible threats to Governor Rell by political activist [sic], to include photographs of the individuals. One of the photographs was of the accused Kenneth Krayeske” (quoted in Levine, 2007). Evidently, part of the reason Krayeske was targeted was that intelligence analysts, most likely at the fusion center, were monitoring blog posts on the Internet and interpreted one of them as threatening: “Who is going to protest the inaugural ball with me?… No need to make nice” (CNN.com, 2009). According to a CNN report on the arrest, after finding that blog post, “police began digging for information, mining public and commercial data bases. They learned Krayeske had been a Green Party campaign director, had protested the gubernatorial debate and had once been convicted for civil disobedience. He had no history of violence” (Ibid.). The person who read Krayeske his Miranda rights and attempted to interview him in custody was Andrew Weaver, a sergeant for the City of Hartford Police Department who also works in the CTIC fusion center (Department of Emergency Management and Homeland Security, 2008).

These few examples demonstrate some of the dangers and problems with fusion centers. Fusion center threat assessments lend themselves to profiling along lines of race, religion, and political affiliation. Their products are not impartial assess- ments of terrorist threats, but rather betray biases against individuals or groups who deviate from—or challenge—the status quo. According to a Washington Times commentary that became a focal point for a congressional hearing on fusion centers, as long as terrorism is defined as coercive or intimidating acts that are intended to shape government policy, “any dissidence or political dissident is suspect to fusion centers” (Fein, 2009). Evidence from the Maryland and Connecticut fusion center cases suggests that their representatives are either involved in data-gathering and investigative work, or are at least complicit in such activities, including illegal spying operations (German and Stanley, 2008). The Connecticut case further shows that individuals working at fusion centers are actively monitoring online sources and

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interviewing suspects, a departure from the official Fusion Center Guidelines that stress “exchange” and “analysis” of data, not data acquisition through investiga- tions (U.S. Department of Justice, 2006).

One important issue here is that fusion centers occupy ambiguous organizational positions. Many of them are located in police departments or are combined with FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces, but their activities are supposed to be separate and different from the routine activities of the police or the FBI. A related complication is that fusion center employees often occupy multiple organizational roles (e.g., police officers or National Guard members and fusion center analysts), which can lead to an understandable, but nonetheless problematic, blurring of professional identities, rules of conduct, and systems of accountability. Whereas in 2010 DHS and the Department of Justice responded to concerns about profiling by implement- ing a civil liberties certification requirement for fusion centers, public oversight and accountability of fusion centers are becoming even more difficult and unlikely because of a concerted effort to exempt fusion centers from freedom of informa- tion requests. For example, according to a police official, Virginia legislators were coerced into passing a 2008 law that exempted its fusion center from the Freedom of Information Act; in this instance, federal officials threatened to withhold classified intelligence from the state’s fusion center and police if they did not pass such a law (German and Stanley, 2008). Another tactic used by fusion center representatives to thwart open-records requests is to claim that there is no “material product” for them to turn over because they only “access,” rather than “retain,” information (Hylton, 2009).

Although it may be tempting to view these cases of fusion center missteps and infractions as isolated examples, they are probably just the tip of the iceberg. A handful of other cases has surfaced recently in which fusion centers in California, Colorado, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Georgia have recommended peace activists, Muslim-rights groups, and/or environmentalists be profiled (German, 2009; Wolfe, 2009). The Texas example reveals the ways in which the flexibility of fusion centers affords the incorporation of xenophobic and racist beliefs. In 2009, the North Central Texas Fusion System produced a report that argued that the United States is especially vulnerable to terrorist infiltration because the country is too tolerant and accommodating of religious difference, especially of Islam. Through several indicators, the report lists supposed signs that the country is gradually be- ing invaded and transformed: “Muslim cab drivers in Minneapolis refuse to carry passengers who have alcohol in their possession; the Indianapolis airport in 2007 installed footbaths to accommodate Muslim prayer; public schools schedule prayer breaks to accommodate Muslim students; pork is banned in the workplace; etc.” (North Central Texas Fusion System, 2009: 4). Because “the threats to Texas are significant,” the fusion center advises keeping an eye out for Muslim civil liberties groups and sympathetic individuals, organizations, or media that might carry their

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message: hip-hop bands, social networking sites, online chat forums, blogs, and even the U.S. Department of Treasury (Ibid.).

Recent infiltration of peace groups seems to reproduce some of the sordid history of political surveillance of U.S. citizens, such as the FBI and CIA’s COINTELPRO program, which targeted civil rights leaders and those peacefully protesting against the Vietnam War, among others (Churchill and Vander Wall, 2002). A contempo- rary case involves a U.S. Army agent who infiltrated a nonviolent, anti-war protest group in Olympia, Washington, in 2007. A military agent spying on civilians likely violated the Posse Comitatus Act. Moreover, this agent actively shared intelligence with the Washington State Fusion Center, which shared it more broadly (Anderson, 2010). According to released documents, intelligence representatives from as far away as New Jersey were kept apprised of the spying:

In a 2008 e-mail to an Olympia police officer, Thomas Glapion, Chief of Investigations and Intelligence at New Jersey’s McGuire Air Force Base, wrote: “You are now part of my Intel network. I’m still looking at possible protests by the PMR SDS MDS and other left wing antiwar groups so any Intel you have would be appreciated…. In return if you need anything from the Armed Forces I will try to help you as well” (Ibid.: 4).

Given that political surveillance under COINTELPRO is widely considered to be a dark period in U.S. intelligence history, the fact that fusion centers may be contributing to similar practices today makes it all the more important to subject them to public scrutiny and oversight.

Transgressive Data Collection

By now it should be apparent that fusion center personnel are neither objectively assessing terrorist threats nor passively analyzing preexisting data. Fusion centers may appear to be more impartial and rational than previous forms of state surveil- lance. Yet they have incorporated previous surveillance modalities, including their prejudicial beliefs and invasive techniques, and merged them with dataveillance capabilities that amplify the potential for civil liberties violations and personal harm. Even if fusion center activities were restricted to passive data analysis, which they are not, they could still transgress existing laws that are intended to protect people from unreasonable searches. Specifically, Title 28, Part 23 of the Code of Federal Regulations states that law enforcement agencies “shall collect and maintain criminal intelligence information concerning an individual only if there is reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal conduct or activity and the information is relevant to that criminal conduct or activity” (in German and Stanley, 2008: 2). When fusion center analysts create profiles of risky individuals and then engage in data mining to identify people who match those

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profiles, they are effectively bypassing the “reasonable suspicion” requirement for intelligence operations.

Aside from the known cases of abuse, in their official capacity fusion centers are apparently exploiting a technicality in terms of what constitutes “collecting” and “maintaining” criminal intelligence information. The implied reasoning is this: provided that fusion centers merely analyze data stored in databases housed else- where, they are not violating the “reasonable suspicion” stipulation even if they are conducting “dragnet” or “fishing expedition” searches that would have been illegal with previous generations of computing technology that did not depend entirely on networks. This rationalization is especially specious when analysts can access police records that are located in the same buildings as the fusion centers. Nonetheless, DHS and Department of Justice guidelines explicitly encourage fusion centers to access as much data as possible, extending “beyond criminal intelligence, to include federal intelligence as well as public and private-sector data” (quoted in German and Stanley, 2007: 7). In an unusually candid statement, Sheriff Kevin Rambosk, who is associated with the Florida fusion center, justifies widespread data sharing as a way to compete with criminals who similarly move across jurisdictional lines:

We know as law enforcement professionals that there are no jurisdictional boundaries for criminals…. And we historically and intuitively know that the more information that we can share with one another, the more cases can be solved, the more crimes can be prevented, and the more informa- tion each of our agencies will have to continue to make Collier County one of the safest places in Florida to live (Mills, 2010).

The implication of this assertion is that there should not be any jurisdictional or legal boundaries for law enforcement to collect and share data either, includ- ing data from the private sector, which fusion centers in Florida access through a system called “Florida Integrated Network for Data Exchange and Retrieval” or “FINDER” (Ibid.).

Conclusion: Surveillance Iterations

Although criminals or terrorists may be crossing jurisdictional boundaries and breaking the law, state agencies and agents do more harm than good when they ignore existing legal constraints or seek out exemptions from public oversight. The few problematic cases reviewed in this article illustrate that without due respect for the “reasonable suspicion” provision on police intelligence-gathering activi- ties, fusion center personnel engage in or endorse racial, political, and religious profiling; they perceive challenges to the status quo as threatening and possibly “terrorist”; they support the investigation and arrest of law-abiding individuals, marking them as “terrorists” in official databases, perhaps in perpetuity; and they

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exert a chilling effect on free speech in that activists and others are more likely to temper their activities to avoid similar kinds of harmful scrutiny.

It is important to note that the politics of those being targeted by fusion centers spans the spectrum from right-wing militia members to left-wing anti-war activists. Some may be surprised that individuals supporting progressive causes would be seen as threats during a Democratic presidency. Yet these cases underscore that the politics of many environmentalists, anti-war activists, and other progressives are still radical vis-à-vis the mainstream politics of contemporary Washington. Moreover, law enforcement cultures are typically quite conservative (Greene, 2007; Reiner, 2010) and, similar to other organizations, slow to change (Zhao, He, and Lovrich, 1998). Thus, the outcomes of national elections are unlikely to produce discernable near-term changes in the cultures of these organizations.

If today’s surveillance state were to fully embody Barack Obama’s campaign rhetoric of respect for “the rule of law,” fusion centers would differ markedly. The blurring or suspending of the law are supposedly practices that characterized the “war on terror” under the Bush administration. Impatience with bureaucratic con- straints upon counterterrorism efforts or frustration with the burden of protecting civil liberties are similarly more readily associated with the masculinist orientation of the previous administration. Fusion centers could strictly follow stipulations on intelligence gathering; they could erect barriers between public and private databases; they could embrace transparency and accountability by complying with, rather than avoiding, freedom of information requests.

Instead of romanticizing the ideals that could have been achieved, or might yet be achieved, I prefer to conclude by highlighting what can be learned from the example of fusion centers. First, fusion centers show the ways in which the logics of “surveillance societies” pervade all aspects of social life, including the opera- tions of government organizations. Imperatives to collect, share, analyze, and act on data increasingly shape the activities of public institutions, private companies, and individuals. The capabilities of new media technologies simply augment this particular drive, which is unchecked or under-regulated in most domains, and the realm of national security is no different. If governments are reluctant to impose serious restrictions on data sharing more generally, except perhaps for particularly sensitive data such as those contained in medical records, one should not be sur- prised that government agencies would avail themselves of similar data-sharing functions (Regan, 2004). Second, the unstandardized composition and mission of fusion centers may afford them ample flexibility, but it also allows particularistic biases to shape their activities. When made public, such biases may embarrass fusion center officials, but they are undoubtedly more damaging to the targets of unwarranted surveillance and intervention. The latter must contend with legal battles and fees, emotional stress, and perhaps even physical abuse associated with being marked as terrorist suspects (Guzik, 2009). For surveillance states to be more democratic, their police apparatuses should possess and follow clear guidelines

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that respect the law, and subject their activities to routine public scrutiny. To do otherwise is a recipe for abuse. Acknowledgment: This material is based upon a research project being conducted by the author and Priscilla Regan. The work is supported by the National Science Foundation under grant number SES 0957283.

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Proceedings of the 2016 Winter Simulation Conference

T. M. K. Roeder, P. I. Frazier, R. Szechtman, E. Zhou, T. Huschka, and S.E. Chick, eds.

ACTIVE SHOOTER: AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF UNARMED RESISTANCE

Thomas W. Briggs William G. Kennedy

Department of Computational and Data Sciences Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study

George Mason University

4400 University Drive

George Mason University

4400 University Drive

Fairfax, VA 20030, USA Fairfax, VA 20030, USA

ABSTRACT

Mass shootings unfold quickly and are rarely foreseen by victims. Increasingly, training is provided to

increase chances of surviving active shooter scenarios, usually emphasizing “Run, Hide, Fight.” Evidence

from prior mass shootings suggests that casualties may be limited should the shooter encounter unarmed

resistance prior to the arrival of law enforcement officers (LEOs). An agent-based model (ABM) explored

the potential for limiting casualties should a small proportion of potential victims swarm a gunman, as

occurred on a train from Amsterdam to Paris in 2015. Results suggest that even with a miniscule

probability of overcoming a shooter, fighters may save lives but put themselves at increased risk. While

not intended to prescribe a course of action, the model suggests the potential for a reduction in casualties

in active shooter scenarios.

1 INTRODUCTION

Mass shootings unfold quickly and are rarely foreseen by victims. Mass shootings have occurred at a

variety of locations including military installations and government buildings, public spaces including

nightclubs (Orlando, FL), movie theaters (Aurora, CO), shopping malls, workplaces, religious facilities,

and educational campuses (Littleton, CO; Blacksburg, VA; Newtown, CT).

The difficulty of preventing mass shootings has led to increased active shooter training. Law

enforcement agencies have revised response tactics for active shooter situations following the Columbine

high school shooting (Police Executive Research Forum 2014) and employers and public safety

organizations have developed protocols including “Run, Hide, Fight” or “Avoid, Deny, Defend” for

individuals in an active shooter situation. The implementation of these tiered strategies may benefit the

individual who successfully flees or hides, but may subsequently put someone else at greater risk (e.g., by

monopolizing a secure hiding spot) and may not substantively reduce the overall number of casualties in a

mass shooting scenario.

In 2015, a presumed mass shooter on a Thalys train from Amsterdam to Paris was subdued by the

rapid action of several men who engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the gunman. Two of the men were

seriously injured—one shot, one severely cut—but both survived. No one was killed and the gunman was

captured, despite being armed with an AKM rifle, a Luger pistol, and a box cutter.

Researching mass shootings presents obvious methodological challenges: conducting an experiment

in which participants believe they are actually facing potential death from an active shooter is ethically

intractable and could lead to actual harm (e.g., attempts to subdue shooter). While tactical drills such as

those used by LEOs and military can simulate the mechanics of facing an active shooter, the explicit

knowledge that one is in a simulation likely dampens neurophysiological responses and would hopefully

preclude participants from improvising a lethal response against the individual acting as the mass shooter.

Examining historical mass shootings is a valuable research technique, but there are known limitations on

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eyewitness accounts and certainly no possibility of altering the historical scenario in an attempt to

influence outcomes. Agent-based modeling (ABM) is a logical choice to explore the potential impact of

intended targets’ behavior when encountering an active shooter since it harms no human subjects, can

explicitly encapsulate behavioral rules, and offers the possibility of running the model under altered

conditions to investigate outcomes. The present research uses ABM to investigate the degree to which the

rapid action of a few individuals who physically confront a shooter might potentially limit the casualties

in mass shooting scenarios.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Active Shooters and Mass Shootings

From 2000 to 2013, the U.S. FBI reported 160 active shooter incidents in which 486 were killed and 557

wounded, excluding the shooters (Blair and Schweit 2013). Any attempt to tabulate shooting incidents is

ultimately definition-dependent and definitions are debated. The FBI defines an active shooter as “an

individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area,” noting that

“implicit in this definition is the subject’s criminal actions [must] involve the use of firearms.” The

definition of a mass shooting is based on that of mass murder, defined as four or more individuals killed

during the same incident. An active shooter scenario may or may not qualify as a mass shooting, then, as

fatalities depend on both the lethality of victims’ wounds and relatively distal variables like the

availability of advanced trauma care following the shooting. A potential drawback of using the mass

murder definition is that it relies on quantified fatalities, so an active shooter incident in which many

people are shot but fewer than four perish does not meet the threshold of mass shooting.

The FBI notes that both law enforcement and citizens have the potential to affect the outcome of an

active shooter event (Blair and Schweit 2013). In the 104 active shooter incidents from 2000 to 2012, the

shooter was stopped by victims in 17 incidents, by police in 32 incidents, and in 55 incidents, stopped on

his own accord, committing suicide in 44 cases, surrendering in 6 cases, and leaving in 5 cases. (Blair,

Martaindale, and Nichols 2014). Of the 17 incidents in which victims stopped the gunman, in 3 cases the

active shooter was shot by armed victims.

2.2 Prior Agent-Based Models

Hayes and Hayes (2014) created several ABMs of mass shooting scenarios to test specific provisions of

Senator Dianne Feinstein’s proposed legislation to limit certain specific types of firearms. A model of the

Aurora, CO movie theater shooting in 2012 and a generalized indoor model found that only a reduction in

a firearm’s rate of fire would have likely reduced the number of casualties in the Aurora shooting (Hayes

and Hayes 2014). A school shooting model exploring the presence of armed school law enforcement

officers (LEOs) and staff carrying concealed firearms suggested that either intervention would likely

decrease response time in confronting the shooter and reduce casualties, though the model assumes that

the shooter would be instantly neutralized upon entering a room in which a single armed individual is

present (Anklam et al. 2015). This assumption may be overly optimistic in light of studies of shooting

performance of law enforcement officers (Lewinski et al. 2015; Vickers and Lewinski 2012). Anklam et

al. (2015) conclude that reducing the time-to-intercept of an active shooter will likely reduce casualties,

but their school shooting model considered intercept possible only by armed individuals, with no

distinction between LEOs and civilians.

No ABMs could be located that examined the potential role of unarmed resistance in an active

shooter scenario.

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3 METHOD

3.1 Agent-Based Model

Developed using NetLogo (Wilensky 1999), model implementation followed Wilensky and Rand’s

(2015) ABM design principle: start simply and build toward the question of interest. A crowd of agents is

distributed on an open landscape (e.g., a large outdoor concert or rally) with no possible cover or

concealment. Agents are unaware that a shooting is about to occur. A randomly-located shooter begins

firing on the closest targets. Once the shooting begins, most agents flee from the shooter at their running

speed. On reaching the outer perimeter of the simulation, fleeing agents are presumed safe and can no

longer be targeted. A small proportion of agents, if close enough, try to tackle and subdue the shooter.

The simulation ends if the shooter is subdued, when the shooter hits every possible target, and/or all

targets have escaped. For parsimony, a fired shot can hit only one victim, no victim can be hit twice, and

no lethality determination is made due to the many factors affecting outcomes of gunshot wounds.

3.2 Agents

Population. The agents in the current model possess a normally-distributed running speed sourced from

the Hayes and Hayes (2014) ABM of active shooter scenarios: the distribution has a mean of 3.9 m/s and

standard deviation 2.7 m/s. Agents are also assumed to have a cognitive delay required to recognize and

process that a shooting has begun, after which they immediately run away from the shooter. While actual

cognitive delay would likely differ for each individual, in the current model it is a constant such that the

entire population simultaneously realizes that a shooting has begun. This parameter is user-adjustable and

can be disabled if desired (i.e., set to 0 seconds).

Fighters vs Fleers. Some proportion of the agents are fighters. This proportion is set by the user and

is expected to be very small relative to the population. Instead of fleeing from the shooter these

individuals, like the individuals who subdued the gunman on the Thalys train, will attempt to tackle the

shooter if/when they are close enough. Whether these individuals have military or law enforcement

training or are simply extreme altruists is an open question beyond the scope of the current effort. The

model simply assumes that some number of people – however few – might choose to endanger

themselves in response to an active shooter. In this model, fighters run toward the active shooter, putting

themselves at greater risk by closing the distance and increasing the likelihood of being hit by a

consequently more accurate shot. The user sets the probability with which a fighter struggling with a

shooter is likely to overcome the shooter on each tick. This is a global parameter: if the user gives a

fighter a 1% chance of overcoming the shooter and three fighters struggle with a shooter, each fighter has

precisely a 1% chance per tick of overcoming the shooter. In other words, there is currently no additional

advantage when multiple fighters conduct a swarm attack and struggle with the shooter simultaneously,

though this will be explored in future model extensions.

Shooter. User-adjustable parameters can be set to account for armament (magazine capacity and

firearm effective range) and shooter ability (accuracy and field of view for targeting). For parsimony a

shooter always targets the closest agent in (1) firearm effective range and (2) field of view, and will fire

one round per second (tick). Firearm rate of fire is frequently debated. For parsimony, one round per

second is fired in the current model. This rate of fire likely overestimates most shooters’ ability to

accurately target and fire but could represent indiscriminate firing into a crowd.

Whether or not the target is hit is probabilistic and depends on three factors: distance between shooter

and target, the user-adjustable accuracy parameter, and the firearm’s effective range. Firearm effective

range is implemented in the current model as the range at which a 100% accurate shooter hits a human-

sized target 50% of the time. This parameter allows users to approximate the type of firearm employed:

most shooters will be accurate at greater distances with rifles than pistols and range can be set

accordingly. The user-adjustable accuracy parameter allows the user to account for the human component

of shooting accuracy. At 1.0, the shooter is 100% accurate at point-blank range and 50% accurate at the

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firearm’s effective range. In actual firefights involving LEOs, many rounds miss their intended targets

even at relatively close ranges, so a 1.0 accuracy setting is likely highly unrealistic, but is nevertheless

available to the user (Lewinski et al. 2015). If a fired round misses the intended target, it continues

traveling and may hit another agent if that agent is in the round’s trajectory. In dense crowds, therefore,

even an inaccurate shooter is capable of inflicting substantial casualties. The shooter continues to target

and fire on each tick, either until subdued by fighters or until all potential targets have reached the

perimeter of the landscape. In the current version of the model, the shooter does not move to pursue

targets and remains in a single location for the duration of the simulation.

3.3 Initial Setup

The user adjusts the population size such that the desired physical crowd density is achieved. Density is

important because it affects (1) the number of possible targets in the shooter’s range and vision and (2)

the likelihood that a shot that misses the intended target will wound another agent in the round’s

trajectory. The user also sets model parameters described above.

3.4 Model Action

On the first model tick, the shooter “activates,” targeting the nearest individual in his field of view and

firing. (To conceptualize field of view, imagine sweeping a wide-beam flashlight from side to side –

everything in the cone made by the flashlight beam is in the field of view.) On each subsequent tick, the

shooter takes the same action: target, then fire. When the shooter targets, he turns to directly face the

targeted individual, changing his field of view. A shooter cannot see behind himself and can only see

what is in his field of view. After the shooting begins and the cognitive delay time has elapsed, most

agents will begin fleeing from the shooter. Fighters present will run toward the shooter and try to tackle

him if close enough to reach in less than one second, a distance that varies depending on a fighter’s

unique running speed.

When a fighter reaches a shooter, a struggle begins and the shooter shifts his attention to the fighter.

In reality, the likelihood of either a fighter overcoming a shooter or a shooter overcoming a fighter will

depend on a substantial number of variables such as prior combat training, physical strength, weaponry,

and assistance from others. As each of these can be vigorously debated, the user sets probabilities of

success for both the shooter and the fighter. Probabilities are implemented on a per-tick basis. Calibration

data for these probabilities could not be located, so it is suggested that the shooter should have a very high

probability of overcoming the fighter (perhaps because the shooter also carries weapons intended for

close-range combat, whether pistols or bladed weapons) and the fighter should have a low probability of

overcoming the fighter due to the relative disadvantage in armament. Fighters who fail become victims

(i.e., are wounded and incapacitated for the remainder of the simulation).

3.5 Model Output

In addition to a visual view of the unfolding scenario, the model tracks the number of rounds fired, the

number of rounds that strike individuals, and the number of fighters struggling with a shooter at each tick.

3.6 Model Calibration

Parameter sweeps using NetLogo BehaviorSpace examined model sensitivity and differences in outputs.

The parameters were varied as indicated in Table 1 and results are discussed in the next section.

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Table 1: Model parameters with bold values indicating final stable model defaults.

Parameter Values Notes

population 500 1000

5000 7500

Agent population

%-who-fight 0.001 0.003

0.005 0.010

Percentage of agent population

who are “fighters” rather than

“fleers”

chance-of-overcoming-

shooter

0.01 0.05

0.10

Per-tick probability of a fighter

overcoming the shooter in a

hand-to-hand struggle

shooters 1 Number of shooters

shooter-magazine-

capacity 10 Rounds that can be fired before

a magazine reload (shooters

have unlimited magazines)

firearm-effective-range 30m 50m

70m

Range at which a 100%

accurate shooter will hit target

50% of the time; used in hit

probability

shot-accuracy 0.5 0.8 1.0 Human factor in accuracy;

combines with firearm-

effective-range to determine hit

probability of each shot

field-of-view 180 degrees shooter’s field of view (see

section 3.2)

shooter-chance-of-

overcoming-fighter 0.5 Per-tick probability of shooter

overcoming a fighter in a hand-

to-hand struggle

3.7 Verification and Validation

Verification and validation are particularly challenging for the current model and topic. Though mass

shootings occur, there is a dearth of detailed publicly available data and a large number of variables and

unknowns that affect ultimate outcomes. Hayes and Hayes (2014) validated their model of the 2012

Aurora, CO movie theater shooting by calibrating the model such that, on average, a model run

approximated the same number of casualties that actually occurred during the shooting. This is a laudable

strategy, but one that is not easily employed in a generalized active shooter model. A shooter’s targeting

strategy, weaponry, and accuracy are likely to have the greatest impact on casualties, followed by the

behavior of intended victims (e.g., do intended victims make themselves easier or more difficult targets?).

As mentioned in the introduction, conducting an experiment to test victim response to an active shooter is

not practicable; it would be ethically impossible to create a true life-or-death situation in which

individuals would respond with potentially lethal force. This model is inspired by the events on the

Thalys train and also what is believed to have occurred on United Flight 93 on September 11, 2001, but

these situations are extremely rare and ought not be considered representative. Each mass shooting is

different, and caution should be employed making generalizations from one mass shooting to another.

Subject-matter experts are invited to criticize the assumptions of the current model and suggestions are

welcomed. Other modelers are encouraged to replicate or extend the current model.

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The current ABM was subject to verification during the process of model construction using unit tests

written into model code to ensure that a particular procedure is behaving as intended and that code was

adequately debugged (Wilensky and Rand 2015).

Validation requires at least some correspondence between the model’s behavior and the behavior of

the target system (Gilbert and Troitzsch 2005). At the present stage of this research effort, invoking the

oft-cited quote from George Box may prove helpful: “All models are wrong, but some are useful.” The

validation question, then, rests on whether or not the current model can be useful as platform for

exploring the role of intended victims of an active shooter.

4 RESULTS

4.1 Overall

The current model suggests unarmed resistance to an active shooter may reduce overall casualties in an

active shooter incident.

With default model parameter settings (as shown in Table 1), the shooter is subdued in 67 percent of

experimental model runs and overall casualties are mean 30. This is a substantial reduction in casualties

from the no fighter control condition in which mean casualties are 57. In the remaining 33 percent of

model runs in which the shooter is not subdued, mean casualties are increased only slightly to 63, with a

greater share of fighters among the casualties as a result of putting themselves in harm’s way. Figure 1

plots casualties by simulation end time in 500 model runs in both the control and experimental conditions.

The number of casualties sustained in each incident is directly related to time since the shooter has a

sustained rate of fire of one round per second. In the experimental runs in which the shooter is subdued,

mean time elapsed is 100 seconds, far less than in the control condition in which the simulation typically

concludes at 255 seconds after which all remaining victims have escaped the perimeter.

Importantly, default model parameters were selected to be as conservative as possible, and the model

and code are available upon request from the author for any user who wishes to set the parameters less or

even more conservatively. In the absence of empirical data sources to calibrate the model, users are

encouraged to consult relevant subject matter experts in choosing parameter settings.

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Figure 1: Casualties by simulation end time in control and experimental conditions (plot displays a

random sample of 500 of 2000 model runs for ease of visibility).

4.2 Flee vs. Fight Proportion

Unsurprisingly, the greater the proportion of fighters in the population, the more likely the shooter will be

subdued. If too few fight, there is little chance of overcoming the shooter. Varying the proportion of the

population that fights changes the likelihood of overcoming the shooter. If only 0.1 percent fight, virtually

no model runs result in subduing the shooter; if 0.4 percent fight, the shooter is subdued in about half of

model runs, and if between 0.8 and 1 percent fight, the shooter is subdued in nearly all model runs.

4.3 Other Parameters

The current effort did not test rate of fire, since the Hayes and Hayes (2014) ABM demonstrated that

reducing rate of fire would likely reduce casualties in an active shooter scenario. No appreciable

difference in outcomes occurred by varying magazine capacity, since reload times of ~1 second (note that

such a rapid reload time is possible by using a technique known as a “speed reload”) do not substantially

reduce overall rounds fired. (Reloads may, however, present ideal opportunities to engage a shooter,

though this was not tested with the current model.)

Firearm effective range was varied between 30 m, 50 m, and 70 m to explore potential differences

between the use of pistols and rifles, the latter being more accurate at greater distances. Despite extensive

media coverage of the use of semiautomatic rifles in mass shootings, the majority of mass shooters to date

have used pistols. In runs in which the shooter is subdued, casualties are only slightly increased with the

use of more accurate firearms since the majority of casualties occur initially at close range. When the

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shooter is not subdued and can continue firing on fleeing victims, casualties increase almost linearly, as

might be expected.

4.4 Qualitative Observations

The greatest concentration of casualties will occur at the beginning of the simulation since victims only

begin fleeing after realizing what is happening. Shooters will almost always possess an informational

advantage over intended victims because only the shooter knows when and where he will open fire and

his targeting strategy (if anything other than random or based on proximity).

Viewing the model visualization in real time illustrates that individuals who attempt to attack the

shooter from a great distance are at a serious tactical disadvantage, particularly if they have a slow

approach speed. By reducing the distance between themselves and the shooter, they increase the

likelihood that they will be shot. This may suggest pursuing an avoid (run) or deny (hide) strategy unless

structural features of the environment can shield would-be fighters from the shooter’s sight and fire (e.g.,

rooms, corners, or other cover or concealment) and facilitate getting close enough for hand-to-hand

combat with the shooter. Another important interpretation of this result is that LEO entry teams, moving

slowly toward the shooter’s location, would potentially be at great risk should a shooter stage an ambush.

5 DISCUSSION

5.1 Fighters will likely save lives but put themselves at increased risk

Attention is a scarce commodity, and every second that an active shooter struggles with a fighter is a

second that he is not able to effectively target and fire upon another victim. The “Run” and “Hide”

prescriptions are intended to occupy the shooter’s time and attention: time spent by a shooter searching

for available victims is time for law enforcement to arrive on the scene, form an entry team, and sweep

for the shooter. Unfortunately, as suggested by incident reports for the Virginia Tech and Sandy Hook

shootings, active shooters encountering harder targets like barricaded rooms will simply move on to softer

targets. Further, when potential victims “hide” by huddling together in a room corner with little or no

cover or concealment – like most victims at Sandy Hook Elementary – it may be even easier for a shooter

to inflict maximal casualties with fewer rounds fired.

It is impossible to calculate precise odds of becoming a casualty in an active shooter scenario,

regardless of whether an individual chooses to run, hide, or fight. However, it is the case that there is at

least a nonzero probability of successfully overcoming a shooter, as demonstrated on the Thalys train and

in 17 of the 104 cases studied by the FBI (Blair, Martaindale, and Nichols 2014). The present model

suggests that even with a relatively low probability of success and no combined advantage from a

coordinated group attack, overall casualties might be reduced if a small number individuals close enough

to fight the shooter fight rather than flee.

5.2 Cautions and Guidelines for Interpretation

An important caveat of this work is that it is not intended to prescribe a course of action for individuals to

specifically put themselves in harm’s way. Most active shooter training emphasizes “Run, Hide, Fight” or

“Avoid, Deny, Defend,” and emphasis is placed on the order of those options. Trainees are told to “run if

you can,” “hide if you must,” “fight if you have to,” with the acknowledgement that each individual must

make his or her own decision and there are no guaranteed outcomes.

However, active shooter training also contradicts prior training for hostage situations and armed

robberies, which trained compliance with gunmen’s demands to prevent violence. In mass shooting

scenarios, calm cooperation may result in being shot.

The suggestion that untrained civilians engage armed attackers must be considered carefully. When

shooters have been subdued in prior incidents, individuals with some form of combat training—either law

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enforcement or military—are typically involved. Two of the three Americans who subdued the gunman

on the Thalys train had military training and one had just returned from deployment in Afghanistan. But

even trained, armed LEOs responding to an active shooter can become victims, as was demonstrated

when a shooter armed with a semiautomatic rifle attacked a Planned Parenthood facility in Colorado in

2015. Six of the responding LEOs were wounded and one, Officer Garrett Swasey, was killed. Whether

one or more average citizens without training might subdue a gunman requires additional research.

Though the principal and school psychologist at Sandy Hook were both killed by gunfire, the shooter was

very underweight at only 112 pounds (50.8 kg) despite being six feet (1.83 m) tall. It is certainly possible

that he could have been subdued in a hand-to-hand struggle had the staff been close enough to physically

reach and engage him.

5.3 Limitations

Numerous limitations exist in this preliminary modeling effort.

The model does not give any combined advantage to multiple fighters who swarm attack a shooter.

This likely underestimates the probability of success should multiple fighters engage the shooter as

occurred on the Thalys train. One fighter might, for example, attempt to control the direction of a

shooter’s weapon while another fighter attempts to take the shooter to the ground by tackling the

shooter’s legs. (This type of swarm attack is exactly the technique that is typically emphasized in the

“Fight” component of many active shooter trainings for civilians.)

The current model is low-fidelity in a number of respects. Both ballistics and hand-to-hand combat

are modeled as probabilities. Additionally, agents, whether fleeing or fighting, do not communicate or

interact with one another, nor do they have any cover or concealment in the open environment. Crowd

behavior is not accounted for in the current model: faster agents simply run through slower agents.

This model does not address the cognitive and behavioral processes underlying heroic acts or acts of

extreme altruism; the assumption is that at least some individuals are capable of such acts and will resist

when faced with an imminent threat as in the incident on the Thalys train. The user is free to set the

percentage of individuals likely to engage a gunman rather than flee.

Importantly, the current model does not represent ballistics with high fidelity. However, the model

approximates shot accuracy and permits rounds to continue to travel beyond their intended target,

possibly striking another person in the round’s trajectory. Fired rounds do not discriminate, and physics

ultimately determines when and where rounds will stop. (This is also relevant when considering armed

response to an active shooter: trained LEOs may hit their intended targets 50 percent of the time, so an

important aspect of modeling mass shooter scenarios is the potential collateral damage of various

potential responses, including casualties by friendly fire.)

The current model also does not represent hand-to-hand combat with any fidelity. Any struggle will

depend on the skills of the individuals involved and any weaponry available, either the shooter’s or

improvised by fighters.

A limitation of the current model is the lack of specific forensic information from prior mass

shootings with which to validate the model. Presumably, such information exists but is not accessible by

the general public. For example, precisely how close were the Americans to the gunman on the Thalys

train in 2015? How close were the principal and school psychologist to the gunman at Sandy Hook

Elementary when they confronted him in the hallway and were killed in the 2012 shooting? These are

important data for model validation, especially for a higher-fidelity simulation.

5.4 Future Research

The current model serves as a starting point for future research efforts, including testing additional

parameter combinations, variables, scenarios, and assumptions.

The notion of rapid collective action should be explored. Specifically, agents could be given the

ability to communicate—even rapidly, as reportedly happened on the Thalys train—in making the

3529

Briggs and Kennedy

decision to jointly attack a shooter. It may also be the case that there are only an infinitesimally small

number of individuals who would attack an active shooter, but that others would join once that individual

begins the struggle. In this sense, agents could be further divided into individuals who would attack,

regardless, and a greater number of individuals who attack only when others do, invoking a threshold like

Epstein’s (2002) model of civil violence or Granovetter’s (1978) model of collective behavior.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors are grateful to Kenneth Comer for inspiring this modeling effort through his seminar on

military agent-based modeling at George Mason University in 2015, to Dale Brearcliffe for comments

and discussions on drafts of this paper, and to three anonymous peer reviewers for their thoughtful

feedback and helpful suggestions.

REFERENCES

Anklam, C., A. Kirby, F. Sharevski, and J. E. Dietz. 2015. “Mitigating Active Shooter Impact: Analysis

for Policy Options Based on Agent/computer-Based Modeling.” Journal of Emergency

Having Trouble Meeting Your Deadline?

Get your assignment on Reflective adj completed on time. avoid delay and – ORDER NOW

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Management 13 (3): 201–16. doi:10.5055/jem.2015.0234.

Blair, J. P., M. Hunter Martaindale, and Terry Nichols. 2014. “Active Shooter Events from 2000 to

2012.” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. https://leb.fbi.gov/2014/january/active-shooter-events-

from-2000-to-2012.

Blair, J. P, and K. W. Schweit. 2013. “A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000-2013.”

https://hazdoc.colorado.edu/handle/10590/2712.

Epstein, J. M. 2002. “Modeling Civil Violence: An Agent-Based Computational Approach.” Proceedings

of the National Academy of Sciences 99 (Supplement 3): 7243–50. doi:10.1073/pnas.092080199.

Gilbert, G. Nigel, and K. G. Troitzsch. 2005. Simulation for the Social Scientist. 2nd ed. Maidenhead,

England ; New York, NY: Open University Press.

Granovetter, M.. 1978. “Threshold Models of Collective Behavior.” American Journal of Sociology 83

(6): 1420–43.

Hayes, R., and R. Hayes. 2014. “Agent-Based Simulation of Mass Shootings: Determining How to Limit

the Scale of a Tragedy.” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 17 (2): 5.

Lewinski, W. J., R. Avery, J. Dysterheft, N. D. Dicks, and J. Bushey. 2015. “The Real Risks during

Deadly Police Shootouts Accuracy of the Naïve Shooter.” International Journal of Police Science

& Management, 117–27.

Police Executive Research Forum. 2014. The Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents.

Vickers, J. N., and W. Lewinski. 2012. “Performing under Pressure: Gaze Control, Decision Making and

Shooting Performance of Elite and Rookie Police Officers.” Human Movement Science 31 (1):

101–17. doi:10.1016/j.humov.2011.04.004.

Wilensky, U.. 1999. NetLogo. Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling. Evanston,

IL: Northwestern University. http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo.

Wilensky, U., and W. Rand. 2015. Introduction to Agent-Based Modeling: Modeling Natural, Social, and

Engineered Complex Systems with NetLogo. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

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Briggs and Kennedy

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

THOMAS W. BRIGGS is a Ph.D. student in Computational Social Science at George Mason University.

He holds a M.P.S. in Industrial/Organizational Psychology from the University of Maryland, Baltimore

County. His email address is [email protected].

WILLIAM G. KENNEDY is Research Assistant Professor at the Center for Social Complexity in the

Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study at George Mason University. He holds a Ph.D. in information

technology from George Mason University. He is a retired Navy Captain with 30 years of service in

submarines and the Naval Reserve and also a retired civil servant with 25 years of service with the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. Department of Energy. His research interests include:

integrating computational cognitive modeling and computational social science; cognitive plausibility;

and cognitive robotics. He is an IEEE Life Member. His email address is [email protected].

3531

Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

DSpace Repository

Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

2017-12

Active shooter response: defensive tactics

and tactical decision-making for elementary

school teachers and staff

Whitney, John A., IV

Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56841

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THESIS

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE: DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING FOR

ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS AND STAFF

by

John A. Whitney IV

December 2017

Thesis Co-Advisors: Carolyn Halladay Kathleen Kiernan Second Reader: Lauren Wollman

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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE: DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING FOR ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS AND STAFF

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S) John A. Whitney IV

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

This study analyzes characteristics of Run, Hide, Fight and defensive tactics and tactical-based decision-making tools that can be modified and applied to enhance depth and breadth of preparedness. Specifically, the research focuses on law enforcement and military tactics and tactical decision-making tools that could be taught to teachers and school staff for use in elementary school settings. Research sources include government operation manuals as well as literature from experts in the fields of defensive tactics and tactical decision-making.

While much of the tactical advice and techniques described may seem intimidating to the non-military or non-law-enforcement professional, they are not. The tactics provide basic guidance in mindset, movement, and self-protection strategies that have the potential of improving the likelihood of survival of students, faculty, and staff alike. Findings from the research are categorized as pre-action (mental preparation and situational awareness), action (defensive tactics and tactical decision-making techniques), and re-action (ongoing situational awareness, action analysis and modification). Additionally, the findings support the following recommendations: provide training to teachers and school staff on options-based responses (including defensive tactics and tactical decision-making), empower teachers to protect students by any means necessary, and establish reconnection procedures in the event of an incident.

14. SUBJECT TERMS active shooter, education, school, defense, tactics, elementary

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139

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Unclassified

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Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

ACTIVE SHOOTER RESPONSE: DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING FOR ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHERS AND STAFF

John A. Whitney IV Division Chief, Scottsdale Fire Department, Scottsdale, Arizona

B.A., Arizona State University, 2002 M.S., Arizona State University, 2007

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December 2017

Approved by: Carolyn Halladay Thesis Co-Advisor

Kathleen Kiernan Thesis Co-Advisor Lauren Wollman Second Reader Erik Dahl Associate Chair for Instruction Department of National Security Affairs

iv

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PREFACE

I am a dad. I am not a law enforcement officer. I am not a soldier. I am a dad who

was scared to death that his son would not be adequately protected in the event of an

active shooter. I asked the questions, surveyed the layout of the school, and spoke with

my son about his school’s lockdown practices. None of them made me feel any better.

Run, Hide, Fight provides a great foundation to build on, but I felt it needed more. I felt

people needed to know when to run. They needed to know where to hide. Moreover, they

needed to know how to fight. The fear I felt inspired me to conduct research on how to

prepare elementary school teachers better to respond to active-shooter events. Based on

this research, I feel that I have uncovered many simple practices that can be learned for

free and practiced on a daily basis.

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ABSTRACT

This study analyzes characteristics of Run, Hide, Fight and defensive tactics and

tactical-based decision-making tools that can be modified and applied to enhance depth

and breadth of preparedness. Specifically, the research focuses on law enforcement and

military tactics and tactical decision-making tools that could be taught to teachers and

school staff for use in elementary school settings. Research sources include government

operation manuals as well as literature from experts in the fields of defensive tactics and

tactical decision-making.

While much of the tactical advice and techniques described may seem

intimidating to the non-military or non-law-enforcement professional, they are not. The

tactics provide basic guidance in mindset, movement, and self-protection strategies that

have the potential of improving the likelihood of survival of students, faculty, and staff

alike. Findings from the research are categorized as pre-action (mental preparation and

situational awareness), action (defensive tactics and tactical decision-making techniques),

and re-action (ongoing situational awareness, action analysis and modification).

Additionally, the findings support the following recommendations: provide training to

teachers and school staff on options-based responses (including defensive tactics and

tactical decision-making), empower teachers to protect students by any means necessary,

and establish reconnection procedures in the event of an incident.

viii

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ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.  INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………………..1  A.  RESEARCH QUESTION ……………………………………………………………….1  B.  PROBLEM STATEMENT ……………………………………………………………..1  C.  LITERATURE REVIEW ……………………………………………………………….7 

1. After-Action Reports ……………………………………………………………9 2. Psychological Impact of Training ………………………………………..10 3. Mitigation Strategies …………………………………………………………..12

D.  RESEARCH DESIGN …………………………………………………………………..14 

II. RUN, HIDE, FIGHT ………………………………………………………………………………..17 A.  HISTORY OF SCHOOL SHOOTINGS ………………………………………..17  B.  NEED FOR CHANGE ………………………………………………………………….20  C.  RUN AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY …………………………………………….23 

1. Positives of Run ………………………………………………………………….24 2. Negatives of Run ………………………………………………………………..25 3. Best Practices of Run ………………………………………………………….28 4. Summary of Run as a Response Strategy …………………………….30

D.  HIDE AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY …………………………………………..31  1. Positives of Hide …………………………………………………………………33 2. Negatives of Hide………………………………………………………………..34 3. Best Practices of Hide …………………………………………………………36 4. Summary of Hide as a Response Strategy ……………………………39

E.  FIGHT AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY…………………………………………40  1. Positives of Fight ………………………………………………………………..43 2. Negatives of Fight ……………………………………………………………….45 3. Best Practices of Fight ………………………………………………………..47 4. Summary of Fight as a Response Strategy …………………………..48

III. MENTAL PREPARATION FOR DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING ……………………………………………………..51  A.  WARRIOR MINDSET ………………………………………………………………….52  B.  WILL TO SURVIVE …………………………………………………………………….58  C.  SENSORY INTEGRATION ………………………………………………………….60  D.  JOHN BOYD’S OODA LOOP ………………………………………………………65  E.  DEFEND YOUR SECTOR—AIR FORCE ……………………………………71  F.  STRESS EXPOSURE TRAINING AND THE DIRT DIVE ……………72  G.  SITUATIONAL AWARENESS …………………………………………………….73 

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IV.  DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING ……………77  A.  COVER VERSUS CONCEALMENT ……………………………………………78  B.  ANTI-SNIPER MOVEMENT ……………………………………………………….79  C.  I’M UP, THEY SEE ME, I’M DOWN ……………………………………………80  D.  KILL ZONES ……………………………………………………………………………….81  E.  NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES …………………………………………………….83  F.  DANGER AREAS …………………………………………………………………………85  G.  BARRICADING …………………………………………………………………………..89 

V.  CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY …………………………………………………………..91  A.  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ………………………………………………………….92  B.  PRE-ACTION ………………………………………………………………………………93 

1.  School Administrators Empowering Teachers to Find Success by any Means Necessary …………………………………………93 

2.  Situational and Area Awareness …………………………………………94  3.  Commit to Mission Success …………………………………………………94 

C.  ACTION……………………………………………………………………………………….95  1.  Do Not Delay ………………………………………………………………………95  2.  Be Decisive …………………………………………………………………………95  3.  Move with a Purpose ………………………………………………………….96  4.  Put Distance between Self and Threat …………………………………96  5.  Cover over Concealment …………………………………………………….96  6.  Quick Movements that Maintain Cover or Concealment

and Provide a Tactical Advantage ……………………………………….97  D.  RE-ACTION …………………………………………………………………………………97 

1.  Stay Ahead of Threat Tempo by Doing the Least Expected Action …………………………………………………………………97 

2.  Stay Flexible, Adapt and Overcome …………………………………….98  E.  RECOMMENDATIONS ……………………………………………………………….98  F.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY ……………………….99  G.  CONCLUSION …………………………………………………………………………..100 

APPENDIX A. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CHECKLIST ………………………….101 

APPENDIX B. THE ACTIVE SHOOTER DIRT DIVE ……………………………………103 

LIST OF REFERENCES ………………………………………………………………………………….105 

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ………………………………………………………………………113 

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.  Teacher-Warrior Creed. (Modeled after the Warrior Ethos: Soldier’s Creed.) …………………………………………………………………………………………….6 

Figure 2.  Active Shooter Incidents: Location Categories …………………………………..19 

Figure 3.  Active Shooter Incidents: Incidents Annually …………………………………….19 

Figure 4.  Number of People Shot and Killed at Virginia Tech ……………………………21 

Figure 5.  Resolution of Active Shooter Events in the United States (2000– 2010) …………………………………………………………………………………………….42 

Figure 6.  The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter Events ……………………………………………………………………………….63 

Figure 7.  Boyd’s OODA Loop ……………………………………………………………………….66 

Figure 8.  The Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act Loop ………………………………………66 

Figure 9.  Cover versus Concealment ………………………………………………………………79 

Figure 10.  Kill Zones………………………………………………………………………………………82 

Figure 11.  High Crawl versus Low Crawl …………………………………………………………84 

Figure 12.  Clearing Hallway Junctions at “a ‘T’ Intersection when Approaching along the ‘Cross’ of the ‘T’” …………………………………………………………….86 

Figure 13.  Clearing Hallway Junctions at “a ‘T’ Intersection when Approaching from the Base of the ‘T’” …………………………………………………………………87 

Figure 14.  Stairwell Clearing …………………………………………………………………………..88 

Figure 15.  The Active Shooter Dirt Dive …………………………………………………………104 

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.  Comparison of Treatment Group’s Safety, Fear, and Resilience Scores ……………………………………………………………………………………………12 

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR after-action report

ALICE alert lockdown inform counter evacuate

COA courses of action

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

EMS emergency medical services

EOP emergency operations plan

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

GLOCK get out, lock out, knock out

IMT individual movement techniques

ISC Interagency Security Committee

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

NYPD New York Police Department

OODA observe, orient, decide, act

SET stress exposure training

SPD Scottsdale Police Department

SSIC Safe School Initiative Committee

SWAT special weapons and tactics

TADMUS tactical decision making under stress

USAF United States Air Force

USMC United States Marine Corps

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Active shooter events are not a new threat to educational facilities.1 They remain

a consistent threat and have the potential for significant impact.2 Since the 1999

Columbine High School shootings, school-based active shooter events have remained in

the public’s awareness as a potential threat.3 Response strategies need to evolve beyond

the basics of lockdowns.4 Run, Hide, Fight provides a firm foundation for the expansion

of an options-based response strategy for school-based active shooter events.

The term lockdown refers to a conventional practice in which teachers isolate

students in their respective classrooms, lock the doors, and attempt to impede any

visibility into the rooms. Lockdowns were designed to address threats from the exterior

of the school grounds.5 In active shooter events, mitigation efforts focused on outside

threats become extremely problematic, as the shooter may have already accessed the

interior of the school. Another strategic limitation is that once committed to an area

perceived as secure, teachers and staff may have limited opportunities to re-evaluate

responses and change their actions.

In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsored a policy for

responding to active shooter events called Run, Hide, Fight.6 The adaptive strategy,

1 Traci L. Wike and Mark W. Fraser, “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless,” Aggression

and Violent Behavior 14, no. 3 (May 2009): 163, doi: 10.1016/j.avb.2009.01.005.

2 J. Pete Blair and Katherine W. Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013 (Washington, DC: Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, 2014), 21, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study- 2000-2013-1.pdf.

3 Michael E. Buerger and Geoffrey E. Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, September 2010, https://leb.fbi.gov/2010/september/those-terrible-first-few-minutes- revisiting-active-shooter-protocols-for-schools.

4 Ibid.

5 Joseph A. Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from (Hartland, WI: ALICE Training Institute, n.d.), 7, accessed November 17, 2016, http://hartlake.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/Origin-Of-Lockdown.pdf.

6 Ready Houston, “RUN. HIDE. FIGHT.® Surviving an Active Shooter Event—English,” YouTube video, 5:55, posted by the City of Houston, July 23, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VcSwejU2 D0.

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funded by the DHS, was developed by the City of Houston.7 The public rollout of the

strategy came on the heels of the 2012 movie-theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado.8 The

DHS policy of Run, Hide, Fight has evolved for use by the general public, as well as

those in schools in response to active shooter events.9

The research evaluated the elements of Run, Hide (Lockdown), Fight as response

strategies to active shooter events in elementary schools. The objective of the study was

to analyze what characteristics of current active shooter mitigation strategies are

beneficial, what characteristics are not, and what other defensive tactics and tactical-

based decision-making tools can be modified and applied to current strategies to enhance

the overall depth and breadth of preparedness. Specifically, the research focused on law

enforcement and military tactics and tactical decision-making that could be taught to

teachers and school staff for use in elementary school settings.

Research found that commitment to a winning mindset could be a critical

component in the potential survival of a threatening event. A lot of research addresses

handling stressful situations and the impact of stress on decision-making. Teachers and

school staff, while not frequently faced with situations of this type, must engage actively

in practicing the principles of functioning in stressful environments. It does not cost

money to practice and perfect situational awareness, mindset preparation, and a

willingness to succeed. It is critical that school systems emphasize the importance of

preparedness and a desire to support readiness processes. With the appropriate mindset

practices in place, teachers and school staff can work to familiarize themselves with task-

level tactical practices.

While much of the tactical advice and techniques described may seem

intimidating to the non-military or non–law-enforcement professional, they are not. The

7 Emily Anne Epstein, “‘Run, Hide, Fight’: Homeland Security Releases Public Service Video on How to Get to Safety and Survive a Mass Shooting,” Mail Online, July 27, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ news/article-2180041/Run-hide-fight-Homeland-Security-releases-public-service-video-to-safety-survive- mass-shooting.html.

8 Ibid.

9 “Active Shooter Resources,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed September 23, 2016, https:// www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-resources.

xix

tactics, broken down to their simplest components, provide basic guidance in movement

and self-protection strategies that have the potential of furthering the likelihood of

survival. Once committed to the “will to survive” and a “warrior mindset,” the goal is for

teachers and school professionals to feel empowered in their ability to adapt to a

multitude of threatening environments.10

Findings from the research fall into three general categories: Pre-action, action,

and re-action. Pre-action refers to the steps leading up to an event that establish the

necessary mindset and confidence for survival, and create an awareness that carries over

into the action phase. Action refers to the actual response to a threat. The tactical

movements and techniques that potential victims implement increase survival. Action

also carries into re-action, and vice-versa, as a feedback loop. Re-action means the

reevaluation phase of the situation. It analyzes whether the actions taken are improving or

worsening the tactical advantage. That analysis determines the next action. Again, a

looped system takes seconds to process. Individually, the significant findings of the

research are the following.

A. PRE-ACTION

 School administrators empowering teachers to find success by any means

necessary

 Situational and area awareness

 Commit to mission success

B. ACTION

 Do not delay

 Be decisive

 Move with a purpose

10 “Active Shooter Resources”; Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery (Hampton, VA: Department of Defense, 2007), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-50-3.pdf.

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 Put distance between self and threat

 Cover over concealment

 Quick movements that maintain cover or concealment and provide a

tactical advantage

C. RE-ACTION

 Stay ahead of threat tempo by doing the least expected action

 Stay flexible, adapt and overcome

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

 Recommendation #1—Provide training to teachers and school staff on

options-based response to active shooter preparedness and response

including defensive tactics and tactical decision-making.

This research provides defensive tactics and tactical decision-making available to

school environments at little to no cost. The sources included provide further opportunity

to establish new approaches to response and decision-making.

 Recommendation #2—Empower teachers through district policy to

protect the children in their care by any means necessary.

Teachers and school staff need to be empowered to implement their training.

Empowerment must be supported through policy to alleviate concerns over liability. If

teachers make a tactical real-time decision to take their students out the window and into

a nearby neighborhood to provide a safe haven from a shooter, they need to know that

their ability to decide is supported.

 Recommendation #3—Establish reconnection procedures in the event of

an incident.

With an options-based approach, reconnection procedures need to be developed.

In the previous example when teachers implement steps to protect their children, a

xxi

process needs to be established for them to reconnect to the school administration to

provide a student count or roster and arrange transportation to a family reunification area.

By recognizing options-based approaches as an acceptable strategy, school

systems have the potential of dramatically increasing the likelihood of survival.

Lockdown should be an option, not THE solution. This nation, as a society, entrusts

teachers with the daily protection of the children. Why not empower them with the tools

and opportunity to evolve that protection in an ever-increasing threat environment?

References

Air Land Sea Application Center. Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery. Hampton, VA: Department of Defense, 2007. https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ fm3-50-3.pdf.

Blair, J. Pete, and Katherine W. Schweit. A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, 2000– 2013. Washington, DC: Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, 2014. https://www.fbi. gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study-2000-2013-1.pdf.

Buerger, Michael E., and Geoffrey E. Buerger. “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. September 2010. https://leb.fbi.gov/2010/september/ those-terrible-first-few-minutes-revisiting-active-shooter-protocols-for-schools.

Epstein, Emily Anne. “‘Run, Hide, Fight’: Homeland Security Releases Public Service Video on How to Get to Safety and Survive a Mass Shooting.” Mail Online. July 27, 2012. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2180041/Run-hide-fight- Homeland-Security-releases-public-service-video-to-safety-survive-mass-shoot ing.html.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Active Shooter Resources.” Accessed September 23, 2016. https://www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/ active-shooter-resources.

Hendry Jr., Joseph A. The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from. Hartland, WI: ALICE Training Institute, n.d. Accessed November 17, 2016. http://hartlake.org/wpcontent/uploa ds/2015/12/Origin-Of-Lockdown.pdf.

Ready Houston. “RUN. HIDE. FIGHT.® Surviving an Active Shooter Event—English.” YouTube video. 5:55. Posted by the City of Houston. July 23, 2012. https://www. youtube.com/watch?v=5VcSwejU2D0. 

xxii

United States Air Force. Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS). Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 2012. http://static. epublishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/afttp3-4.6_as/afttp_3-4.6_ active_shooter_(20121114).pdf.

Wike, Traci L., and Mark W. Fraser. “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless.” Aggression and Violent Behavior 14, no. 3 (May 2009): 162–69. doi: 10.1016/j. avb.2009.01.005.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to begin with a special thanks to my outstanding thesis committee.

The amount of energy the “Tres Amigas” put into this project is beyond appreciated!

Thanks to Dr. Carolyn Halladay for her precision and professionalism, to Dr.

Kathleen Kiernan for her support, encouragement, and vast subject matter expertise,

and, especially, to Dr. Lauren Wollman for the support, guidance, and “motivation” to

continue.

I would like to recognize and thank Dr. Anders Strindberg and Dr. David

Brannan. As faculty members in this program, they truly inspired me to change the way I

think and approach problems completely. Challenging my own biases, assumptions, and

recognizing different ways to approach problems, gave me a path to take on a project that

brought together vastly different disciplines. Thank you both!

I would also like to thank the City of Scottsdale for its support, and specifically,

Fire Chief Tom Shannon, Center for Homeland Defense and Security alumni, for the

motivation and inspiration to enter and complete the program. The entire Scottsdale Fire

Department family has been completely supportive and patient as I complete this

program. Thank you, Sir, and thank you all!

My extended family has been incredibly patient throughout this process, which I

greatly appreciate. I want to thank my parents, Rosanne and Jerry, who instilled my work

ethic and desire to always try to better myself and my surroundings, for their

love, support, and childcare! I greatly appreciate my dad, John, for his pride and

interest in my project. A special thanks to Grandma Barbara who always checked to

make sure I was home safe from the in-residence portions and told me how proud of

me she was every time. Thank you all!

I am especially thankful for my son, John, who inspired the subject matter of

this project and remains a constant motivator to apply my heart and soul into

something in which I truly believe. Thank you, buddy!

xxiv

me every step of the way and gave me the energy and inspiration to succeed. I truly could

not have done it without her. This accomplishment is just as much hers as it is mine.

Thank you, babe. I love you!

Most importantly, this thesis would have not been possible without the love,

support, and INCREDIBLE patience that my wife, Desi, has provided me. She was with

1

I. INTRODUCTION

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

Which defensive tactics and tactical decision-making processes can be provided

to teachers and school staff to enhance preparedness for active shooter events?

B. PROBLEM STATEMENT

In “Active Shooters in Secondary Schools: The Unique Role of the Physical

Educator,” author Jason Winkle recognized the critical value that faculty play in dealing

with the situation immediately following acts of school violence.1 Beyond current

strategies, opportunities exist to train teachers and school administrators in basic

defensive tactical decision-making strategies. The goal of the training is to become more

comfortable in reacting to a potentially chaotic situation. Teachers and school

administrators are then able to make defensive tactical decisions that consider all

available information. With an options-based decision-making matrix, teachers can make

defensive tactical decisions regardless of the scenario they encounter. If they are not in

their classroom, not with their entire class, or any other myriad of possible circumstances,

they can make sound decisions based on the best information available. By educating

teachers to be familiar with defensive tactical decision-making, they have the potential to

be better equipped to react to active shooter events and better protect the students in their

care.

Active shooter events are not a new threat to educational facilities.2 They remain

a consistent threat and have the potential for significant impact.3 Since the 1999

1 George Matthew Snyder, “The Effects of Active Shooter Resilience Training Programs on College

Students’ Perceptions of Personal Safety” (PhD diss., Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA, 2014), 44; Jason Winkle, “Active Shooters in Secondary Schools: The Unique Role of the Physical Educator,” Illinois Journal for Health, Physical Education, Recreation & Dance 63 (April 2009).

2 Traci L. Wike and Mark W. Fraser, “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless,” Aggression and Violent Behavior 14, no. 3 (May 2009): 163, doi: 10.1016/j.avb.2009.01.005.

3 J. Pete Blair and Katherine W. Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013 (Washington, DC: Texas State University and Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, 2014), 21, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study- 2000-2013-1.pdf.

2

Columbine High School shootings, school-based active shooter events have remained in

the public’s awareness as a potential threat.4 Response strategies need to evolve beyond

the basics of lockdowns.5 Run, Hide, Fight provides a firm foundation for the expansion

of an options-based response strategy for school-based active shooter events.

The occurrence of school shootings, while a significant percentage of all active

shooter events, is still very unlikely.6 Schools struggle with balancing cost and time

commitments with the potential risks associated with various threats potentially

impacting school-aged children.7 While balance is always necessary, the detrimental

impact of a school-based active shooter cannot be understated. Beyond the given risk of

injury and death, a potential psychological impact exists to all associated with the event.8

The fear of such events can spread far beyond the intended target. As a vulnerable

population, school-aged children require additional protection from external threats.

Options-based active shooter defensive tactical training for teachers and school

administrators may provide the help they need to remain safe.

Government organizations have worked to advance strategies for school shootings

since the Columbine High School shootings in 1999. The term active shooter came into

the public vernacular in the wake of this tragedy.9 Government-developed active shooter

strategies have historically focused on lockdowns as the primary defense for school

4 Michael E. Buerger and Geoffrey E. Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes,” FBI Law

Enforcement Bulletin, September 2010, https://leb.fbi.gov/2010/september/those-terrible-first-few-minutes- revisiting-active-shooter-protocols-for-schools.

5 Ibid.

6 National Association of School Psychologists and National Association of School Resource Officers, Best Practice Considerations for Schools in Active Shooter and Other Armed Assailant Drills (Bethesda, MD and Hoover, AL: National Association of School Psychologists and National Association of School Resource Officers, 2014), https://nasro.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Best-Practice-Active-Shooter- Drills.pdf.

7 Ibid.

8 Cathy Kennedy-Paine and Franci Crepeau-Hobson, “FBI Study of Active Shooter Incidents: Implications for School Psychologists,” National Association of School Psychologists, Communique 43, no. 1 (2015): 22–23, http:// search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/1785215596/abstract/98531B474D944CBPQ/31.

9 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”

3

shootings.10 Aided by after-action reports (AARs) following the 2012 mass shooting at

the Sandy Hook Elementary School, which left 20 elementary students ages six and seven

dead, adaptive active shooter strategies have now become more prevalent in schools.11

The term lockdown refers to a conventional practice in which teachers isolate

students in their respective classrooms, lock the doors, and attempt to impede any

visibility into the rooms. Lockdowns were designed to address threats from the exterior

of the school grounds.12 In active shooter events, mitigation efforts focused on outside

threats become extremely problematic, as the shooter may have already accessed the

interior of the school. Another strategic limitation is that once committed to an area

perceived as secure, teachers and staff may have limited opportunities to re-evaluate

response and change their actions.

In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsored a policy for

responding to active shooter events called Run, Hide, Fight.13 The adaptive strategy,

funded by the DHS, was developed by the City of Houston.14 The public rollout of the

strategy came on the heels of the 2012 movie-theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado.15 The

10 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Training First Responders and School Officials on Active

Shooter Situations (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, n.d.), accessed November 15, 2016, https:// www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/fact-sheet-training-first-responders_0.pdf.

11 Steve Vogel, Sori Horwitz, and David A. Fahrenthold, “Sandy Hook Elementary Shooting Leaves 28 Dead, Law Enforcement Sources Say,” Washington Post, December 14, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ sandy-hook-elementary-school-shooting-leaves-students-staff-dead/2012/12/14/24334570-461e-11e2- 8e70-e19935 28222d_story.html.

12 Joseph A. Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from (Hartland, WI: ALICE Training Institute, n.d.), 7, accessed November 17, 2016, http://hartlake.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/Origin-Of-Lockdown.pdf.

13 Ready Houston, “RUN. HIDE. FIGHT.® Surviving an Active Shooter Event—English,” YouTube video, 5:55, posted by the City of Houston, July 23, 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VcSwejU2D0.

14 Emily Anne Epstein, “‘Run, Hide, Fight’: Homeland Security Releases Public Service Video on How to Get to Safety and Survive a Mass Shooting,” Mail Online, July 27, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2180041/Run-hide-fight-Homeland-Security-releases-public- service-video-to-safety-survive-mass-shooting.html.

15 Ibid.

4

DHS policy of Run, Hide, Fight has evolved for use by the general public, as well as

those in schools in response to active shooter events.16

The first fundamental principle of the DHS active shooter policy is to evacuate

the affected area. If the first option becomes unavailable, hiding from sight is the next

step. The last option—fight—guides the threatened individuals to confront the shooter in

self-defense.17 Running, hiding and fighting are already natural instincts (akin to “fight or

flight”).18 For this reason, the adaptable and actionable characteristics of Run, Hide, Fight

make it a potential strategy for implementation across a broad spectrum of situations.19

The components of Run, Hide, Fight have had successes and failures both before

and after the official rollout of the strategy. In the AARs of Columbine and Sandy Hook,

numerous examples illustrated these achievements and failures.20 Some who attempted to

escape were shot in the process, while others made it to safety. Of those who hid, some

avoided the shooter entirely while others were executed under their desks.21 Civilians

who directly confronted shooters also had varied outcomes. The 2014 Berrendo Middle

School (New Mexico) shooting concluded when a teacher ordered the shooter to put

16 “Active Shooter Resources,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed September 23, 2016,

https://www. fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-resources.

17 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 4, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet.pdf.

18 Holt Clark, “Run. Hide. Fight.: Effective Public Policy for Individual Safety in Response to Active Shooting Incidents,” McKenzie Institute, July 5, 2014, http://mackenzieinstitute.com/run-hide-fight- effective-public-policy-individual-safety-response-active-shooting-incidents/.

19 Ibid.

20 William H. Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission (Littleton, CO: Columbine Review Commission, 2001), https://schoolshooters.info/sites/default/files/Columbine%20-%20Gover nor’s%20Commission%20Report.pdf; Stephen J. Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012 (Danbury, CT: Office of the State’s Attorney, Judicial District of Danbury: State of Connecticut Division of Criminal Justice, 2013), http://www.ct.gov/csao/lib/csao/Sandy_Hook_Final_Report. pdf; Scott D. Jackson et al., Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission (Hartford, CT: Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 2015), http://www.shac.ct.gov/SHAC_Final_Report_3-6-2015.pdf.

21 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, 29–32.

5

down his weapon.22 On the other hand, one of the victims killed in the 2013 Sparks

Middle School (Nevada) shooting was a teacher who attempted to confront the shooter.23

Run, Hide, Fight has definite benefits that should remain in the creation of a new

model. It is easily remembered, adaptable, and in sync with natural instincts.

Unfortunately, it is so non-specific that someone not typically trained in high-stress

tactical scenarios—teachers and school staff, for example—might have difficulty

implementing the model when faced with multiple and changing variables. For example,

a panicked teacher unfamiliar with movement under fire may inadvertently stray or lead

students into a firing lane. No one-size-fits-all approach addresses the evolving

environment of an active shooter event.24 Additionally, no mechanism is available during

an event to assess the mental state of a shooter rapidly to decide the best course of action.

A mitigation strategy, bolstered by tactical decision-making tools, can provide an element

of structure to an unpredictable situation.

Sophisticated tactical decision-making models and principles can be adapted to

the educational environment to provide better depth and breadth of understanding by

teachers. For example, reciting “I’m up—They see me—I’m down” is a tool used by the

U.S. military to limit exposure time for personnel confronted with a shooting threat.25

The mnemonic can easily be attached to a lesson plan under the Run element to enhance

the capabilities of a civilian population further. “I’m up—They see me—I’m down” is

22 Katherine W. Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015

(Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, 2016), 6, https://www.fbi.gov/filerepository/active shooterincidentsus_2014-2015.pdf.

23 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 42.

24 Laura Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense” in ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, ed. Robin Hattersley (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, 2016), 53, https://kiernan.co/sites/default/files/ASIS%20School%20Safety%20%26%20Security%20Council%2C%20 Active_Shooter_Open%20%282015%29.pdf.

25 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement (Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps, 2011), http:// www.usnavy.vt.edu/Marines/PLC_Junior/Fall_Semester/TACT3019_Intro_to_Fire&Movement_Student_Out line.pdf.

6

just one example of the numerous tactical training methods that can be adapted to equip

teachers and school staff better.26

The research identified many similarities between military and law enforcement

personnel and teachers. Both serve with a level of pride and dedication unique to their

professions. Both commit to the service of others. Moreover, both find themselves

directly responsible for the safety of themselves and those they protect. Adapted from the

United States Department of the ’Army’s “Warrior Ethos: Soldier’s Creed,” the following

Teacher-Warrior Creed illustrates the dedication and commitment that teachers and

school staff take responsibility for every day with the students in their charge.

I am a Teacher.

I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the community and my students.

I will always place my students first.

I will never accept defeat.

I will never quit.

I am disciplined, mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills.

I am an expert and I am a professional.

I stand ready to defend my students against any threat.

I am a guardian of my students.

I am a teacher.

Figure 1. Teacher-Warrior Creed. (Modeled after the Warrior Ethos: Soldier’s Creed.)27

26 Ibid.

27 Adapted from United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2007), 1–10, http://armyrotc.msu.edu/resources/FM3- 21InfantryRifleSQPL.pdf.

7

With strong dedication, commitment to the safety of their students, and a

willingness to succeed, teachers and school staff can better prepare themselves to respond

to threatening events. The Teacher-Warrior Creed solidifies that commitment to success

and survival. Combined with other elements in the research, the Teacher-Warrior Creed

serves to celebrate the selfless service that teachers have provided throughout their entire

existence.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review focuses on how school personnel train and react during

active shooter events. Specifically, it concentrates on the psychological impact of

training, as well as the many versions of Run, Hide, Fight that have evolved from various

sources both governmental and private. It does not address law-enforcement response to

active shooter incidents or the psychology of the shooters. A review of the literature

represents three overarching categories: AARs, the psychological impact of training, and

mitigation strategies.

Immediately following the Sandy Hook report in November 2013, an increased

focus was placed upon school-shooter mitigation strategies.28 The New York Police

Department (NYPD) active shooter study was released shortly after the actual event but

only included events up to December 2012.29 The Blair and Schweit report does include

the Sandy Hook incident in their study.30 Although the Sandy Hook shooting appears in

recent studies, limited literature remains regarding an options-based approach to active

shooter responses and mitigation.

The second main area of consensus in the literature is the need to develop or

expand schools’ emergency operations plans (EOPs) to address active shooter

28 Sedensky, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at

Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012.

29 Raymond W. Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation (New York: New York City Police Department, 2012), iii, http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/Activeshooter.pdf.

30 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 7, 12, 15–17.

8

preparedness adequately.31 Experts agree that school response strategies need to be

expanded to include other options besides lockdown. In the 2010 Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) publication, Those Terrible First Few Minutes: Revisiting Active-

Shooter Protocols for Schools, authors Michael Buerger and Geoffrey Buerger discussed

the foundational benefits of lockdown but also described the many variables where

lockdown is not sufficient.32 The authors described one such variable as, “the most

glaring gap involves non-classroom locations and activities.”33 They went further to

discuss such problematic scenarios as students at recess, in transition from class to class,

and students getting off the bus who they stated may be better served by fleeing the scene

and reconvening at an alternate location versus attempting to lock themselves down.34

One of the takeaways of Sandy Hook is that lockdowns should not be the sole response to

shootings. Experts also agree that an options-based approach needs to be recognized and

applied based on the variables that differentiate one school from another.35 Again,

Buerger and Buerger stated, “An effective response requires school-specific planning and

coordination grounded in local conditions.”36

Ample literature and information provides a sound basis for the proposed topic. A

significant gap in the literature is the lack of specificity when it comes to the needed

types of changes to active shooter preparedness. The majority of the literature reviewed

seems to stop just short of providing that kind of guidance. Specifically, tactical planning

or training is hardly mentioned if at all. The next step of the research is to review what

guidance, if any, was provided to teachers and school administrators immediately

31 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for

Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans (Washington, DC: United States Department of Education, 2013), 57, https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1922-25045- 3850/rems_k_12_guide.pdf.

32 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”

33 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”

34 Ibid.

35 Tracy L. Frazzano and G. Matthew Snyder, “Hybrid Targeted Violence: Challenging Conventional ‘Active Shooter’ Response Strategies,” Homeland Security Affairs X, 2014, http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ docview/1728289935/abstract/1CC4943198E144AEPQ/10.

36 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”

9

following past events. Value and a need for furthering research into the specifics of

advancing defensive tactical decision-making training for teachers still exists.

1. After-Action Reports

The majority of the literature associated with past active-shooter events analyzes

the situations from a law-enforcement response perspective. However, studies show that

in the majority of cases, the shooter is no longer a threat before the arrival of law

enforcement. In a 2014 study on active shooter events in the United States from 2000 to

2013, Blair and Schweit reported that 66.9 percent of the cases they analyzed ended

before the arrival of law enforcement.37 This statistic is valuable in illustrating that the

expectation of law enforcement mitigating the shooter may not be reasonable.

Although few statistical studies regarding historical active shooter events exist,

the few studies that do show consistent statistics across time.38 Researchers from the

NYPD identified 230 quantifiable active shooter events occurring over 279 locations

between 1966 and 2012.39 Of the locations analyzed, 68 happened in schools, which

accounted for approximately 24 percent of the cases.40 The 2014 Blair and Schweit study

also showed that approximately 24 percent of events occurred in educational facilities.41

The total number of school-based shootings equates to 39 out of 160 events.42 Blair and

Schweit report that of 39 school-based events, 27 occurred at K-12 institutions.43 Blair

and Schweit’s findings regarding the percentage of school shootings are consistent with

37 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013,

9.

38 Joel A. Cappelan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter? A Study of Ideological Active Shooter Events in the United States, 1970–2014,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 38, no. 6 (2015): 397, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10. 1080/1057610X.2015.1008341.

39 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 4, 8.

40 Ibid., 8.

41 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 13.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

10

those of a 2012 NYPD report.44 Also, the Blair and Schweit study demonstrates an

overall increase in active shooter events from 2000 to 2013.45 In the first seven years of

the Blair and Schweit study, active shooter events averaged 6.4 per year.46 In the last

seven years of the study, that number increased to 16.4 events per year.47 Given the

statistics, it can be inferred that an increase in school-based shootings is very likely.

2. Psychological Impact of Training

Many school agencies have made changes to how they train their staff and

students to respond to active shooter events. These changes in programming have raised

numerous questions regarding the potential psychological impact of proposed training

styles. The FBI has focused on the role of school psychologists in both pre-event

mitigation and assistance in dealing with the impacts of training.48 The majority of the

literature on the topic agrees that both running and hiding are potentially beneficial

responses to active shooters and those facilities must approach implementation of these

steps strategically.

The research shows two distinct schools of thought regarding training to confront

the shooter physically. Critics of the practice contend it is an unrealistic expectation to

have school-age children confront active shooters.49 Also, they feel the training itself can

have a detrimental impact on the psyches of both teachers and students participating in

44 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation.

45 Ibid., 9.

46 Ibid., 6.

47 Ibid.

48 Kennedy-Paine and Crepeau-Hobson, “FBI Study of Active Shooter Incidents: Implications for School Psychologists,” 22–23.

49 Steve Albrecht, “The Truth behind the Run-Hide-Fight Debate,” Psychology Today, August 25, 2014, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-act-violence/201408/the-truth-behind-the-run-hide-fight- debate.

11

the training.50 The U.S. Department of Education offers that confronting the shooter may

be the only option remaining when all other possibilities have been exhausted.51

Carole Rider’s 2015 doctoral dissertation is a significant empirical study that

analyzes the relationship between training and perceived ability to react to an event.52

The study analyzes teachers in Mississippi and how prepared they felt for responding to

an active shooter based on which training they or policies their district had

implemented.53 The study shows that teachers who have a regular amount of active

shooter training feel far more prepared to respond to an event.54 Although isolated to a

particular region, Rider’s study correlates a positive perception of preparedness with

increased active shooter training.55

Matthew Snyder found results similar to Rider’s in “The Effects of Active

Shooter Resilience Training Programs on College Students’ Perceptions of Personal

Safety.” Snyder found, “the research suggest that active shooter awareness training

programs do positively influence students in a way that better prepares them to identify,

report, react to, and recover from an active shooter incident (see Table 1).”56

Snyder’s research (illustrated in Table 1) again shows an overall increase in the

perception of safety and resilience from active shooter training. While focused on college

students, a correlation can be made based on Snyder’s and Rider’s findings that adult

learners experience a greater sense of preparedness from training.

50 Romeo Vitelli, “Should Students Be Trained to Respond to School Shootings?” Psychology Today,

January 13, 2016, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/media-spotlight/201601/should-students-be- trained-respond-school-shootings.

51 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65–66.

52 Carole Frances Rider, “Teachers’ Perceptions of Their Ability to Respond to an Active Shooter Incident” (PhD diss., University of Southern Mississippi, 2015), 1, http://aquila.usm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067& context=dissertations.

53 Ibid., 9, 108.

54 Rider, “Teachers’ Perceptions of Their Ability to Respond to an Active Shooter Incident,” 142.

55 Ibid., 125.

56 Snyder, “The Effects of Active Shooter Resilience Training Programs on College Students’ Perceptions of Personal Safety,” 73.

12

Table 1. Comparison of Treatment Group’s Safety, Fear, and Resilience Scores57

3. Mitigation Strategies

In 2012, the DHS sponsored a policy for responding to active shooter events

called Run, Hide, Fight. The adaptive strategy, developed with DHS funding by the City

of Houston, came on the heels of the 2012 movie-theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado.58

The DHS’s Run, Hide, Fight has evolved for use by the general public, as well as those in

schools in response to active shooter events.59 The most prevalent iterations of Run,

Hide, Fight are alert lockdown inform counter evacuate (ALICE), which was developed

by Greg Crane with the ALICE Training Institute, and get out, lockout, knockout

(GLOCK), which was prepared by Basim Abu-Hamid.60 Limited literature exists

regarding the evolution of these various mitigation strategies.

57 Source: Ibid.

58 Epstein, “‘Run, Hide, Fight’: Homeland Security Releases Public Service Video on How to Get to Safety and Survive a Mass Shooting.”

59 “Active Shooter Resources.”

60 National School Safety and Security Services, “ALICE & Run-Hide-Fight Training: Teaching Students to Attack Gunmen,” School Security, accessed September 23, 2016, http://www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/alice-training/; “Get Out, Lock Out, Knock Out,” Polk County Itemizer-Observer, April 16, 2013, http://www.polkio. com/news/2013/apr/16/get-out-lock-out-knock-out/; Cody Vance, “Active Shooter Training,” Alice Training Institute, accessed December 8, 2016, https://www.alicetraining.com/about-us/; Brad Bakke, “Surviving an Active Shooter Incident is a Matter of Get Out, Lock Out, Knock Out,” Chemeketa Community College, January 30, 2013, http://blogs.chemeketa.edu/courier/2013/02/15/surviving-an-active- shooter-incident-is-a-matter-of-get-out-lock-out-knock-out/.

Variable

DHS (N=29)

CPPS (N=38)

DHS & CPPS (N=39)

Control Group (N=30)

Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD

Safety 4.793 .4913 4.579 .5987 4.846 .3655 3.467 1.306

Fear 2.207 2.6643 3.026 2.4104 2.128 2.2616 2.0736 .3786

Resilience .6652 .14035 .7218 .11955 .7592 .13364 .6470 .1676

13

The scientific backing behind the development of the Run, Hide, Fight strategy

remains unclear. Despite the lack of available scientific evidence, it is apparent from the

literature review that proposed mitigation strategies are relatively consistent. Most, if not

all of the strategies researched were some form of Run, Hide, Fight. For example, the

United States Air Force (USAF) produced an active shooter guideline in 2012 that

highlighted its mitigation strategy as escape, barricade, or fight.61

ASIS, an international network of security professionals, published a white paper

in 2016 through its School Safety and Security Council. In the article, Laura Spadanuta

interviewed numerous subject matter experts in the field of school security. Of those

interviewed, not all agree on the details of best practices but do agree with the

overarching messages. Kenneth Trump, president of National School Safety and Security

Services, felt that trends in school active shooter strategy changes were too quick to

abandon proven techniques, such as lockdown.62 Amy Klinger, an educational

administration professor at Ashland University (Ohio), viewed the expansion of

mitigation strategies as an enhancement to current techniques.63 A point of continued

contention is the subject of whether to teach K-12 students to fight. Again, Trump

disagrees with the approach.64 Conversely, Linda Watson, a security consultant for

Whirlaway group LLC, supports the notion of when all else fails, it is essential to do

whatever it takes to survive.65

Literature that outlines specific changes for active shooter response in schools is

limited. In 2010, Buerger and Buerger called for further development of flexible

strategies related to school-based active shooter events.66 They contend that active

shooter strategies in schools do not consider the flexibility needed to avoid becoming a

61 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter

(AS) (Washington, DC: United States Air Force, 2012), 6–1, http://static.epublishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/ publication/afttp3-4.6_as/afttp_3-4.6_active_shooter_(20121114).pdf.

62 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 53.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., 55.

65 Ibid.

66 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”

14

victim.67 Many experts have called for the need to advance active shooter strategies for

schools in the wake of the Sandy Hook shooting, but have failed to provide specific

details as to what those changes need to be. The majority of recommendations focus more

on the need for schools to develop thorough emergency-operation plans rather than

specifically detailing how active shooter responses should adjust.68

Literature exists regarding different sources of tactical decision-making tools and

strategies. Department of Defense (DOD) related standard operating procedures and

guidelines are available in an open-source format. For example, the United States Marine

Corps has information regarding tactical movement while under fire.69 Additionally, the

USAF discusses the “warrior mindset” to provide mental clarity in the face of stressful

situations.70 Documents of this type have many components of tactical decision-making.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

The research evaluated the elements of Run, Hide (Lockdown), Fight as response

strategies to active-shooter events in elementary schools. The objective of the study was

to analyze what characteristics of current active-shooter mitigation strategies are

beneficial, what characteristics are not, and what other defensive tactics and tactical

based decision-making tools can be modified and applied to current strategies to enhance

the overall depth and breadth of preparedness. Specifically, the research focused on law

enforcement and military tactics and tactical decision-making that could be taught to

teachers and school staff for use in elementary school settings.

While all aspects surrounding elementary school response to active-shooter events

have significant value, it was important to limit the focus of research to maintain a

manageable scope that could be comprehensively evaluated. Public safety (law

enforcement/fire/emergency medical services (ems)) response was not evaluated, as those

67 Ibid.

68 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 56–58, 63–66.

69 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement.

70 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 1–1.

15

are separate from the actions taken by teachers and school staff. Additionally, these

factors were avoided to not create an inappropriate dependence on the thought that

someone else will solve the issue. Another limitation was the analysis of after-event

mitigation/recovery. The research did not study the reunification process or long-term

implications of an event. Based on the highly complex aspects of the psychology of

shooter/warning signs/indicators of potential threats, this area was excluded from the

research.

With the research being focused on elementary schools, additional limitations of

the research presented themselves. First, the research focused on the training and

preparation of teachers, school administrators, and staff. Training of the students was not

researched. Training elementary students in Run, Hide, Fight is a debated topic and

beyond the scope of the research. Higher education settings were not researched in depth,

based on student age and capability differences, other than to draw similarities and

takeaways that could be applied to lower grade levels. Also, what practices were in place

in individual schools was not researched, as that would create too large of a scope. Based

on the overall research it was assumed that elementary schools fall somewhere into the

broad categories of Run, Hide, Fight and lockdown.

The main information source for Run, Hide, Fight were the Department of

Homeland Security active-shooter documents. The Department of Education provided

Lockdown information. DOD training manuals, as well as law enforcement procedural

documents, provided tactics and tactical decision-making procedures. Literature-based

sources were AARs, such as the Sandy Hook Commission final report, and scholarly

research providing historical data and analysis. Specifically, this research included Blair

and Schweit’s studies of active-shooter events, as well as the 2012 NYPD review.

The type and mode of analysis followed for the research was “policy analysis”

based on Bardach and Patashnik’s Practical Guide to Policy Analysis.71 The specific

steps of the analysis were the following:

71 Eugene Bardach and Eric M. Patashnik, Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to

More Effective Problem Solving, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 2015).

16

 Determine the common characteristics of success or failure for current

mitigation strategies.

 Research what defensive tactics and tactical decision-making tools exist in

other disciplines with a focus on military and law enforcement.

 Analyze what implementation would look like.

 Analyze what barriers exist to implementation and what potential

problems it creates and then attempt to mitigate those issues in advance.

 Create an output tool and recommended implementation plan.

The research output is a tangible training tool providing recommendations for

teachers and school staff to aid them in tactical-based decision-making, preparation, and

response to active-shooter events. Recommendations from the research provide for the

development of a self-guided online module that provides a continuing education style

mode of delivery for ease of access at minimal cost. The foundational education provides

a firm base from which conversations and interactions can occur with local public safety

agencies, such as police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and emergency

management.

Based on the preliminary work conducted on the topic, it was determined that the

project was possible. Enough credible information was available on the topic to draw the

various conclusions and connections to relate the different disciplines (elementary school

teachers and the military). Many research projects have been conducted that analyzed the

myriad variable aspects of active shooter events. None of the studies located described, in

depth, the defensive tactics and tactical decision-making tools to be applied specifically

to these situations by elementary school teachers and staff. The research summarizes the

benefits of Run, Hide, Fight, discusses the complications of the protocol, describes the

defensive tactics and tactical decision-making tools available to assist in minimizing

potential risk, and applies these tools and tactics to the elementary school setting.

17

II. RUN, HIDE, FIGHT

Development of new self-protection strategies was necessary to adapt to the

increasing and changing environment of active shooter events.72 By providing a

memorable and adaptable approach to self-protection, the DHS has provided a potential

solution applicable to a variety of scenarios. Also, the policy provides a starting point

from which to build further programs and plans.73 Run, Hide, Fight is adaptable to a

multitude of situations and functions as a cost-effective foundation from which to

customize individual response and mitigation strategies. This chapter explores the need

for change, researches the three aspects of the protocol, discusses the benefits and

challenges of each practice, and summarizes their efficacy.

A. HISTORY OF SCHOOL SHOOTINGS

School shootings in the United States have occurred as far back as the Pontiac’s

Rebellion on July 26, 1764.74 Since then, the number and severity of events have varied

but remained a consistent threat. In 1999, school based active shooter events hit the main

stage of public awareness with the Columbine High School shootings.75 Since that time,

the mitigation and response strategies for such events have had a different focus and

discussion. Although few statistical studies are available regarding historical active

shooter events, those that do exist show consistent statistics from various eras in time.76

Researchers from the NYPD identified 230 quantifiable active shooter events occurring

over 279 locations between 1966 and 2012.77 Of the locations analyzed, 68 took place in

72 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”

73 “Developing Emergency Operations Plans for Schools,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, 56–58, 63–66, June 2013, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/rems-k-12-guide-508.pdf/view.

74 “History of School Shootings in the United States,” K12 Academics, accessed November 23, 2016, http:// www.k12academics.com/school-shootings/history-school-shootings-united-states#.WDXak3eZP-Y.

75 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”

76 Cappelan, “Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter? A Study of Ideological Active Shooter Events in the United States, 1970–2014,” 397.

77 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 4, 8.

18

schools, which accounted for approximately 24 percent of the cases.78 The 2014 Blair

and Schweit study also shows that approximately 24 percent of events occurred in

educational facilities.79 The total amount of school-based shootings equates to 39 out of

160 events.80 Blair and Schweit report that of the 39 school-based events, 27 occurred at

K-12 institutions.81 Blair and Schweit’s findings regarding the percentage of school

shootings are consistent with those of the 2012 NYPD report. The studies cited show a

consistent proportion of active shooter events occurring in educational settings (Figure

2).82 Also, the Blair and Schweit study demonstrates an overall increase in active shooter

events from 2000 to 2013 (Figure 3).83 In the first seven years of the Blair and Schweit

study, active shooter events averaged 6.4 per year.84 In the last seven years of the study,

that number increased to 16.4 events per year.85 Given the statistics, it can be inferred

that a continuing increase in school-based shootings is very likely.

78 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 8.

79 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 13.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid., 9.

84 Ibid., 6.

85 Ibid.

19

Figure 2. Active Shooter Incidents: Location Categories86

Figure 3. Active Shooter Incidents: Incidents Annually87

86 Source: Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000

and 2013, 6.

87 Source: Ibid., 8.

20

While all school-based shootings are significant, a few have had a direct impact

on the evolution of mitigation strategies. The 1999 Columbine High School shooting

brought the term “active shooter” to the forefront of society’s vocabulary.88 Various

government agencies began discussions regarding what changes needed to be made in the

overall reaction strategy to school-based shootings after Columbine. The majority of

these reviews appeared to be centered on law enforcement’s actions as they relate to

overall response tactics.

B. NEED FOR CHANGE

The shooting at Virginia Tech is a dynamic example of the many elements of

active-shooter events the research evaluated. In April 2007, Seung Hui Cho killed 32

teachers and students.89 Students and staff, to lessen the impact of the situation,

implemented a variety of tactics. In room 211, the teacher saw the shooter in the hallway,

moved back to the classroom, and began to barricade the door with lightweight desks.90

Cho then entered the room, pushing past the desks and killing an Air Force cadet who

had attempted to rush him, and opened fire on the rest of the classroom.91 After leaving

the room and returning, Cho shot everyone in the classroom; those already dead, and

those attempting to play dead, and killed approximately two-thirds of the students in the

class.92

In room 205, students attempted to barricade the door with a large teacher’s

desk.93 Cho fired through the door and hit no one.94 In the end, Cho never gained access

to classroom 205, and no students were shot or killed.95 Abandoning his attempts at room

88 Buerger and Buerger, “Those Terrible First Few Minutes.”

89 “Massacre at Virginia Tech Leaves 32 Dead,” History, April 16, 2007, http://www.history.com/this- day-in-history/massacre-at-virginia-tech-leaves-32-dead.

90 John P. Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 195.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid., 196.

93 Ibid., 195.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

21

205, Cho moved to room 204.96 In room 204, the teacher had placed himself against the

door in an attempt to barricade it and advised his students to exit through a window.97

When Cho attacked room 204, he shot through the door, hitting the teacher, then pushed

his way through the door and killed him.98 After gaining entry, Cho shot everyone who

had not escaped through the window.99 Blair et al. summarize the actions taken and

resulting impacts in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Number of People Shot and Killed at Virginia Tech100

The conditions are as follows:

 “In room 206 where the potential victims took no defensive actions

other than freezing, 92 percent of the people were shot and more

than three-quarters of them died.

96 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press Taylor & Francis

Group, 2013), 195.

97 Ibid., 195–196.

98 Ibid., 196.

99 Ibid.

100 Source: Ibid.

22

 In room 211, where the potential victims attempted unsuccessfully

to barricade the door and Cadet LaPorte attempted to attack the

shooter, everyone was shot and about two-thirds were killed.

 In room 207, no initial defensive action was taken, but the

potential victims successfully barricaded the door to prevent the

shooter from reentering. Here, 85 percent of the people were shot

and 38 percent of those in the classroom died.

 Room 204 performed a denial and then attempted to avoid the

shooter. While the denial was ultimately unsuccessful, it provided

most of the students with time to escape. In this room, 36 percent

of the occupants were shot and 14 percent of those in the

classroom were killed.

 Room 205 successfully denied the shooter access to the room. The

shooter fired through the door, but no one was hit or killed.”101

Blair, a leading researcher in the field of active shooter events, deduced along

with his co-authors from the Virginia Tech research, “The data show a clear pattern that

those who took some form of defensive action at Virginia Tech fared much better than

those who did not. Freezing or playing dead were not good options.”102

Combining these findings with Blair and Martaindale’s previous research on

active shooter events from 2000–2010, the authors of Active Shooter Events and

Response found that “you are not helpless during these events” and “what you do

matters.”103 Blair et al. continued to find other valuable takeaways from the events

studied. Consistent with other professionals in the field, Blair et al. found that “people

need options other than lockdown.”104 Additionally, they found that many active shooter

101 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 196–197.

102 Ibid., 197.

103 Ibid., 198.

104 Ibid.

23

policies were too lengthy and inappropriately attempted to be all encompassing.105 Based

on the extreme variability of these events, long and wordy policies and procedures are

ineffective at addressing every situation. Blair et al. note, “it is simply not possible to

write a policy that will address every possibility.”106 Again, Blair et al. reinforce the idea

that it is necessary to engage in options and be adaptable versus trying to define every

potential variable of every possible situation.

C. RUN AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Escaping danger is one of the most primal actions of the human brain. Fight or

flight is an automated neurologic response either to confront danger directly or flee the

area. The Run, Hide, Fight practice echoes this primal instinct. Many variations of run are

studied, discussed, and practiced: evacuate, evade, and avoid among them. The U.S.

Department of Education provides guidelines for evacuation in the Guide for Developing

High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans. Specifically, the annex speaks to:

 “How to safely move students and visitors to designated assembly

areas from classrooms, outside areas, cafeterias, and other school

locations.

 How to evacuate when the primary evacuation route is unusable.

 How to evacuate students who are not with a teacher or staff

member.

 How to evacuate individuals with disabilities (along with service

animals and assistive devices, e.g., wheelchairs) and others with

access and functional needs, including language, transportation,

and medical needs.”107

105 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 198.

106 Ibid.

107 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 28–29.

24

Specifically, the 2013 guide prioritizes evacuation as the number one priority, as

safely available, to respond to an active shooter in schools. This direction was a departure

from the previously held stance that lockdowns were the preferred default reaction.108

1. Positives of Run

The research provides numerous examples of successful outcomes of Run

implementation. The tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary demonstrated the potential

success of evacuating. Of the survivors, nine of the children had escaped the attacked

rooms.109 AARs from Sandy Hook established that the nine students were able to take

advantage of an opportunity when the shooter stopped firing, while either reloading or

correcting a weapon malfunction, to make an options-based decision to escape.110 Many

of the other survivors were able to escape the school, find safe shelter, and notify

police.111

The 1999 Columbine massacre demonstrated the positive outcomes of running.

The Columbine AAR describes many surviving students who fled the school once the

shooting started. Specifically, many students, teachers, and staff were able to escape

through the cafeteria or upstairs to the second level of the school.112 When the students

witnessed the actions occurring outside, they began to hide under cafeteria tables.113

According to the AAR, teacher Dave Sanders advised students in the cafeteria to flee the

area, potentially saving many lives.114 As the shooting continued at Columbine, students

108 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide

for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 64.

109 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012, 10.

110 Jackson et al., Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission, 12.

111 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012, 11.

112 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, ii.

113 Ibid., 27.

114 Ibid., 27–28.

25

were able to escape as the shooters moved through different areas.115 Again, this example

demonstrated the natural inclination to options-based, nonlinear response strategies.

Another successful case example of evacuation is the 2009 Hampton University

shooting in Hampton, Virginia.116 The Harkness Hall shooting ended due to the quick

thinking of a dormitory manager, who activated the hall’s fire alarm, which in turn,

evacuated the building.117

Despite having limited direct examples of the positives of Run, it could be

concluded that anyone who escaped an active shooter situation was a success. While not

always documented or recorded, the sheer survivability reveals the value of this strategy.

The clear benefit and survivability support the value of evacuation being the number one

response plan.

2. Negatives of Run

Negative examples or characteristics of Run also appear in the research. The

USAF states that all employees should be trained in evacuation procedures and have the

routes pre-identified.118 Unfortunately, pre-existing evacuation plans, whether fire related

or not, can prove to be problematic under active shooter conditions. While training in

advance on these routes has great value for specific scenarios, escapees can find

themselves in a high-risk position if a shooter cuts off routes. In the 2015 document,

Planning and Response to an Active Shooter, the Interagency Security Committee

discusses how pre-established evacuation routes may be inaccessible in an active shooter

115 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, 33.

116 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 31.

117 Ibid.

118 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 5–1.

26

scenario or put people in a higher risk position.119 By recognizing evacuation routes

having specific applicability, (i.e., fire, natural disaster event, etc.), teachers must focus

on the elements of the routes to be navigated versus the routes themselves. When faced

with an active shooter event, teachers and school staff should not lock themselves into a

specific route. They need to stay adaptable and take the route that provides the safest and

timeliest escape.

The AARs of Columbine discuss concern over the contradictions of the practice

of evacuating. Specifically, they discuss the possibility that the students shot while hiding

under tables might equally have met their fate while escaping in the hallway.120 After

directing students to evacuate the cafeteria, potentially saving many lives, Dave Sanders

was shot moving through the hallways attempting to warn others.121 The Columbine

AARs also describe scenarios where students were shot at and wounded as they

attempted to flee.122 Unfortunately, the what-if scenarios confirm the idea that no one

single answer exists to the question.

The Columbine AARs also discuss the plans originally set forth by the shooters,

Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris. In their initial plan, an explosion was intended to kill

those in the immediate vicinity, as well as trigger an evacuation.123 The shooters then

planned to shoot school staff and students as they escaped from the area of the

119 Interagency Security Committee, Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide (Washington, DC: Interagency Security Committee, 2015), 20, https:// www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/isc-planning-response-active-shooter-guide-non-fouo-nov- 2015-508. pdf.

120 Lawrence Fennelly, “Lessons Learned,” in ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, ed. Robin Hattersley (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, 2016), 20, https:// kiernan.co/sites/default/files/ASIS%20School%20Safety%20%26%20Security%20Council%2C%20Active _Shooter_Open%20%282015%29.pdf.

121 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, 29.

122 Ibid., 27.

123 Ibid., 25.

27

explosion.124 Klebold and Harris also staged their vehicles to ensnare escapees in their

crossfire.125

In a white paper compiled by ASIS International, various subject-matter experts

discussed the positives and negatives of different active shooter response strategies.

Specifically, they examine the difficulties of keeping children controlled and quiet along

an evacuation route.126 Moving children becomes increasingly more complicated with the

potential of an active shooter being on the path of an escape route.127 Paul Timm,

president of RETA Security, contends that ample opportunities are available to lockdown

school children in secure locations and minimize the risk exposure of attempting

escape.128 Additionally, a 2014 report provided by the National Association of School

Psychologists, in conjunction with the National Association of School Resource Officers,

titled Best Practice Considerations for Schools in Active Shooter and Other Armed

Assailant Drills describes other negative potentials of escaping an area. Again, it includes

running into a path of danger, but adds exposure to victims, and potentially trampling

each other in an attempt to evacuate.129

Described in Kelly’s 2012 NYPD report, two additional case studies demonstrate

potentially negative characteristics of escape. In August 2010, Thomas Cowan reportedly

asked for the location of the fire alarm at Sullivan Central High School in Blountville,

Tennessee.130 Cowan’s reported intent was to activate the fire alarm to lure students into

hallways as they evacuated to provide targets for him in the firing lanes.131 The second

case in Kelly’s report occurred at Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas.132 In

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid., 26.

126 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 54.

127 Ibid.

128 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 54.

129 National Association of School Psychologists and National Association of School Resource Officers, Best Practice Considerations for Schools in Active Shooter and Other Armed Assailant Drills, 5.

130 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 97.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid., 123.

28

March 1998, two students shot at classmates and teachers after luring them out of the

building by activating the fire alarm.133 These examples enumerate the risks associated

with moving from secure locations into potentially more vulnerable areas. While fire

alarms should not be assumed as false, the examples provided emphasize the value in

teachers and staff not making assumptions about situations. Although teachers will

implement standard evacuation procedures and take pre-determined routes in case of fire

alarm activation, they must maintain heightened situational awareness to avoid being

drawn into a shooting lane.

3. Best Practices of Run

Consistent characteristics in the research relate to the best practices of Run. ASIS

International, a recognized authority in the field of security, provides various collections

of best practices from experts in the active shooter field. The 2016 ASIS School Safety

and Security Council active shooter white paper describes the most recent best practice

compilations. Specifically, they list Run features as:

 “Find a path and attempt to evacuate

 Evacuate whether others agree or not

 Leave your belongings

 Help others Evacuate

 Prevent others from entering

 Call 911”134

The document continues to discuss the untethered approach that evacuation

should take. ASIS advises the need to escape in “any way possible” should the situation

133 Ibid.

134 Jason T. Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” in Active Shooter (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, 2016), 1.

29

allow it, preferably by running.135 The document’s subject matter experts discuss the

value of taking any means necessary, including breaking windows, to create student

escape routes.136 They also recognize the potential that a previously secured area can

become less safe and require the potential victim to escape.137 The Final Report of the

Sandy Hook Advisory Commission also described the potential use of windows for

escape.138 That report goes as far to recommend construction standards for new builds

and remodels.139

The 2012 NYPD report discusses recommendations for evacuating as well. While

the majority of the information is consistent with other sources, one area is contradictory

to the overall consensus of research. Presumably adapted from the 2008 version of DHS

Active Shooter: How to Respond, the NYPD report advises evacuees to “visualize their

entire escape route” before beginning to move.140 As seen in other areas of the research,

this approach becomes problematic if the route previously committed to or visualized

becomes inaccessible or puts the evacuee at a higher risk.

Again, the U.S. Department of Education guide provides thorough

recommendations for escape. Specifically, they list:

 “Leave personal belongings behind;

 Visualize possible escape routes, including physically accessible

routes for students and staff with disabilities as well as persons

with access and functional needs;

 Avoid escalators and elevators;

135 Ibid., 5.

136 Ibid.

137 Ibid.

138 Jackson et al., “Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission,” 54.

139 Ibid.

140 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 3; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 4.

30

 Take others with them, but not to stay behind because others will

not go;

 Call 911 when safe to do so; and

 Let a responsible adult know where they are.”141

Although the directions regarding visualizing routes may seem consistent between

the NYPD report and the Department of Education’s guide, slight variances are evident.

As opposed to the visualization of an entire path (NYPD), the Department of Education

prompts teachers and students to visualize possible escape routes, and emphasize the

importance of options. Additionally, they extend the direction to accommodate the

consideration of what routes are even physically possible based on the capabilities or

restrictions of the population attempting evacuation.142 This direction provides a perfect

balance between planning and reaction. By visualizing different routes, the escapees are

building a system of possibilities should they encounter any inputs requiring them to alter

their plans. The planning aspect also prevents evacuees from running off with no

direction or guidance. Additionally, the flexibility avoids the risk of delaying response

and the potential decrease of adaptive thinking.

4. Summary of Run as a Response Strategy

Statistically, Run is a challenging response strategy to assess. The data suggest

that people putting as much distance as possible between themselves and their attacker

when safely feasible has obvious benefits. From an after-action standpoint, examples of

both positive and negative outcomes resulted when Run was applied. The positives

appear to outweigh the negatives. Based on the information, the position that the U.S.

Department of Education took making evacuate the number one priority in active shooter

141 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65.

142 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65.

31

response makes sense.143 The key, as discussed in subsequent chapters, is to assess the

scenario strategically to determine the appropriate time and details of escaping.

The status quo direction of Run oversimplifies a complex situation. As seen in the

examples, evacuating can have both positive and negative outcomes. As discussed in

greater depth in the following chapters, different tactics and tactical decision-making

tools can be applied to running. It is critical to maintain situational awareness at all times

as teachers move through their school day. For example, teachers and school staff should

be constantly analyzing where the nearest two exits are. They should identify a primary

and secondary option. Additionally, teachers and school staff should work to familiarize

themselves on cover and concealment and should work to make noticing it second nature.

Purposeful, short burst movements, when faced with a nearby threat, can dramatically

decrease casualty rates. Additionally, when a threat is further away, a well-executed

escape can provide distance from the shooter that will likely increase potential survival.

Regardless of distance, if escape is an option, it should always be prioritized.

D. HIDE AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

Schools have historically implemented lockdowns as the primary response to

threatening situations.144 Many schools are now implementing more adaptive strategies,

such as Run, Hide, Fight.145 The Hide portion of the Run, Hide, Fight active shooter

response strategy is the most discussed and implemented. Packaged under terms, such as

lockdown, secure in place, and isolate, hiding is standard amongst many school systems

based on its simplicity, relative advantages, and a level of comfort associated with

familiar surroundings. Lockdown is the most commonly used terminology utilized in

schools related to the practice.146

143 Ibid., 64.

144 National Association of School Psychologists and National Association of School Resource Officers, Best Practice Considerations for Schools in Active Shooter and Other Armed Assailant Drills, 4.

145 Ibid., 1.

146 Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” 3.

32

Terminology makes a significant difference in defining expectations of action.

Hiding is the practice of using concealment to avoid detection by a threat. Lockdown, on

the other hand, describes a system in which physical barriers, locked doors, for example,

are utilized to prevent access from a threat. Secure-in-place, a commonly misused term,

represents a strategy of safely maintaining an area to avoid exposures from outside

threats, usually natural. Although they appear similar on the surface, secure-in-place is a

much more passive strategy intended to last for an extended period. Lockdown, on the

other hand, is a shorter-term strategy, and ideally both active and defensive. Hiding is

similar to lockdown with or without the aid of physical barrier mechanisms.

Lockdown is the most commonly seen active shooter response strategy for

elementary schools. The Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency

Operations Plans, a collaborative government guidance document, describes the purpose

of lockdown as, “to quickly ensure all school staff, students, and visitors are secured in

the rooms away from immediate danger.”147 Despite offering lockdown as an option, the

guide recommends evacuation as the primary mitigation strategy.148

The origin of lockdown is unclear. Some experts trace it to the Los Angeles

Unified School District’s response to riots in the 1960s.149 Lockdown continued as an

appropriate strategy for that same area, which saw an increase in drive-by shootings and

violent threats outside school perimeters.150 It is apparent from the literature that

lockdowns were designed and developed to address threats from the exterior of the

school grounds.151 In active shooter events, it becomes extremely problematic, as the

shooter may have already accessed the interior of the school.

147 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide

for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 29.

148 Ibid., 64: Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from, 7.

149 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from, 6.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid., 7.

33

Modern mitigation strategies challenge the wisdom of lockdown as the primary

strategy in active shooter events.152 However, Kenneth Trump, president of National

School Safety and Security Services, argues that the emotional response following the

Sandy Hook shooting has caused those in the industry to want to move away from a

practice that has proven successful in past scenarios.153 While acknowledging the

benefits of evacuation, the potential safety of lockdown and recognizing that it may be

the only option, critics also demonstrate concern in leaving students defenseless while

simply hiding without the protection of security barriers.154

1. Positives of Hide

The Safe School Initiative Committee (SSIC) report following the Sandy Hook

shooting stated, “The testimony and other evidence presented to the Commission reveals

that there has never been an event in which an active shooter breached a locked

classroom door.”155 This statement demonstrates the significant value of lockdown when

done correctly and with the appropriate factors in place. Implementation of hiding and

lockdown has a litany of success stories. Numerous case studies and AARs describe the

achievements associated with implementing the strategy. For example, in one AAR from

Sandy Hook, staff hid under their desks in the front office of the school, near where the

shooter Adam Lanza first made entry.156 The shooter reportedly entered the office area,

apparently did not see anyone, and moved back into the hallway.157 Throughout the

school, many students successfully hid from the shooter. Students hid in school

restrooms, as well as other areas throughout the school.158

152 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 53.

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid.

155 Jackson et al., “Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission,” 32.

156 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012, 2, 10, 12.

157 Ibid., 2.

158 Ibid., 10, 11.

34

Another positive result occurred in the 1999 shooting at Notus Junior-Senior High

School in Idaho.159 The AAR describes students barricading themselves in classrooms

when they heard shots.160 These actions attributed to the zero casualty count of this

incident.161

2. Negatives of Hide

Unfortunately, examples of hiding have also led to harmful outcomes. Both in

Sandy Hook and Columbine, two of the most significant active shooter events provide

examples of the disadvantages of hiding. In Sandy Hook, the shooter gained access to the

interior of the school.162 In two classrooms, 20 students were murdered (15 and five,

respectively).163 The majority of the victims were all located, hiding, in their

classroom.164 Of the nine students who ran from classroom, 10 survived the event while

the five students and two teachers who remained in the classroom died.165

In 1985, in the Portland, Connecticut shooting at the Portland Junior High School,

the perpetrator walked the halls looking for victims.166 After killing a custodian and

wounding two other staff members, Floyd Warmsley took a student hostage.167

Warmsley then reportedly wandered the halls with the student hostage for 30 minutes.168

159 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 122.

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid.

162 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012.

163 Ibid.; Vogel, Horwitz, and Fahrenthold, “Sandy Hook Elementary Shooting Leaves 28 Dead, Law Enforcement Sources Say.”

164 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012.

165 Ibid.

166 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 138.

167 Ibid.

168 Ibid.

35

The now-infamous Columbine library was an additional example of problems

associated with hiding. Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris entered the school library

approximately 15 minutes into their shooting spree.169 Students in the library had been

directed by staff to hide under the tables when the shooting started.170 In seven and a half

minutes, the two shooters worked through the library, killing 10 students out of the 60

total students and staff, and injuring many others.171 Witnesses reported that the two

shooters seemed to have no exact method as to whom they shot, which they left alone,

and what prompted them to discontinue the slaughter.172 In this case, it is unclear whether

having hidden in the library was overall a successful strategy. However, had students and

staff taken advantage of the 15-minute gap between the start of the shooting and when the

two shooters entered the library, many more might have survived. By applying an

options-based approach, students and staff could have either fled the area to safety or

confront the shooters in an attempt to overwhelm them. Professor Amy Klinger from

Ashland University in Ohio poses this (rhetorical) question: if you know that an event is

taking place at one end of a school, and you are at the other end of the school, why would

you wait to see if the threat reaches you rather than evacuating?173 To address this

scenario, Klinger advocates for options-based approaches to active shooter events in

schools. In the trainings she provides, the emphasis is placed on showing teachers that

multiple options exist to address these threats. The focus of the training is to illustrate that

no single “right way” of doing things exists. Instead, the value is placed on teachers

recognizing the different options available to them.

Structural design challenges to implementing lockdowns in schools do occur.

Experts in the field of school security discuss the issues associated with attempting to

lockdown a classroom that has glass in or around doors or locks if they are not easy to

169 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, ii.

170 Ibid., 29.

171 Ibid., iii.

172 Ibid., 30.

173 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 54.

36

use in an emergency.174 Depending on the configuration, glass can be broken to allow

access to the locking mechanism; teachers may have difficulty in engaging the lock

during stressful times.175 Another significant drawback to lockdown or other similar

linear response strategies is the familiarity of the practice to the shooter. Many times, the

shooter is familiar with the facility and can anticipate the practices associated with threat

response.176

Lockdowns have obvious strategic limitations. Once committed to an area

perceived as secure, opportunities may be limited to reevaluate a response strategy or

make new decisions. To put it bluntly, once a commitment to hiding is made, victims

become “sitting ducks,” at the mercy of chance. Structural integrity and design of the

building and classrooms become significant in their ability to protect occupants from

shooters.177

3. Best Practices of Hide

The SSIC report following Sandy Hook made two critical recommendations to

assist in the implementation of lockdown in K-12 schools. The recommendations are as

follows:

 Recommendation No. 1: “The SSIC Report includes a standard

requiring classroom and other safe-haven areas to have doors that

can be locked from the inside. The Commission cannot emphasize

enough the importance of this recommendation. The testimony and

other evidence presented to the Commission reveals that there has

never been an event in which an active shooter breached a locked

classroom door. Accordingly, the Commission reiterates its

174 Jim McLain, “Buying Time—Realistic Hardening of the Target at the Classroom Door,” in ASIS

International School Safety and Security Council, ed. Robin Hattersley (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International School Safety and Security Council, 2016), 30.

175 Ibid.

176 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from, 4.

177 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from, 6.

37

recommendation that all classrooms in K-12 schools should be

equipped with locked doors that can be locked from the inside by

the classroom teacher or substitute.

 Recommendation No. 2: The Commission also reiterates its

recommendation that all exterior doors in K-12 schools be

equipped with hardware capable of implementing a full perimeter

lockdown.”178

These recommendations provide relatively straightforward changes that

institutions can make to provide for better success in potential lockdown scenarios.

The Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans also

provides a best practices list for implementing both lockdown and shelter-in-place. As

part of the planning process, the guide stipulates that the assessment team should

consider:

 “How to lock all exterior doors, and when it may or may not be

safe to do so.

 How particular classroom and building characteristics (i.e.,

windows, doors) impact possible lockdown courses of action

(COA).

 What to do when a threat materializes inside the school.

 When to use the different variations of a lockdown (e.g., when

outside activities are curtailed, doors are locked, and visitors are

closely monitored, but all other school activities continue as

normal).”179

178 Jackson et al., “Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission,” 32–33.

179 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 29.

38

Unique to the practice of hiding, the guide provides the following list of best

practices: “Students and staff should be trained to hide in a location where the walls

might be thicker and have fewer windows. In addition:

 “Lock the doors;

 Barricade the doors with heavy furniture;

 Close and lock windows and close blinds or cover windows;

 Turn off lights;

 Silence all electronic devices;

 Remain silent;

 Hide along the wall closest to the exit but out of the view from the

hallway (allowing for an ambush of the shooter and for possible

escape if the shooter enters the room);

 Use strategies to silently communicate with first responders if

possible, for example, in rooms with exterior windows make signs

to silently signal law enforcement officers and emergency

responders to indicate the status of the room’s occupants; and

 Remain in place until given an all clear by identifiable law

enforcement officers.”180

Other best practice considerations are to establish plans specifically designed for

those who cannot Hide or evacuate.181 Special populations require special planning

180 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65.

181 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS).

39

considerations. Additionally, plans should include variables, such as teachers not being in

their classroom when a lockdown order is given.182

4. Summary of Hide as a Response Strategy

It is unrealistic to assume or make the correlation that more victims could have

survived if they had approached the situation differently. The outcomes are highly

influenced based on many variables involved. A few of the many variables that impact a

potential victim’s response options and the likelihood of survival include time, distance

from the shooter, exits, and escape routes.

Again, the Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations

Plans provides that evacuation should be the number one priority in response to an active

shooter threat when safely feasible.183 However, the guide also provides best practices

that can significantly increase the likelihood of survival if faced with hiding or locking

down. Takeaways from the research demonstrate that locking down can be successful

when done correctly and with the right supporting factors (door construction, locking

mechanisms, and classroom layouts for example). The key is to delineate the difference

between hiding, lockdown, and sheltering-in-place. Again, no one-size-fits-all approach

exists.

If Hide or Lockdown is determined to be the best option given the scenario, it is

critical that teachers and staff actively pursue self-protection. Practicing passive

lockdown procedures can lull teachers and school staff into a false sense of security.

Asking teachers to put themselves in the high-risk, high-stress mindset, and commit to

aggressive defensive tactics, will change the way staff approach hiding and locking

down. Subsequent chapters go into more depth regarding the tactics and tactical decision-

making tools that can be applied to the situation. Having students sit on the floor and

remain quiet is simply not enough when faced with a real threat. Doors need to be locked

and barricaded. Children need to be hidden. All access paths need to be made as

182 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came from, 7.

183 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans.

40

complicated as possible for the shooter to navigate. In addition, makeshift weapons

should be identified early for deployment as a last resort.

E. FIGHT AS A RESPONSE STRATEGY

The Fight portion of Run, Hide, Fight is the most highly debated element of

mitigation strategy for schools. When dealing with elementary age children, many feel

that it is an unreasonable expectation to ask kids to Fight attackers. Some psychologists

and school administrators challenge the Fight aspect of Run, Hide, Fight,184 arguing that

it is unrealistic and inefficient to confront the shooter physically. Many reasons for this

critique have been stated, such as age, knowledge base, and physical capabilities of the

threatened party. Since all situations reveal themselves differently, and are full of

variables, these factors must be discussed when considering the last phase of the protocol.

Having school-aged children confront the shooter, for example, becomes more

problematic the lower the grade level.185 Additionally, access to weapons or objects

potentially used as weapons remains a factor for consideration. Critics also contend that

even the training can be traumatic to participants.186 Proponents of Fight believe, to the

contrary, that when no other option exists, kids may simply have to Fight.187

When discussing Fight, it is important to recognize that the term has many

variables. Fight is recognized as a primary component of the Fight or Flight response.

This natural instinct prompts the threatened to attack the attacker physically. Another

version is to confront an attacker; approach and attempt to mitigate the situation without

physical engagement. Approaching an attacker has distinct risk factors associated with it

but has proved a successful strategy in some cases, as described in the positive examples

184 Albrecht, “The Truth behind the Run-Hide-Fight Debate.”

185 Kennedy-Paine and Crepeau-Hobson, “FBI Study of Active Shooter Incidents: Implications for School Psychologists,” 22–23.

186 Dan Frosch, “‘Active Shooter’ Drills Spark Raft of Legal Complaints; Critics Say Simulation Exercises Can Traumatize Those Taking Part,” Wall Street Journal, September 4, 2014, http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps. edu/docview/=1559961268/abstract/98531B474D944CBPQ/28.

187 Clark, “Run. Hide. Fight.: Effective Public Policy for Individual Safety in Response to Active Shooting Incidents.”

41

of Fight in this chapter. The ability to adapt to the given situation to determine the

appropriate outcome lends itself to supporting the idea of options-based approaches.

According to a 2014 study reviewing active shooter events from 2000 to 2013,

66.9 percent of events end before police intervention.188 The shooters either were stopped

by a citizen, or otherwise discontinued their attack (fled, committed suicide, or killed by

someone on-scene).189 Breaking it down by school type, the report identified seven of 10

high school shooters being detained by school staff, three held by educators in middle

schools, and three apprehended at elementary schools. The decision to confront

an attacker, either verbally or physically, is extremely situational. Split-second

decisions need to be made that include only available facts at that time. For example,

could the shooter be easily overpowered, do they seem unsure of themselves, are they

reloading, or is a school staff member at a tactically advantageous position to

incapacitate the attacker? Statistically, the following case studies demonstrate that potential victims can directly impact the outcome of the event (Figure 5).190 As Blair et al. stated:

In 39% of the attacks that were stopped before the police arrived, the victims took action to stop the shooter themselves either by physically subduing the attacker (81%) or by shooting him with their own personal weapons (19%). These data clearly show that it is possible to defend yourself successfully in these events even if you are unarmed.191

188 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 9.

189 Ibid.

190 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 197.

191 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 197.

42

Figure 5. Resolution of Active Shooter Events in the United States (2000– 2010)192

More recently, a 2016 study by Schweit reviewing active shooter events in 2014

and 2015 identified six scenarios out of 40 in which citizen intervention ended the

situation.193 Of the six incidents Schweit describes as ending with citizen involvement,

two involved people restraining the shooters after citizens with permitted firearms fired

upon them.194 Two more incidents involved physically restraining shooters until the

arrival of law enforcement.195 The remaining two events were non-physical

confrontations where one shooter complied with an order from a teacher to put the gun

down.196 The other student shooter committed suicide after being confronted by a

teacher.197 The U.S. Department of Education’s Guide for Developing High-Quality

School Emergency Operations Plans describes 16 events, out of 41, in which victims

192 Source: Ibid., 62.

193 Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015, 2.

194 Ibid., 3.

195 Ibid.

196 Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015, 3.

197 Ibid.

43

physically halted an attack before law enforcement’s arrival.198 Of the 16 events

described, in 13 cases, the potential victims physically “subdued” the attacker.199 Blair

and Schweit’s 2014 report described 65 out of 160 incidents in which events ended due to

citizen involvement or suicide, and 21 concluded due to the intervention of unarmed

citizens.200 Specifically, 11 of the 21 events included the engagement of unarmed school

staff, teachers, and students.201

These statistics demonstrate the likelihood that events will end before the arrival

of law enforcement. The examples also point to the reality that many times,

confrontations (both physical and verbal) lead to the end of the threat. The U.S.

Department of Education’s guide admits that although the idea of confronting a shooter

may be difficult to explain and understand, early mitigation of an event may save many

lives.202 Although potentially beneficial, the research again demonstrates both positive

and negative examples of the implementation of Fight (or confrontation).

1. Positives of Fight

The 2004 Columbia High School (New York) shooting ended when school staff

restrained the shooter after he wounded one person.203 After killing one staff member and

wounding two others in 2005, Campbell County Comprehensive High School

(Tennessee) students and administrators subdued the shooter.204 A teacher restrained a

14-year-old shooter at Pine Middle School in Nevada after he wounded two people.205 In

198 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65–66.

199 Ibid., 66.

200 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 11.

201 Ibid.

202 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 66.

203 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 24.

204 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 26.

205 Ibid.

44

2006, at Weston High School (Wisconsin), staff restrained the shooter after he killed one

person.206 Another shooting in 2006 occurred at Memorial Middle School (Missouri)

where staff escorted the shooter out of the building after his rifle jammed.207 School staff

tackled and restrained an adult shooter in 2010 after he opened fire, wounding two, at

Deer Creek Middle School (Colorado).208 Showing high situational awareness,

construction workers near Kelly Elementary School (California) tackled a shooter when

he stopped to reload after he had wounded two in 2010.209 School staff restrained a 2012

Perry High School (Maryland) shooter after he wounded one classmate.210 In 2013, a 16-

year-old student began firing at Taft Union High School in California.211 He stopped

shooting, after wounding two people, when a staff member persuaded him to halt.212 A

non-physical confrontation concluded the 2014 Berrendo Middle School (New Mexico)

after the shooter was ordered to drop his gun by a school staff member.213 The shooter

had already wounded three people but complied with the order. In 1999, Fort Gibson

Middle School (Oklahoma) staff restrained a gunman after wounding four in 1999.214

Also in 1999, Heritage High School (Georgia) staff disarmed a high school shooter.215

Two Heath High School (Kentucky) students persuaded a shooter in 1997 to put down his

gun after he had killed three and wounded five others.216 After a student killed three,

wounded one, and held his class hostage for 10 minutes, a school staff member restrained

a Frontier Middle School (Washington) shooter.217

206 Ibid., 27.

207 Ibid.

208 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 95.

209 Ibid., 99.

210 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 39.

211 Ibid., 41.

212 Ibid.

213 Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015, 6.

214 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 120.

215 Ibid.

216 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 124.

217 Ibid., 127.

45

2. Negatives of Fight

Negative examples of situations when shooters were confronted or fought are not

numerous. In 2013, Sparks Middle School (Nevada) was the scene of an active

shooter.218 According to the 2014 Blair and Schweit report, the 12-year-old student shot a

teacher when the teacher confronted the shooter.219 An international example occurred in

2003 at a school in Bavaria.220 The student shot a teacher who had tried to “wrestle” the

gun away.221 An example previously described as positive had negative outcomes as

well. In 2006 at Weston High School in Wisconsin, a 15-year-old student opened fire; the

gun was “wrestled” away from him by a custodial worker.222 The shooter then pulled out

a second gun and killed the school’s principal with it.223 The Blair and Schweit report

describe that school staff then detained the shooter while they awaited the police

department.224 This example demonstrates the fluidity of these events showing how

difficult they are to mitigate or control.

Critics maintain that teaching elementary age students to Fight is dangerous and

unnecessary both because of physical disadvantage (by age and size), and the potential

trauma of the training outweighing the likelihood of an attack.225 Most of the examples

indeed show teachers and school staff who confronted shooters; no known examples of

elementary school-age students facing down shooters are available. Kenneth Trump,

President of National School Safety and Security Services, thinks the inclusion of counter

or Fight in elementary school student training is a response to the fear induced by the

Sandy Hook Elementary student.226 Trump does not feel it is the “best way” to prepare

218 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and

2013, 42.

219 Ibid.

220 Rider, “Teachers’ Perceptions of Their Ability to Respond to an Active Shooter Incident,” 88.

221 Ibid.

222 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 107.

223 Ibid.

224 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013,” 27.

225 Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” 3.

226 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 53, 55.

46

students for an active shooter event.227 Paul Timm, RETA Security President, agrees that

teaching fighting or confrontation to elementary students “might not be the best

approach” especially if they have other options to them, such as secure classrooms they

can Hide in and lockdown.228 Amy Klinger from Ashland University (Ohio) takes a

different view of the potential setbacks of teaching elementary students to Fight.229 She

points out the enormous potential for pushback and negativity by parents, administrators,

and the community.230 Pushback was the case in Burleson, Texas when students were

trained to Fight would-be shooters.231 After the negative public reaction, the school board

reversed its position and removed that portion from its procedures.232 Klinger also

contends that when teaching Fight, the focus seems to center on that portion and other

options are overlooked.233

The complexities described in teaching elementary age children to Fight

emphasize the value in properly preparing teachers and school staff on defensive tactics

and tactical decision-making. Without the ability to count on the physical swarming of

students attempting to subdue an attacker, elementary school teachers must rely more on

avoidance and evasion. They will have to outsmart and outmaneuver an attacker

whenever possible. Again, when faced with no other option, they will simply have to

employ any tactics available. While physically fighting an attacker may not be a preferred

option, impeding progress by confronting an attacker from a distance may prove

valuable. By maintaining composure in a stressful environment, teachers can outfit and

direct their students to throw objects at attackers if they get through the door of a

227 Ibid., 55.

228 Ibid., 54–55.

229 Ibid., 55.

230 Ibid.

231 Wike and Fraser, “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless,” 165; Mike Von Fremd, “Texas School District Learning to Fight Back against School Gunmen,” ABC News, October 8, 2003, http://abcnews. go.com/GMA/story?id=2580664&page=1.

232 Wike and Fraser, “School Shootings: Making Sense of the Senseless,” 165; Associated Press, “Burleson Changes Stance on Student Attack Training,” Dallas Morning News, October 25, 2006, http://www.dallasnews. com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/102606dnmetburleson.736f1085.html.

233 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 55.

47

classroom. Klinger supports this practice in stating that she does limited training on Fight

that mainly focuses on simple tactics, such as “throwing things and creating

diversions.”234 At that point of an event, anything helps.

3. Best Practices of Fight

The best practices seen through the literature are insufficient when it comes to

fighting. Based on the variables of the situation, combined with the unforeseen actions or

intent of the assailant, instructions are brief. Due to unknown abilities of potential

victims, the instructions also appear to be designed in a “do the best you can” approach.

Experts in the ASIS white paper provide general instructions when faced with an

active shooter. The literature states, “If you do not have the ability to hide, then the last

option is to:

Fight

 Attempt to incapacitate the shooter

 Act with physical aggression

 Improvise weapons

 Commit to your actions”235

As found in the Kelly NYPD report, the 2008 version of the DHS’s Active

Shooter: How to Respond guidance document directs that potential victims “should

attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter.”236 This guidance, however, is

provided only when escape or shelter is not available.237 Specifically, the guide mentions

“throwing objects, using aggressive force and yelling.”238

234 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 55.

235 Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” 2.

236 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 3; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 5.

237 Kelly, Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk Mitigation, 3; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 5.

238 Ibid.

48

The Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans

provides similar guidance. The U.S. Department of Education document states:

If neither running nor hiding is a safe option, as a last resort when confronted by the shooter, adults in immediate danger should consider trying to disrupt or incapacitate the shooter by using aggressive force and items in their environment, such as fire extinguishers, and chairs.239

4. Summary of Fight as a Response Strategy

As previously stated, many disagree with teaching students the Fight portion of

Run, Hide, Fight. Others contend that when all else fails, it may be all they have left.

Most experts do agree that Fight is a potential necessity for teachers to know how to

defend themselves and their students appropriately. The benefit of the training leads to

the promotion of options-based approaches while still adhering to past proven practices.

Linda Watson, a Whirlaway Group LLC security consultant, states, “If you’re in a dire

situation, you need to go into survival mode and do whatever you have to do to have a

chance to live.”240 This message rings true in almost all the guiding documents on the

subject.

Despite Fight typically being labeled as the last option of mitigating an active

shooter event, it may end up being the first option depending on the variables of the

encounter. For example, if a teacher is at the front office when a shooter enters and

begins firing, physical confrontation may be the only option. As demonstrated in the

research, these events are non-linear, and do not yield to linear response strategies.

Situations have resulted in successful outcomes by someone simply attacking the shooter

at the onset of an event, but no formula really exists for the exact situations were attack is

warranted and prioritized. Typically, in these scenarios, instincts simply take over. It may

end well or poorly, but doing nothing never ends well.

As shown through the research, fighting or confronting an active shooter can have

mixed results. No doubt exists that the immediate mitigation of active shooter events by

239 Office of Elementary and Secondary Education and Office of Safe and Healthy Students, Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, 65.

240 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 55.

49

school administrators and others have saved many lives. Other scenarios have shown that

the people attempting to confront the shooter became a victim themselves. It is hard to

assess what would have happened had they not tried to intervene. The mixed responses

when faced with a direct threat indeed speak to the fight or flight mentality that almost

seems to come naturally to the potential victims. Despite concern about teachers and

staff’s willingness to confront a shooter, the research shows that they are willing to face

an active shooter to protect their students. The desire to defend provides excellent support

for enhancing the tactical decision-making capabilities of those entrusted to protect the

youth.

As provided in the Run, Hide, Fight research findings, all three of the elements,

plus lockdown, have definite advantages. Unfortunately, numerous examples of the

protocol elements failing were also provided. Active shooter events are highly complex.

Based on the variability of the events, no one size fits all solution exists. Run, Hide, Fight

provides a solid foundation from which to build off of. The following chapters provide

specific tactics and tactical decision-making tools that can be applied to the foundation of

Run, Hide, Fight by elementary school teachers and staff. The goal of these findings is to

provide specificity to the different elements of Run, Hide, Fight. By linking the practices,

providing details about potential applicability, and training teachers and school staff on

implementation, the goal is to increase the likelihood of survival in these incredibly

challenging events.

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III. MENTAL PREPARATION FOR DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING

Run, Hide, Fight has definite advantages and disadvantages. It is evident from the

research that Run, Hide, Fight, and similar mechanisms, are not linear approaches.241 It is

necessary to be prepared to adapt on the fly and change strategies as different variables

present themselves. By modifying thought processes and overall preparedness, potential

victims have a potentially higher likelihood of survival. Mental preparation, both before

and during an event, is critical in establishing the mindset necessary for survival.

Statistically, the majority of active shooter events end before the arrival of law

enforcement.242 The importance of this statistic is the recognition that regular citizens

will have to make “life and death” decisions and be willing to adapt to all the possibilities

presented.243 In 11 out of 21 incidents described by Blair and Schweit in 2014, “unarmed

principals, teachers, other school staff, and students confronted the shooters to end the

threat.”244 In 2016, in a study of active-shooter incidents in 2014 and 2015, Katherine

Schweit reiterated:

The “active” aspect of the definition inherently implies that both law enforcement personnel and citizens have the potential to affect the outcome of the event based on their responses to the situation. The consistency of these incidents supports the paramount need for training and exercises for law enforcement, other first responders, and citizens alike.245

This chapter analyzes tactical mental preparation techniques to assist teachers and

school staff on how to react when faced with an active shooter threat. Run, Hide, Fight is

considered a best practice for response to active shooter events. Unfortunately, it fails to

241 Spadanuta, “Appendix C: The Best Defense,” 53–56; Interagency Security Committee, Planning

and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide.

242 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013.

243 Ibid., 8.

244 Ibid., 21.

245 Schweit, Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015, 1.

52

recognize the mental preparedness and steps taken in advance of an event that may assist

in increasing the likelihood of survival. By leveraging the advantages available to

teachers and school staff, the goal is to win the challenge and survive. Having the

appropriate mental attitude before and during an event is critical. By reviewing best

practices of mental preparation used by law enforcement and the military, teachers and

school staff can work to create the appropriate mindset and internal defense mechanisms

to increase survival. Teachers and school staff must not prepare for or accept being a

victim. They must prepare themselves for success, survival and accept nothing else.

A. WARRIOR MINDSET

With military personnel, self-defense and protection of their fellow soldiers is

critical. Countless examples are available of heroic efforts made by soldiers to save their

fellow soldiers. Similarly, teachers have proven their willingness to go to extreme

measures to protect their students time and time again. History has shown that the

willingness to protect exists. By providing defensive tactical decision-making skills, the

intent of the research is to outfit teachers with mechanisms to make decisions to support

their willingness to protect. While a warrior mindset may seem foreign in an educational

environment, it is reflected in numerous cases in which teachers have paid the ultimate

sacrifice in attempting to protect their students.

One of the most thorough guidance documents is the USAF Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures manual on active-shooter response and preparedness. Described in the

introduction, the manual “is applicable to all theaters of operation.”246 Not only is it

designed to assist soldiers in war zones, it also works for domestic Air Force personnel

working in offices stateside. Based on this flexibility, it provides excellent guidance that

can be applied to teachers and school staff as well.

One of the first recommendations in the manual is the emphasis to develop a

“warrior mindset.”247 The warrior mindset is a mental state of mind that emphasizes

246 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), iii.

247 Ibid., 1–1.

53

survivability over a flawless procedure. By implementing this mentality, the goal is to

empower and inspire potential victims with the mindset that they WILL survive and will

not let anything get in their way. The Air Force manual describes the warrior mindset as:

1.2.1 Warrior Mindset. The warrior mindset is more important than polished technique.

When faced with an attack, act immediately and escape. Do not let anything get in your way of survival or mission accomplishment.

1.2.1.1 Toughness. The uninhibited mental resolution to aggressively react to illegal violence with a fierce and violent defense.

1.2.1.2 Immediate Response. Respond immediately with the appropriate level of force. Stop the attack and escape or press forward with the mission. A warrior does not wait, as the advantage is the surprise of instant and direct offense.

1.2.1.3 Focus. Stay focused on your goal of survival and mission accomplishment. Be persistent and continue to respond if the first response is not effective. Commit to your goal of survival and let nothing get in your way.248

By training on, promoting, and implementing a warrior mindset, teachers and

school staff have the ability to develop an enhanced level of confidence and comfort in

the situation at hand.

The Air Force manual goes further to provide a multitude of recommendations.

The document describes the necessity that those threatened need to be immediately

focused and conscientious of not hesitating. The value of reacting and not waiting is

stated numerous times throughout the document, and suggests that it can lead to increased

survivability. One of the techniques described to assist in avoiding hesitation is to

overcome the thought that “this could never happen to me.”249 Teachers and school staff

should recognize that it is a possibility at any school in the world. While relative

consistencies in shooter profiles are prevalent to a degree, the factors concerning the

location of the event are extremely variable. These events occur in a broad-spectrum of

248 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter

(AS), 1–1.

249 Ibid., 1–2.

54

location, type, time and socio-economic status. Additionally, as an extension to avoid

hesitation, the manual describes the inappropriate belief potentially shared by airmen and

school staff that someone will respond and mitigate the situation on their behalf.250

Statistically, this belief is shown not to be the reality. Emergency response will occur, but

66.9 percent of events end before the arrival of law enforcement.251

A major component in being prepared to react appropriately in a stressful

situation is to understand what happens physiologically to the body when faced with a

threat. While every individual is different, basic known factors occur to the human body

when confronted with an immediate danger. Controlled by the autonomic nervous

system, the parasympathetic nervous system drives the human body’s “fight or flight”

response.252 This response is an internal self-defense mechanism to enhance survival.253

When the parasympathetic nervous system takes over, the body can take on many

recognizable changes. The Air Force describes these potential physical changes as:

 “Pounding heart

 Muscle tension

 Trembling

 Rapid, shallow breathing

 Dizziness

 Nausea

 Gut wrenching knot

 Sweating

250 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 1–2.

251 Blair and Schweit, A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013, 9.

252 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 1–3.

253 Ibid.

55

 Dry mouth

 Goose bumps

 Tingling sensation in limbs or face

 Insensitive to pain” 254

In addition to physical changes in response to fear, individuals may potentially

experience changes in perception, as well as cognitive or behavioral changes.255 The Air

Force describes “perceptual changes” as, “tunnel vision, heightened visual clarity,

hearing distortion, and time distortion.”256 When faced with an event, teachers may

experience these changes. It is important to recognize their likelihood and work to

embrace their benefits. When faced with stressful events, teachers may find themselves

hyper-aware and attuned to the situation. To the contrary, while these changes can be

utilized in a beneficial fashion, they can also cause detrimental impacts if not recognized

or addressed.

The Air Force lists cognitive or behavioral changes as “automatic behavior.”257

The Air Force describes these changes as instincts taking over during traumatic events.

When applied to elementary school teachers, this change becomes critical. When faced

with traumatic or stressful events, those involved will many times instinctively resort to

whatever they have been thoroughly trained to do. Since teachers are not soldiers,

firefighters, or law enforcement, in training constantly to handle stressful situations, they

must take the initiative to do mental walkthroughs of these types of events. Repetition is

critical in establishing patterns to implement when automaticity takes over.

Resilience is a critical component to responding successfully to an active shooter

threat. The Air Force defines resilience as:

254 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter

(AS), 1–3—1–4.

255 Ibid., 1–4.

256 Ibid.

257 Ibid.

56

The ability to respond, withstand, recover, and/or grow in the face of stressors and changing demands. Resilience does not mean an absence of stress or fear. Resilience during an active shooter incident is about a process of performing under stress, resisting the effects it may have, and then recovering and restoring as needed.258

Resilience recognizes that a potential victim will be scared when faced with a

threat of this type. It acknowledges that individuals’ bodies will react without their

complete control. More importantly, resilience recognizes that despite fear and

physiological changes, potential victims can overcome all these and be successful in their

response.

The Air Force continues to build upon the mental preparation aspect of active

shooter response and reaction. Tactical mental toughness skills are “designed to optimize

performance and enhance resilience.”259 Specifically, the Air Force divides tactical

mental toughness skills into two primary categories, composure and concentration.260

The importance of tactical breathing is emphasized to enhance composure and

concentration.261 Tactical breathing is “a technique employed to consciously control

breathing to overcome or prevent the physical effects of stress.”262 Tactical breathing is

accomplished by “Inhale(ing) through your nose to the count of four seconds, hold your

breath for four seconds, exhale(ing) through your mouth slowly for four seconds, and

hold your breath for four seconds.”263

The tactical breathing technique is also known as “box breathing,” and is common

in both military situations and anxiety mitigation practices.264 Tactical Breathing, the

Warrior Mindset, and Attention Management are the Air Force’s steps described as

258 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 2–1.

259 Ibid., 2–5.

260 Ibid.

261 Ibid.

262 Ibid.

263 Ibid.

264 Mark Divine, Unbeatable Mind: Forge Resiliency and Mental Toughness to Succeed at an Elite Level, 3rd ed. (Scotts Valley, CA: Createspace Independent Publishing, 2015), 50–51.

57

necessary to develop tactical mental toughness skills.265 Attention management is a skill

designed to enhance “internal and external awareness.”266 Attention management is

accomplished by recognizing physiological stress responses and managing the body’s

physical mechanisms to help keep those factors in check, which can be done through

heart rate control, fear or rage response, and thought control.267 Tactical breathing can

assist in overall calming and heart rate reduction. Fear and anger are natural reactions

when threatened. The Air Force does not recommend focusing on eliminating fear or rage

but rather managing those responses to optimize survivability.268 Thought control is an

attempt in clearing “mental static” by pushing out negative thoughts of what could

potentially happen, the feeling of being unprepared, or the lack of recognition of the

situation.269 Instead, the focus should be on recognizing the situation for what it is, not

being in denial, focusing thoughts on what is necessary to survive, and engaging the

warrior mindset to set up for positive outcomes.

Many active shooter advisory documents refer to overall situational awareness to

aid individuals better in surviving an active shooter event. In Active Shooter: How to

Respond, the DHS advises to be cognizant of the surrounding environment and to stay

vigilant to any potential dangers.270 Additionally, the guiding document references the

value in predetermining exit routes in any building entered.271 Ready Marine, a United

States Marine Corps (USMC) website dedicated to personal emergency preparedness for

soldiers and their families, also advises individuals to be aware of their environment and

265 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 2–5.

266 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 2–5.

267 Ibid., 2–6.

268 Ibid.

269 Ibid.

270 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Active Shooter: How to Respond, 41.

271 Ibid.

58

pre-establish potential escape routes.272 Despite the inherent value of pre-determining

potential escape routes, potential victims must not lock themselves into any one specific

plan and should remain flexible in adapting to situations.

When the tactical mental toughness skills are combined, they work by recognizing

stressors and being attentive to keep those stressors in check. Utilizing techniques, such

as refocusing and tactical breathing, overall survivability is enhanced by focusing on

resilience and implementing the warrior mindset to let nothing stand in the way of

accomplishing the ultimate goal of survival.273 Teachers preparing themselves in

establishing a warrior mindset, and practicing those behaviors regularly, can greatly assist

in responding to active shooter events. By recognizing the physical indicators of stress,

teachers and school staff can focus on minimizing the impact of those physiological

changes. Once physical changes are controlled, clarity in attention can be applied to the

situation at hand. The more this approach is practiced, the better prepared the staff will be

when called to task.

B. WILL TO SURVIVE

Similar to the “warrior mindset,” the “will to survive” expands on the foundation

established. Teachers with the warrior mindset can implement the will to survive when

faced with threats. By combining these two mental approaches, teachers and school staff

can establish mental toughness and focus on doing whatever it takes to be successful in

protecting themselves and their students. In Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, the DOD

describes the components of “the will to survive” as:

 “Know your capabilities and limitations.

 Keep a positive attitude.

 Develop a realistic plan.

272 United States Marine Corps, Ready Marine Corps: Active Shooter (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, n.d.), accessed March 15, 2017, http://www.ready.marines.mil/Portals/208/Docs/Factsheets/Terrorism/Active %20Shooter_08272015.pdf.

273 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 2–5.

59

 Anticipate fears.

 Combat psychological stress.

 Recognize and anticipate existing stressors (injury, death, fatigue, illness,

environment, hunger, and isolation).

 Attribute normal reactions to existing stressors (fear, anxiety, guilt,

boredom, depression, and anger).

 Identify signals of distress created by stressors (indecision, withdrawal,

forgetfulness, carelessness, and propensity to make mistakes).”274

In a group setting, similar to those common in school shootings, the DOD

recommends that those involved consistently “reassure and encourage each other”

throughout the event to help promote the “will to survive.”275

The U.S. Department of the Army, in The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad,

describes a similar approach known as “mental stamina.”276 The manual discusses mental

stamina by recognizing that an “individual’s awareness during combat is never complete”

and that “there is no such thing as perfect awareness or understanding of the situation.”277

Furthermore, the Department of the Army states:

Mental stamina is the quality Soldiers must have to combat this uncertainty. Mental stamina provides the ability to assess the situation based on whatever facts are at hand, to intuitively make reasonable assumptions about what is not known, and to make logical decisions based on that information.278

274 Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery (Hampton, VA: Department of Defense, 2007), A–1, https://fas.org/ irp/doddir/army/fm3-50-3.pdf.

275 Ibid., A–2.

276 United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 1–6.

277 Ibid.

278 Ibid.

60

Teachers equipped with “mental stamina” will demonstrate the “will to survive”

through the warrior mindset,” especially well when coupled with the three things the

Department of the Army states that a leader needs:

 “Purpose: the reason to accomplish the mission.

 Direction: the means to accomplish the mission.

 Motivation: the will to accomplish the mission.”279

C. SENSORY INTEGRATION

In Active Shooter Events and Response, Blair et al. identify that “the number one

sign of an active shooter event is gun fire.”280 Based on “normalcy bias,” the “brain will

try to describe unusual events as normal first,” which in many scenarios, is classifying the

sound like firecrackers.281 Blair et al. ask, “how many times have you heard firecrackers

at your place of employment or school?”282 For most, they found the answer is zero.283

Based on the infrequency of actual firecrackers on a school campus, Blair et al. challenge

that it is better to assume the worse, that it is gunfire, and accept potential embarrassment

if it is firecrackers but that lives can potentially be saves by reacting in a timely

fashion.284

In The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter Events,

author Mark Landahl provides recommendations regarding potentially advantageous

sensory response mechanisms. He concludes:

279 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 1–1; United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 1–24; Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, A–1.

280 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 187.

281 Ibid.

282 Ibid.

283 Ibid.

284 Ibid.

61

Finding 1. The survivor response to campus active shooter events is social rather than asocial and includes helping behavior between survivors consistent with research findings in other disaster event types.

Finding 2: Survivors of active shooter events will process environmental cues, social cues, and engage in social interaction to define the situation, gather information and implement and reassess protective behavior choices within a framework that maintains and extends social and organizational roles.

Finding 3: Survivors gather additional information and process environmental cues, social observations, and social interactions to determine protective action behaviors that include taking cover on the floor, running to evacuate, running to shelter, hiding, using available resources to barricade themselves, locking door, turning off lights, and barricading doors.

Finding 4. Survivors show group level interaction for confirmation of environmental cues and processing of additional incident cues that lead to implementation and reassessment of protective actions many times with a division of tasks amongst the group. (Emergent Social Structure).”285

A key takeaway from the Landahl findings is the recognition of two senses that

need to be activated before personal action occurs. The value of the result becomes

critical in the time sensitivity of an active shooter event. If potential victims can

recognize, or assume the worst based on an initial sensory input, they have a much more

rapid recognition time and have a potentially higher likelihood of survival based on the

timesaving factor of not needing secondary sensory confirmation. The finding is

consistent with the Air Force’s emphasis on accepting the situation and not delaying

response.286

285 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 21–31; Mark R. Landahl, “The Socio-Behavioral

Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter Events” (PhD diss., Oklahoma State University, 2015), v, 154–157.

286 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS).

62

Figure 6 illustrates Landahl’s research findings. Based on the illustration, the time

delay to seek secondary sensory confirmation is evident.287 As opposed to moving

directly to “protective actions,” potential victims move to “information gathering

activities.”288 By emphasizing immediate action and assumption of worst-case scenarios,

event mitigation activities can begin immediately with one sensory cue and be

advantageous to potential victims.

287 Mark Landahl, “The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter Events” (presentation, The 9th Annual Homeland Security and Defense Education Summit, Evolving Homeland Security to meet Future Threats/Hazards, September 26, 2015), 17, https://www.chds.us/ed/resources/uploads/2015/12/Summit-2015-Landahl-Socio-Behavioral-Response-of- Survivors-of-Active-Shootings.pdf.

288 Ibid.

63

Figure 6. The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter Events289

Actual attacks bear out this fact. One Sandy Hook shooting report described two

school administrators who were killed when they went to investigate the sound of shots

fired, and a staff member who ran towards a “loud crashing noise.”290 After seeing bullet

holes and smelling gunpowder, the employee recognized the situation and retreated to an

area of safety to notify authorities.291 A Columbine review also describes a scenario in

289 Source: Ibid.; Landahl, “The Socio-Behavioral Response of Survivors to Campus Active Shooter

Events,” PhD diss., 155.

290 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012, 11.

291 Sedensky III, Report of the State’s Attorney for the Judicial District of Danbury on the Shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School and 36 Yogananda Street, Newtown, Connecticut on December 14, 2012, 11.

64

which a teacher responded to the sounds of a “commotion” outside the building.292 After

looking out an exterior opening, the staff member and student were injured by debris

resulting from a shot fired at the doors they were looking out.293

The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) also recommends not hesitating when

faced with potential danger. The ISC recognizes, “During an active shooter incident,

those present will rarely have all of the information they need to make a fully-informed

decision about applying the Run, Hide, Fight options.”294

The ISC describes a 2005 report from the National Institute of Standards and

Technology (NIST) that found that those individuals located closest to the floors

impacted by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks “waited longer” to respond to the

threat by evacuating than those further away from the immediate impact.295 It is unclear

exactly what factors drove the evacuation differences. The ISC also discusses the

differing levels of severity of the response of potential victims during the Virginia Tech

shooting.296 These examples once again demonstrate the consequences of a delayed

response to an immediate threat. To mitigate this threat, the ISC recommends that entities

“Train staff to overcome denial and to respond immediately. For example, train staff to

recognize the sounds of danger, act, and forcefully communicate the danger and

necessary action (e.g., ‘Gun! Get out!’).”297

The Active Shooter White Paper compiled by ASIS provides some basic

information outlining the necessity and feasibility of options-based approaches to active

shooter events in schools. One of the first messages is that no one-size-fits-all approach

292 Erickson, The Report of Governor Bill Owens’: Columbine Review Commission, 28.

293 Ibid.

294 Interagency Security Committee, Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide, 18.

295 Ibid.; National Institute of Standards and Technology, Final Report on the Collapse of the World Trade Center Towers (Washington, DC: Department of Commerce, 2005), http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf. cfm?pub_id=909017159.

296 Interagency Security Committee, Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide, 18.

297 Ibid., 19.

65

exists and that all of the current programs have value since their intent is to help save

lives.298 This approach is consistent with the something is better than nothing philosophy.

Additionally, the paper describes the nonlinear nature of Run, Hide, Fight.299 Based on

the incredible variability of active-shooter events, it is not possible to know which option

will be the best at a given time. The white paper also goes on to describe the benefits

teachers’ gain from being highly familiar with their surroundings.300 Since teachers have

the potential to spend more time in the buildings than a shooter may have, they have a

distinct advantage provided they pay attention to their surroundings before an incident.301

D. JOHN BOYD’S OODA LOOP

In the late 1970s, John Boyd, a fighter jet pilot, invented a tactical decision-

making tool that would come to be known as Boyd’s OODA Loop.302 In Boyd: The

Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, author Robert Coram describes the Boyd

OODA cycle in detail. OODA stands for observe, orient, decide, act.303 In its original

form, Boyd’s OODA Loop is a highly complex feedback-based decision-making tool.

(Figure 7) The most recent version illustrated as a simplified feedback loop is directly

applicable to active-shooter responses. (Figure 8) In its simplified form, Coram describes

the loop as “seen as a simple one-dimensional cycle, where one observes what the enemy

is doing, becomes oriented to the enemy action, makes a decision and then takes an

action.”304

298 Destein, “Introduction to Active Shooter Programs,” 1.

299 Ibid., 2.

300 Ibid., 7.

301 Ibid.

302 Joe Firestone, “The OODA Loop and Double-Loop Learning,” All Life Is Problem Solving, June 16, 2008, http://kmci.org/alllifeisproblemsolving/archives/the-ooda-loop-and-double-loop-learning/.

303 Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Boston: Little, Brown, 2002).

304 Ibid., 334.

66

Figure 7. Boyd’s OODA Loop305

Figure 8. The Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act Loop306

305 Source: Firestone, “The OODA Loop and Double-Loop Learning.”

306 Source: United States Marine Corps, Intelligence Operations (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 2003), 2–1, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/mcwp2-1.pdf.

67

Boyd’s intent was to emphasize that fighter pilots must stay ahead of their enemy

and “must operate inside his adversary’s time scale.”307 Coram describes the value of the

Boyd OODA Loop as:

Generating a rapidly changing environment—that is, engaging in activity that is so quick it is disorienting and appears uncertain or ambiguous to the enemy—inhibits the adversary’s ability to adapt and causes confusion and disorder that, in turn, causes an adversary to overreact or underreact.308

Applying this type of approach to an active shooter event in a school provides a

tactical advantage to teachers and school staff. Although teachers and school staff have

an inherent advantage of working in the threat environment regularly, they must assume

that potential attackers will have intimate knowledge of the school layout and active

shooter procedures. Attackers familiar with the school design and expected actions give

them a distinct advantage over their intended victims. If the staff can operate within their

attackers’ timeline and alter any expected actions, they sway the advantage their

direction.

The adversaries’ timescale can be described as the internal mental process

conducted by the enemy. For example, “I am going to shoot out the front door so I can

get past the locking devices. Then I am going to search the offices to find any staff or

students there. After that I will work my way down the main hallway checking all of the

doors, shooting anyone that I come across until someone stops me, but they won’t take

me alive.”

The event or attacker’s timeline, on the other hand, can be described as the

external viewpoint of the timing of the events. For example, the shooter entered the main

entry by shooting through the glass door. After that, the shooter shot everyone in the

entrance area. The shooter then moved to the administration offices. After that, the

shooter started into the hallways.

Combining timescale and timeline opportunities to establish tactical advantage

exist. Using the example previously described, a teacher can find areas to advance in the

307 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 327.

308 Ibid., 328.

68

timeline while operating in the adversaries’ timescale. In this case, teacher x hears what

sounds like gunshots. Teacher x stops teaching and peaks out of door to see what is

happening. Teacher x is now behind in the timeline, as the shooter has already killed

everyone in the main entry and is working toward the offices. Even worse, if teacher x

walks toward the main entry or chats with other teachers trying to determine what is

going on, they have now fallen further behind. Now, the shooter is moving into the main

hallway where the teacher is located and has implemented no defensive tactics. The

teacher never became immersed in the adversaries’ timescale and found opportunities to

get ahead in the attack timeline. Therefore, no tactical advantage was made.

Teacher y, on the other hand, became familiar with defensive tactics and tactical

decision-making tools. Teacher y has already identified the two nearest exits (one

primary, one secondary). Teacher y is already tied at the frontend of the timeline before

the attack occurs. (The only reason teacher y is not ahead is that the attackers know they

are about to attack). Teacher y now hears the same gunshots as teacher x.

 Teacher y immediately isolates the direction of the shots as being toward

the main entry. (Gaining advantage).

 Primary exit is now out of play, secondary needs to be implemented.

(Losing advantage).

 Without hesitating, teacher y orders the students to leave everything, go to

the window, and start going outside. (Gaining advantage).

 Teacher y locks the door then follows the students out. (Gaining

advantage).

Teacher y has already become immersed in the adversaries’ timescale and is

assuming that if attackers are shooting in the front office, it is only a matter of time

before they come down the hallways. Thus, instead of delaying, teacher y works to

advance a timeline advantage. If teacher y is wrong, the students can always be brought

back in and breathe a sigh of relief, but they are alive. Teacher x is not. Nor are any of

those students.

69

In the military, applicability of the loop speed is the main takeaway from the

lesson.309 Coram emphasizes this point, and writes that having a full understanding of the

complexities of Boyd’s original matrix is not as valuable as recognizing, “the need to

execute the cycle in such a fashion as to get inside the mind and the decision cycle of an

adversary. The unpredictability is crucial to the success of the OODA Loop.”310

When teachers and staff encounter an active shooter event, it is critical that they

do not slow the OODA Loop once begun but rather accelerate it to keep the advantage

over their adversary.311 Boyd advises that to stay ahead of the enemy’s tempo potential,

victims must take the “least-expected action” versus the known or “most-effective

action.”312 A USMC intelligence manual describes tempo as “keep(ing) the enemy off

balance, thereby increasing his friction. Speed, initiative, and flexibility generate and

maintain a tempo that the enemy cannot match.”313

As previously discussed, if a perpetrator has knowledge of layouts or procedures,

they can predict the “most effective action” that teachers and staff may be inclined to

take.314 By implementing the “least expected action,” the decision maker can impact the

effectiveness of the attacker. Coram states:

To take the least-expected action disorients the enemy. It causes him to pause, to wonder, to question. This means that as a commander compresses his own time, he causes time to be stretched out for his opponent. The enemy falls farther and farther behind in making relevant decisions. It hastens the unraveling process.315

A relevant example of the expected is the recommendation of many active shooter

guidance documents to post emergency evacuation routes in all classrooms. While

applicable to fire scenarios, it may provide a higher-risk situation for those threatened by

309 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 334.

310 Ibid., 335.

311 Ibid., 338.

312 Ibid., 336.

313 United States Marine Corps, Intelligence Operations, 1–2.

314 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 336.

315 Ibid.

70

an active shooter. If the attacker is familiar with the evacuation routes, this person is then

knowledgeable of the expected action. By following the posted evacuation route, teachers

and students may walk directly into the shooters’ firing lanes. According to the USMC

manual on intelligence operations, “The OODA loop applies to any two-sided conflict,

whether combatants are individuals or large military formations. When engaged in

conflict, participants—

 Observe. Take in information about the environment, the friendly

status, and the threat.

 Orient. Make estimates, assumptions, analyses, and judgments

about the situation to create a cohesive mental image.

 Decide. Determine what needs to be done, whether it is an

immediate reaction or a deliberate plan.

 Act. Put the decision into action.”316

In the previous example, numerous “expected” actions are possible. The most

likely action of the enemy is that of the shooter working through the entry and killing

while proceeding. People are placed at greater risk when left behind while the shooter

advances. The teacher’s “expected” actions would be to delay reaction. Peer into the

hallway or even walk toward the shooting to determine what is happening. If shooting is

determined, the next expected action is for the teacher to lock the classroom door, turn

off the lights, and have the students remain quiet. In this example, the shooter has time to

move forward and attempt to access the classrooms. Teacher y’s actions can be described

as least expected.

 There was no delay (unexpected).

 The door was locked (expected) but a rapidly deployed impediment for

shooter advancement.

316 United States Marine Corps, Intelligence Operations, 2–1.

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 Then teacher y took the students out the window and away from the

school to a nearby neighborhood (unexpected).

If a teacher has the acumen to recognize the pattern of development of the

event at hand, through observation and orientation, it is then possible to stay ahead

of the attacker’s decisions and actions by implementing an action that is “least-

expected” versus “most-effective.”317 Additionally, teachers and staff can rapidly

estimate an “enemy most likely course of action.”318 By quickly determining what the

enemy most likely will do next, potential victims can stay ahead of the enemy’s tempo.

E. DEFEND YOUR SECTOR—AIR FORCE

The USAF embraces an active shooter response philosophy known as “Defend

Your Sector.”319 The phrase “simply implies the actions taken during the fight to protect

yourself and others in the area where you have barricaded.”320 If teacher and school staff

opt to fortify themselves and their students in a location, “Defend Your Sector” implies

that they use multiple mechanisms to protect themselves and others actively.

Actively attempting to barricade and impede the shooter’s advantage has the

potential of increasing survivability. Fortifying describes the action of securing the room

from entry to include such things as locking the door and pushing a large desk in front of

it. Impeding shooter advancement, on the other hand, may not prevent entry or

movement, but will slow or disorient the attacker. Examples of impediments include a

stack of chairs at the door or multiple small desks. If the decision is made to remain in the

classroom, teachers and students should Hide “in a place that reduces observation from

the shooter, but allows you to react if you must defend your sector.”321 If these efforts to

317 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, 336.

318 United States Marine Corps, Rifle Squad Tactics B2F2837 Student Handout (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 2015), 13, http://www.trngcmd.marines.mil/Portals/207/Docs/TBS/B2F2837%20Rifle%20 Squad%20Tactics.pdf?ver=2015-05-27-100939-710.

319 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS).

320 Ibid., 6–3.

321 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 6–3.

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fortify fail, the items put in the attacker’s way, combined with a strategic hiding location,

will provide the tactical advantage needed if fighting is a necessity.

F. STRESS EXPOSURE TRAINING AND THE DIRT DIVE

In 1998, Cannon-Bowers and Salas discovered the value of recognizing expected

stressors to prepare better to respond in times of stress. The resulting book reported the

findings of a research project conducted by the Office of Naval Research. The intent of

the TADMUS (tactical decision making under stress) project “was to develop training,

simulation, decision support, and display principles that would help to mitigate the

impact of stress on decision-making.”322 In Making Decisions under Stress: Implications

for Individual and Team Training, the authors found, “the following characteristics,

which can be defined as stressors, all appear to be present in the operational environment:

 Multiple information sources

 Incomplete, conflicting information

 Rapidly changing, evolving scenarios

 Requirement for team coordination

 Adverse physical conditions

 Performance pressure

 Time pressure

 High work/information load

 Auditory overload/interference

322 Janis A. Cannon-Bowers and Eduardo Salas, Making Decisions under Stress: Implications for Individual and Team Training (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1998), http://www.apa.org/pubs/books/ 4318761.aspx.

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 Threat” 323

Describing SET (Stress Exposure Training), Cannon-Bowers and Salas stated:

It rests on the notion that that when people have accurate expectations regarding what to expect in the stress environment, have confidence in their ability to cope with such stressors, and have an opportunity to practice dealing with the stress so that appropriate skills can be developed, maximal performance can be expected.324

While reality-based training has been both celebrated and criticized by subject

matter experts, stress-based training is possible without the implementation of an actual

drill. Although potentially not as effective, teachers and school staff can perform mental

exercises to prepare themselves for stress exposure better. By doing “dry run” mental

walkthroughs of “if-then” scenarios, teachers and staff can prepare themselves for the

multitude of variables that may be present during an active-shooter event. The Navy

Seals refer to this practice as a “dirt dive.”325 It is rehearsing a detailed mental “walk

through” of an intended mission. Former Navy Seal and author Mark Divine points out,

“When you visualize the mission your body and subconscious mind gain valuable, yet

subtle, physiological and psychological cues. These insights prove to be invaluable keys

for success when you act on your plan to accomplish the mission.”326

G. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

The U.S. Coast Guard defines situational awareness as, “the ability to identify,

process, and comprehend the critical elements of information about what is happening to

the team with regards to the mission. More simply, it’s knowing what is going on around

you.”327

323 Cannon-Bowers and Salas, Making Decisions under Stress: Implications for Individual and Team Training, 19.

324 Ibid., 30.

325 Mark Divine, “SEALFIT—4 Tactics for Success,” Navy SEALs, January 24, 2014, https://navyseals.com/ 3837/sealfit-4-tactics-success/.

326 Ibid.

327 United States Coast Guard, Team Coordination Training Student Guide (Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard, 1998), 5–1, https://www.uscg.mil/auxiliary/training/tct/chap5.pdf.

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Situational awareness is one of the essential elements of human intelligence.

Intelligence has a direct and immediate relationship to operations or defensive decision-

making. The U.S. Marine Corps states, “Intelligence drives operations by shaping the

planning and execution of operations. It provides a menu of factors that the commander

considers when making a decision. Specifically, intelligence

 Identifies potential advantages offered by the environment.

 Describes limitations imposed by the environment.

 Ascertains and assesses enemy strengths to be avoided.

 Uncovers enemy critical vulnerabilities that can be exploited.

 Recommends COAs based on factors of the battle space and threat.

 Enables rapid decision-making and generating and maintaining tempo.”328

Situational awareness is a continuous process. It begins the moment teachers

wake up and are aware of personal well-being. As they pull into the school parking lot,

they are aware of things that look out of place. As they approach the school, and

subsequently, their classroom, they recognize areas of potential concern, areas of refuge,

and routes of safety. In class, they identify the nearest exits. They identify different items

for barricading the door of their classroom. They know how the doors lock. They know

the quickest way out of the building and multiple backup routes. They recognize tools for

diversions, decoys, and weapons. They also know their students. They know their

capabilities and know they will do everything in their power to protect them.

Former Navy Seal and SEAL Survival Guide author Cade Courtley states:

When you’re going to a mall or market, or even during your first days of class at a new school, make a mental note of exits. Have at least three options, preferably in three different directions. This could be as obvious as a double-door entry or as desperate as a second-floor window with a ten-foot drop onto pavement. Second, observe the whereabouts of any large items or objects that seem sturdy enough to provide cover, if needed,

328 United States Marine Corps, Intelligence Operations, 1–5.

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and file this information. In some malls, for example, there may be a lounge area with furniture, or sculptures, or columns that are placed at regular intervals. In a school, are the desks bolted to the floor? Do the windows open? Filled bookshelves in a library or the cooking and dishwashing equipment in a cafeteria will provide very good cover.329

Cade’s soft target Situational Awareness Checklist states:

 “Find your exits.

 Locate places or objects that could serve as your nearest cover.

 Observe individuals who are dressed strangely, acting abnormally,

or carrying something suspicious.

 Trust your gut.”330

Put more succinctly, “situational awareness: exits, cover, people.”331 Teachers

and school staff have a constantly evaluative situational awareness cycle. As they move

throughout the school, and throughout their day, they should constantly be evaluating the

what if scenarios and determining potential “exits, cover, and people.”332

Commitment to a winning mindset can be a critical component in the potential

survival of a threatening event. A lot of research has been conducted on handling

stressful situations and the impact of stress on decision-making. Teachers and school

staff, while not frequently faced with situations of this type, must actively engage in

practicing the principles of functioning in stressful environments at regular intervals. It

does not cost money to practice and perfect situational awareness, mindset preparation,

and a willingness to succeed.

329 Cade Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook) (New York: Gallery Books, 2012), Kindle edition, loc. 141–142, https://www.amazon.com/SEAL- Survival-Guide-Shooter-Med icine-ebook/dp/B01H0IOZKA/ref=sr_1_9?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1500398420&sr=1- 9&keywords=seal+ survival+active+shooter.

330 Ibid., loc. 154–157.

331 Ibid., loc. 141.

332 Ibid.

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IV. DEFENSIVE TACTICS AND TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING

In the 2013 Active Shooter Events and Response, Blair et al. quantified the

casualty rate of active-shooter events as “Casualties = f(rate of suitable target

location*response time)”333 The research identified the casualty rate of the events as a

function of two things:

(1) the amount of time that the shooter has to perform the attack

(2) the rate at which the offender can find suitable targets to shoot334

More importantly, the research concluded, “that many times the attack stopped

because the potential victims took action to stop the shooter directly or made it difficult

for the shooter to find targets.”335 These findings are conducive to the research in

emphasizing that potential victims attempt to make themselves “hard targets” versus “soft

targets.” As simple as it may seem, being harder to hurt has dramatic increases in

survivability. Becoming a hard target begins with ongoing situational awareness and a

willingness to succeed as previously discussed. The following tactical techniques help to

maintain the protection as the situation develops.

Regardless of having the appropriate tactical mindset, if a teacher does not know

how to navigate a threatening environment physically, the likelihood of survival falls. By

combining the tactical mindset with task level tactical skills, teachers and school staff

give themselves a distinct tactical advantage when faced with threats. The following

chapter provides detailed tactical practices utilized by military and law enforcement

personnel. These practices are intended to decrease risk in a high-risk environment,

increase the likelihood of survivability, and provide a tactical advantage to those

threatened.

333 Blair et al., Active Shooter Events and Response, 174.

334 Ibid.

335 Ibid.

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A. COVER VERSUS CONCEALMENT

A major military delineation describes the difference between cover and

concealment. When hiding from or attempting to escape from an active shooter threat, it

is important for those threatened to recognize the difference as well. According to the

USAF, “cover is an object that can protect against weapons fire.”336 Concealment, on

the other hand, is an object that “only provides [protection] against visual detection

from the enemy.”337 When teachers or school staff attempt to Hide or lead themselves

and students to a safe area, it is important to recognize the difference between cover

and concealment. As they move through a zone, concealment locations may need to

be a temporary solution if shooting is occurring. According to the ISC, ballistic

protection “cover” includes such things as:

 “thick walls made of steel,

 cinder block, or brick and mortar;

 solid doors with locks;

 and areas with minimal glass and interior windows”338

If cover is an option, it is preferred, as it provides both concealment and ballistic

protection.339 Granted, an option may not exist to choose between the two; if so, cover

should be prioritized (Figure 9). Courtley states, “Whatever you choose as cover or

concealment, avoid bunching up with too many people. In these circumstances, people

huddled together will create a larger and more attractive target; a single bullet can

penetrate several people.”340

336 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 5–2, 6–3.

337 Ibid.

338 Interagency Security Committee, Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide, 7.

339 Ibid.

340 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 201.

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Figure 9. Cover versus Concealment341

B. ANTI-SNIPER MOVEMENT

Following the July 7, 2016 sniper attack that killed five police officers in Dallas,

Texas, the Scottsdale Police Department (SPD) in Arizona provided anti-sniper

awareness to city staff.342 During the presentation, the SPD snipers provided lessons

learned from a variety of sniper attacks. A valuable takeaway from the training was the

value of individual movement. While most school-based active-shooter scenarios are not

sniper events, the lessons still provide value to anyone attacked. Personnel were advised

to move perpendicularly to the shooter; doing so increases the amount of ground covered

from left to right or right to left. Increasing the amount of distance covered in a shorter

amount of time decreases the shooter’s ability to acquire targets quickly. By running

straight away from a shooter (without concealment or cover) the shooter has straight line

target acquisition ability.343 Moving at an angle away from the shooter narrows the

amount of lateral distance covered and makes target acquisition easier.344 While value is

341 Source: Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook),

loc. 206.

342 Faith Karimi, Catherine E. Shoichet, and Ralph Ellis, “Dallas Shooting: 5 Officers Die, Suspect ID’d,” CNN, July 9, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/08/us/philando-castile-alton-sterling- protests/index.html.

343 Dan Greene, Anti-Sniper Awareness (Scottsdale, AZ: Scottsdale Police Department, n.d.).

344 Greene, Anti-Sniper Awareness.

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obvious in providing the most distance possible between the potential victim and the

threat, it is important to provide as much tactical advantage to the threatened as possible.

Distance should be established as soon as possible when cover or concealment are

available. The U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group provides direction for

combatants under enemy fire. Many of the suggestions can apply to any scenario when

gunfire is a threat. Regarding movement while under fire, the guide emphasizes the value

of not setting patterns. Similar to the OODA philosophy of doing the unexpected,

movement is trackable once patterns occur. The guide also highlights the use of shadows,

cover, and concealment.345 When unable to utilize cover and concealment to mask

movement, the guide recommends “keeping in constant motion,” and “moving in ‘S’ or

‘W’ paths.”346

In Survival, Evasion and Recovery, the DOD states the following when moving

through urban environments:

 “Look for and move to ‘friendly’ controlled location or stronghold

point.

 Head to concealment to break visual contact.

 If seen, change direction radically.

 Use caution when passing windows and doors; try to avoid.”347

C. I’M UP, THEY SEE ME, I’M DOWN

The mnemonic “I’m Up, They See Me, I’m Down” is the preferred USMC

schema for movement under fire.348 The time required to recite this mnemonic when

moving from cover or concealment to other cover or concealment matches the time

345 U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Sniper Awareness and Counter-Sniper Tips (Fort George

G. Meade, MD: U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2007), 1.

346 Ibid.

347 Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery, I–5.

348 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.

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needed for target acquisition by a sniper. The tactic starts upon deciding to move from

one area to another, in an active shooting lane. Upon moving, the next step is to recite,

“I’m up, they see me, I’m down” in a regular speech cadence.349 By the time the end of

“I’m down” is reached, people should be under new cover or concealment. Not only is a

tactical advantage provided by decreasing target acquisition time, but it also assists in

pre-planning movements by comparing the amount of time needed to move from one area

to another. While this detail can vary based on the type of weapon used (single shot

versus semi-automatic or automatic), the saying provides basic guidance again by

increasing the tactical advantage of those threatened.

D. KILL ZONES

According to author Cade Courtley, surviving the first 10 seconds of an attack can

greatly increase overall chances for survival.350 According to Courtley, the three typical

reactions to an immediate threat are to “fight, flight or freeze.”351 He suggests a

technique called “get off the X.”352 Courtley emphasizes that potential victims must not

freeze or “burrow in.”353 The “X” or “kill zone” refers to the shooter’s immediate

vicinity where most damage occurs (Figure 10).354 By immediately providing as much

distance as possible from the “kill zone” in the first few seconds of an attack, and angling

away from the shooter’s primary focus, the chances of survival increase dramatically.355

Courtley points out that a typical response from people to an immediate threat is to hit the

ground and cover their heads; while this action may be automatic for some, it places

potential victims at a higher risk if they do not continue to move.356 This advice is

consistent with the U.S. Army’s emphasis that potential victims “keep moving” since

349 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.

350 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 173.

351 Ibid.

352 Ibid., loc. 171.

353 Ibid., loc. 173.

354 Ibid., loc. 171.

355 Ibid., loc. 171–173.

356 Ibid., loc. 186.

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attackers tend to fixate on the easiest targets.357 Courtley recommends seeking the

immediate cover possibly identified earlier, or if hitting the ground immediately to start

moving to suitable cover.358 Courtley’s guidance is consistent with the USMC guidance

to be a “hard target;” thus, making it harder to be attacked.359

Figure 10. Kill Zones360

357 U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Sniper Awareness and Counter-Sniper Tips, 1.

358 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 186.

359 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.

360 Source: Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 171.

83

Once those threatened have gotten off the “X,” continued, purposeful movement

is key. It is important that as much distance as possible be put between the potential

victims and the shooter. Moving from cover to cover, when available, in small bursts (3–

5 seconds: I’m Up-They See Me, I’m Down) provides a safer escape and small mental

victories, which reinforced the warrior mindset and will to survive.361 After small

covered escapes have occurred, it is then possible to begin to make larger escape bursts

when a safe distance has been established. According to Courtley, “as you gain distance

from the shooter, you can increase the distance you travel between covers.”362 Courtley

also adds, “that the farther away from the shooter you are, the faster you can move, until

even sprinting if the situation warrants it.”363 Courtley reminds, “that if you can hear

gunfire, you can be shot” and to “continue to act with maximum purpose and calculated

caution.”364

E. NEGOTIATING OBSTACLES

The DOD emphasizes the fundamental importance of proper individual

movement techniques (IMT) in battle scenarios.365 The DOD defines the elements of

IMT as “high crawl, low crawl, and 3–5 second rush.”366 Courtley also references the

high and low crawl as potential movement techniques when faced with a potential threat

(Figure 11).367 In discussing techniques to navigate obstacles, the USMC describes high

crawl use conditions as “when you have some cover or concealment, but not enough to

stand.”368 High crawl is executed by “lifting your belly only inches from the floor and

361 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter

(AS); Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery; United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement; Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook).

362 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 208.

363 Ibid.

364 Ibid., loc. 208–213.

365 United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 1–7.

366 Ibid.

367 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 194.

368 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.

84

moving on your knees and elbows.”369 The USMC describes the high crawl as the

preferred method when speed is of the essence, running is not an option, and keeping a

low profile is still necessary.370 The USMC describes low crawl use conditions as “when

there is no cover or you are going through a low lying obstacle.”371 Low crawl is

executed by “pushing with your toes and pulling with your fingers, inch by inch if

necessary, keeping you flat to the floor and out of range.”372 This crawl is mostly utilized

when cover is needed over speed.373

Figure 11. High Crawl versus Low Crawl374

369 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 194–

198.

370 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.

371 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.

372 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 194.

373 United States Marine Corps, Fire and Movement, 3.

374 Source: Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 198.

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F. DANGER AREAS

When moving between cover and concealment, those threatened may be faced

with a variety of open areas, hallway junctions, or otherwise compromised situations,

which are known as “danger crossings” or “danger areas.”375 In SWAT Leadership and

Tactical Planning author Tony Jones advises that movement should “circumvent” or

avoid crossing open areas whenever possible.376 If avoidance is not a possibility,

Courtley advises to:

Take a moment to discern a pattern in the shooting and try to move when there is a pause in the gunfire. This will generally happen when the weapon is being reloaded, and it will give you a few seconds to move without taking fire. While preparing your body to make this move, use the combat breathing technique we discussed earlier.377

Commonly found danger crossings in educational environments are doorways and

hallway intersections. These intersections are typically in a “T” fashion. Teachers

navigating a danger crossing can find themselves at the intersection of a “T” hallway

junction moving in both the direction of the long and short side of the “T.” Combined

with Courtley’s recommendation to recognize patterns in the firing, moving in a tactical

order across the danger crossings can increase potential survivability. Tactical order is

implemented by a teacher (Figures 12 and 13, position number 3) going to the corner of

the hallway, checking if it is clear and ordering students to cross. The teacher is

strategically navigating the danger crossing and increasing the likelihood of survival. The

following figures demonstrate tactical movement across both styles of “T” hallway

intersections. While these figures demonstrate a military building clearing technique

375 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 232;

United States Marine Corps, Marine Rifle Squad (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 2002), 8– 25, http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCWP%203- 11.2%20Marine%20Rifle%20Squad.pdf?ver=2012-10-11-1640 48-590.

376 Tony L. Jones, SWAT Leadership and Tactical Planning: The SWAT Operator’s Guide to Combat Law Enforcement (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1996), 48, 83, https://gooddebate.org/sin/mirror/library/security/Swat_ Leadership_And_Tactical_Planning_-_T_-_Tony_L._Jones.pdf.

377 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 233.

86

(Figures 12 and 13) they can also be applied when a teacher, possibly with the aid of a

teacher’s assistant, is guiding children through the hallways of their school.

Figure 12. Clearing Hallway Junctions at “a ‘T’ Intersection when Approaching along the ‘Cross’ of the ‘T’”378

378 Source: United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 7–43–44.

87

Figure 13. Clearing Hallway Junctions at “a ‘T’ Intersection when Approaching from the Base of the ‘T’”379

Another danger crossing commonly found in schools is stairwells. Navigating

stairwells can be complicated. Figure 14 demonstrates a stairwell clearing technique that

379 Source: United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 7–45–46.

88

can again be implemented by teachers and school staff when trying to escape potentially

hazardous areas.

Figure 14. Stairwell Clearing380

By taking the point position, teachers can move their students across the danger

crossings at intervals conducive with the situation and pause them when at excessive risk.

Although crossing danger areas should be avoided, sometimes they are unavoidable. By

moving with purpose, teachers are strategically navigating their environment and are

avoiding unsafe movement. When faced with danger crossings, teachers should navigate

their students through them as quickly as possible. Unless absolutely necessary, low or

high crawls or “S”/”W” patterned movement should be avoided for the sake of speed.

In conclusion to tactical movements, Courtley offers the following list to reiterate

the valuable steps in providing a safe distance when avoiding the active shooter threat:

 “1. Get off the X. Remove yourself from immediate danger.

 2. Regroup and regain focus.

 3. Perform a self-assessment for injuries and resources.

 4. Form your game plan. Make a decision, keep the group

cohesive, and assign individuals responsibility.

380 Source: United States Department of the Army, The Infantry Rifle and Platoon Squad, 7–47.

89

 5. Live or die. Pull the trigger! This is your mission!

 6. Make sure you safely encounter law enforcement.”381

G. BARRICADING

Terminology regarding hiding varies across the research. Hiding can be different

from lockdown and is definitely different from “shelter-in-place,” which typically refers

to longer periods of time and usually from natural disaster events. As lockdown can be

passive or active, hiding implies an active approach to self-protection. The USAF takes a

step further and emphasizes the value of “barricading.”382 “Barricading is not merely

hiding. It is the active effort to hinder the shooter’s ability to enter the room or

facility.”383

The USAF recognizes barricading as: “A viable option if: (1) it is likely you are

not directly confronted with the shooter(s); or (2) it is likely your egress route is

obstructed and/or under the observation of the shooter(s).”384

Closing and locking the doors, finding an “improvised weapon,” preparing to

Fight, and using “heavy objects to barricade the door,” begin the barricading process.385

The USAF states:

If barricading the door with objects in the room is not possible, use objects in the room as obstacles to slow down, fix, turn, or obscure the vision of the shooter. Even though an obstacle will not prevent a shooter from entering your area (i.e., sector), it will help you achieve a tactical advantage to ‘Defend Your Sector.’”386

According to the USAF, once barricade is decided, the following assists in

attempting to gain a tactical advantage.

381 Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook), loc. 362– 364.

382 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS), 6–2.

383 Ibid.

384 Ibid.

385 Ibid.

386 Ibid., 6–3.

90

 “Turn off the lights.

 Remain quiet and observe noise discipline (e.g., limit movement, talking,

whispering, and yelling).

 Silence your cell phone and/or pager.

 Turn off any source of noise (e.g., radios, televisions).

 Develop a strategy to “Defend Your Sector” using fight in case you cannot

prevent the threat from entering the room.”387

While much of the tactical advice and techniques described in this chapter may

seem intimidating to the non-military or law enforcement professional, they are not. The

tactics, broken down to their simplest components, provide basic guidance in movement

and self-protection strategies that have the potential of furthering the likelihood of

survival. As described in the chapter on mental preparation, once committed to the “will

to survive” and a “warrior mindset,” the goal is for teachers and school professionals to

feel empowered in their ability to adapt to a multitude of threatening environments.388

With preparations combined, mental and tactical, teachers and school staff will have

more opportunity to implement Run, Hide, Fight practices efficiently.

387 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter

(AS), 6–3.

388 Ibid.; Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery.

91

V. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

Training teachers and school staff on defensive tactical decision-making will

prepare them better to react to active shooter events. An options-based approach to active

shooter protection strategies creates an opportunity to advance the safety of school

children in the United States. By providing tactical decision-making processes, simplified

for civilian populations, active shooter protection strategies can evolve to become more

efficient. Despite regular iterations of advanced mitigation strategies dealing with the

handling of school shootings, elementary schools need to advance their active shooter

response strategy beyond the simple implementation of lockdowns.

Expecting teachers to protect in place is the simplest of all strategies and is

riddled with potential concerns. Not all faculty and students will be in their classrooms

when an event occurs. If trained in classroom lockdown drills alone, they will be

potentially more vulnerable. Government agencies agree that teachers need more options

beyond simple lockdowns. In The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One

Man’s Journey to Discover Where Lockdown Came From, author Joe Hendry discussed a

recommendation based on an Ohio task force assembled by the State Attorney General to

look into school safety.389 The recommendation “encouraged a proactive, rather than

passive response to active shooter.”390 Taken even further, Hendry emphasizes, “Not

training everyone to respond as if their life depended on it is shortsighted, high-risk and

does not align with the realities of an active shooter event.”391

Many currently available opportunities can be provided to school staff to increase

their active shooter preparedness. Unfortunately, no clear-cut one-size fits all approaches.

During an active shooter event, lockdown may be the only option. However, any

advanced training provides more opportunities to school staff.

389 Hendry Jr., The Origin of Lockdown: Enduring Questions and One Man’s Journey to Discover

Where Lockdown Came from, 8.

390 Ibid.

391 Ibid.

92

This research has found many defensive tactics and tactical decision-making tools

for elementary school settings. While found in military and law enforcement settings, the

findings demonstrate basic principles of self-defense and decision-making in stressful

environments. By training on and practicing the various components of the results,

teachers and school staff have the potential of increasing possible survivability of active

shooter events in elementary schools.

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Findings from the research fall into three general categories: pre-action, action,

and re-action. Pre-action refers to the steps leading up to an event that establish the

necessary mindset and confidence for survival, and create an awareness that carries over

into the action phase. Action refers to the actual response to a threat. It is the tactical

movements and techniques that potential victims implement to increase survival. Action

also carries into re-action, and vice-versa as a feedback loop. Re-action means the

reevaluation phase of the situation. It analyzes whether the actions taken are improving or

worsening the tactical advantage. That analysis determines the next action. Again, a

looped system takes seconds to process. Individually, the significant findings of the

research are the following:

 Pre-action

 School administrators empowering teachers to find success by any means necessary

 Situational and area awareness

 Commit to mission success

 Action

 Do not delay

 Be decisive

 Move with a purpose

 Put distance between self and threat

 Cover over concealment

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 Quick movements that maintain cover or concealment and provide a tactical advantage

 Re-action

 Stay ahead of threat tempo by doing the least expected action

 Stay flexible, adapt and overcome

B. PRE-ACTION

A major shortcoming of Run, Hide, Fight is the lack of mental preparation prior to

an event. While it is necessary to not overly plan an escape, based on changing factors,

mentally preparing for stressful situations has incredible advantages. Additionally,

familiarizing oneself with surroundings and ongoing situational changes can have a

dramatic impact on the likelihood of survival should an event occur.

1. School Administrators Empowering Teachers to Find Success by any Means Necessary

One who lacks strategic planning and underestimates the enemy will be captured.

~ Sun Tzu392

For many years, experts in the field of active shooters and school shootings have

called for more options-based approaches to active shooter events in schools.

Unfortunately, while advances have taken place, the full acceptance of varied approaches

has not occurred in school settings. Possibly due to budgetary restrictions, liability

concerns or the distraction of teaching young children to Fight, the necessary discussions

and actions have not occurred. Moving forward, school administrators need to recognize

the real threat of violence and empower their teachers to make good, situational-based

decisions. Due to the changing threat environment, schools must adapt to stay ahead of

the threat without causing a constant state of fear. Are parents more concerned that their

child survived, or that the teacher followed the policy?

392 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War—Original, Accurate, and Complete Translation of All 13 Chapters—

Translated by the Sonshi Group,” 12, Sonshi ☮, accessed July 20, 2017, http://www.sonshi.com/original- the-art-of-war-trans lation-not-giles.html.

94

2. Situational and Area Awareness

One who is prepared and waits for the unprepared will be victorious.

~ Sun Tzu393

Situational awareness is a skill that once practiced and refined is ongoing. Many

teachers do so without even recognizing it. What is intuition saying? Why does

something not seem right? Teachers following their instinct and paying attention to what

is going can pay huge dividends. By identifying options available to them, the teacher

and school staff can mentally log and build a playbook for if-then scenarios. For example,

by recognizing the location of their classroom, their current position in the school, nearest

exits, cover and concealment escape routes, safety zones, etc., teachers can maintain a

running dialogue that is actionable in the face of a potential identified threat.

3. Commit to Mission Success

The important thing in doing battle is victory, not protracted warfare.

~ Sun Tzu394

Teachers and school administrators must commit to mission success.

Commitment is a formal mental process and state of mind. The research demonstrates the

incredible importance of this step in surviving stressful and threatening environments.

Teachers must not accept failure as an option and must have the utmost confidence in

their ability to survive and protect their children safe in the process. By adhering to the

Situational Awareness Checklist (Appendix A), and The Active Shooter Dirt Dive

(Appendix B) practices, teachers and school staff can better prepare themselves to have

the confidence in approaching these scenarios.

393 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 5.

394 Ibid., 4.

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C. ACTION

Run, Hide, Fight is the recognized best practice when responding to the threat of

an active shooter. Unfortunately, the guidance lacks specificity. While it is important to

remember to Run, Hide, Fight, it is critical to recognize how to accomplish each one of

those responses. Implementing the steps inappropriately can actually lead those

threatened into a higher risk situation. By implementing the steps accurately, and with

supporting mental preparation and tactics, the chances of survival can be increased

significantly.

1. Do Not Delay

When doing battle, seek a quick victory. A long battle will blunt weapons and diminish ferocity.

~ Sun Tzu395

Hesitation is the enemy of success. The research is consistent that teachers and

school staff must not delay taking action to mitigate or evade an active shooter event. Do

not assume that it is something other than the worst-case scenario. Do not delay action. Is

it better to feel foolish or be dead? Hear what seems like a gunshot, implement immediate

evasive action.

2. Be Decisive

The essential factor in warfare is speed.

~ Sun Tzu396

When analyzing, moving, or reacting to a scenario do not freeze. The research has

shown that hesitating or simply doing nothing is deadly. When faced with a threatening

environment, it is critical that teachers and school staff take action. Right or wrong,

research shows inaction is not successful.

395 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 3.

396 Ibid., 14.

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3. Move with a Purpose

Move when advantageous, stop when not advantageous.

~ Sun Tzu397

In such an environment, all movement is critical. If a particular move does not

immediately improve or lead to increasing the teachers’ overall tactical advantage, it

should not occur unless absolutely no other option is available. While not hesitating, see

the move, analyze the advantage, make the move, and reanalyze.

4. Put Distance between Self and Threat

To march over a thousand kilometers without becoming distressed, march over where the enemy is not present.

~ Sun Tzu398

Distance equals success. As found in the research, active shooter events in schools

are typically short in duration. By immediately providing distance from the threat,

potential victims dramatically increase their chances of survival. Every second counts.

5. Cover over Concealment

To be certain of safety when defending, defend where the enemy cannot attack.

~ Sun Tzu399

The difference between cover and concealment is critical. Cover has to be the

priority over concealment. As implied by the term active shooter, the threat is bullets. If

potential victims are vulnerable to the penetration of gunfire, they are simply not safe.

Concealment is temporary. Cover may also be temporary depending on the situation, but

it is always better than concealment.

397 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 14.

398 Ibid., 7.

399 Ibid.

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6. Quick Movements that Maintain Cover or Concealment and Provide a Tactical Advantage

Calculate the situation, and then move. Those who know the principles of the circuitous and direct will be victorious.

~ Sun Tzu400

Overall, actions in threatening environments need to be fast and result in an

improved tactical advantage. As opposed to envisioning an entire route, potential victims

should move from cover to cover quickly and concisely. These events come down to

seconds, which can impact potential survival. If those threatened can continue to move,

remain in cover, and provide distance from the threat, chances of survival increase.

D. RE-ACTION

With mental preparation engaged and tactically advantageous actions

implemented, it is critical to reevaluate the situation regularly. As a highly dynamic

event, active shooter environments are constantly changing. To maintain tactical

advantage, which increases the likelihood of survival, actions must be reevaluated

relative to the current and forecasted threat environment. By accomplishing this, those

threatened have the tactical advantage of staying ahead of their attacker.

1. Stay Ahead of Threat Tempo by Doing the Least Expected Action

Attack where your enemies are not prepared; go to where they do not expect.

~ Sun Tzu401

These events are competitions of who will win. Winning is survival. The attackers

have the advantage of knowing what their plans are. Knowledge of intent puts those

threatened at an immediate disadvantage. To compensate for this disadvantage, in

addition to not delaying, being decisive and moving with a purpose, potential victims

must gain any tactical advantage available. Pre-established evacuation routes and

400 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 9.

401 Ibid., 2.

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lockdown are the most likely action found in school systems. If the threat is familiar with

school policies and procedures, then all the proposed actions and the specific details of

each one may already be known to that threat. With an options-based approach, teachers

and school staff have the flexibility to get ahead of the threat’s operational tempo and

gain tactical advantage.

2. Stay Flexible, Adapt and Overcome

When moving troops and calculating plans, be formless.

~ Sun Tzu402

Active shooter events are constantly evolving and highly variable. The research

confirms that no one-size fits all approach exists in these situations. Initial plans may

change with routes or conditions. It is critical that teachers and school staff not lock into

any one solution. Instead, they should focus on remaining flexible, adapting to whatever

the situation provides, and overcoming any current, new, or unknown challenges. This

principle is the reason behind the recommendation by experts to establish options-based

approaches and not try to provide a procedural approach to an event. Instead, the

emphasis is to provide the tools for those involved to be successful and then give them

the ability to use the tools as needed.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS

This research has shown that options-based approaches to active shooter events

are necessary for elementary school events. Active shooter events are not linear.

Preparation and response activities should not be linear either. Teachers and school staff

need to be prepared and supported to make changes to standard practice. Additionally,

teachers and school staff should be celebrated for their willingness to protect the students

in their charge. While the research demonstrates detailed actions and ideas, the resulting

recommendations summarize the steps necessary for schools to advance their

preparedness.

402 “Sun Tzu’s The Art of War,” 14.

99

 Recommendation #1—Provide training to teachers and school staff on

options-based response to active shooter preparedness and response

including defensive tactics and tactical decision-making.

This research provides defensive tactics and tactical decision-making available to

school environments at little to no cost. The sources included provide further opportunity

to establish new approaches to response and decision-making.

 Recommendation #2—Empower teachers through district policy to

protect the children in their care by any means necessary.

Teachers and school staff need to be empowered to implement their training.

Empowerment must be supported through policy to alleviate concerns over liability. If

teachers make a tactical real time decision that taking their students out the window and

into a nearby neighborhood to provide a safe haven from a shooter, they need to know

that their ability to decide is supported.

 Recommendation #3—Establish reconnection procedures in the event of

an incident.

With an options-based approach, reconnection procedures need to be developed.

In the previous example of when teachers implement steps to protect their children, a

process needs to be in place for them to reconnect to the school administration to provide

a student count or roster and arrange transportation to a family reunification area.

F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Opportunities exist for further research regarding active shooter events. Most

likely, the most complicated, and most significant, would be the psychological analysis as

to why an individual would commit such an act. Additionally, research regarding target

selection has inherent value. While school and workplace attacks are commonly

understood targets, random active shooter targets are not. Depending on the willingness

and reality of implementing the steps outlined in this document, research could evaluate

the hurdles keeping school systems from evolving their protection measures. Research on

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that topic could potentially assess cultural obstacles, political influences, and social

ramifications. Regardless of the area of research, school-based active shooter events are a

valuable topic, as the protection of youth is a globally accepted social priority.

G. CONCLUSION

I am a dad. I am not a law enforcement officer. I am not a soldier. I am a dad who

is still scared, as I am sure all parents are, but whom now sees options to

increase success—survival—in active shooter events. Through the research, I found

many great resources that could easily be applied to a multitude of varied

environments to increase survivability. Unfortunately, bureaucratic hurdles always

seem to precede change. I feel confident that changes can and will be made based on

the ever-evolving threat environment that this nation’s schools face. The threat of

active shooters in schools has not waned and is statistically increasing. The impact of

these events in elementary schools is significant.

Many school systems have failed to adapt to the changing environment or have

adapted portions of the needed steps. Emergency operations plans have significant value

in overall school planning. Unfortunately, these plans often provide a false sense of

security. Focus on preventing these events and having an overall school threat

vulnerability analysis is critical. Identifying potential risks and intervening in advance is

a daily process and significant step to prevention. Unfortunately, not all events stop at

this stage. Individual schools not wanting to face the reality that it can happen and not

preparing for it is unacceptable. School systems need to recognize the possibility of the

threat, not dismiss the likelihood, be honest with their vulnerability, accept strengths and

weaknesses, and find a way to improve.

By recognizing options-based approaches as an acceptable strategy, school

systems have the potential dramatically increase the likelihood of survival. Lockdown

should be an option, not THE solution. As a society, this country entrusts teachers with

the daily protection of children. Why not empower them with the tools and opportunity to

evolve that protection in an ever-increasing threat environment?

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APPENDIX A. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS CHECKLIST

o Am I in the proper “warrior mindset” today?403 o Do I have the “will to survive” and the will to protect my students?404 o Can I commit to mission success and refuse to accept defeat? o Can I not delay, assume the worst and act decisively?

o Has anyone given me cause for concern recently?

o Students? o Co-workers? o Parents? o Other adults?

o Did anything strike me as odd this morning while driving in or arriving on

campus? o Unusual cars? o Unusual people?

o What are the “weak points” of my school?

o Blind spots? o Glass entrances? o Fences?

 Anything I can fix or recommend changing?

o How close am I typically to those “weak points?”

o What are the nearest exits to my classroom (or where I spend most of my day)? o Primary o Secondary (separate direction from primary) o Tertiary (hopefully separate direction than both primary and secondary)

o What do my escape path options look like?

o Are they identified but not committed to? o Do I have multiples? o Can I adapt and overcome if paths become unsafe or inaccessible?

403 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter

(AS).

404 Air Land Sea Application Center, Survival, Evasion, and Recovery: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Survival, Evasion, and Recovery.

102

o What type of cover or concealment is available while escaping or when hiding?405

o What would hinder my and my student’s escape to safety? o Physical abilities of self or others? o Locked doors? o Location in school? (i.e., second or third floor)

o How fortifiable is my classroom if I could not escape?

o Windows? o Lockable doors? o Large objects that could be moved to impede access? o Smaller objects that could be placed to slow attacker movement? o Areas large enough to accommodate hiding entire class?

o What in my class can be used as a weapon or distraction?

o Extinguisher? o Staplers? o Vases? o Stacks of papers? o Pencils? o Erasers? o Anything!!

o If moving between classes, or moving to another area of the school have I

reevaluated my surroundings? o Newly available, or better, exits? o Different escape paths? o Different concern areas? o Different fortification options?

o Am I willing to stay ahead of an attacker and do the least expected action

whenever necessary to gain the tactical advantage?406

405 United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter

(AS).

406 Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War.

103

APPENDIX B. THE ACTIVE SHOOTER DIRT DIVE

Adapted from the following and shown in Figure 15: Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook)

 “Get off the X”  “Low crawl/high crawl”

United States Marine Corp, Fire and Movement.

 “I’m Up, They See Me, I’m Down” United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS)

 “Avoid danger areas” Greene, Anti-Sniper Awareness; U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Sniper Awareness and Counter-Sniper Tips.

 “Cover & concealment”  “Defend your sector”  “Anti-sniper lateral & angled movement”

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Figure 15. The Active Shooter Dirt Dive407

407Adapted from Courtley, SEAL Survival Guide: Active Shooter and Survival Medicine Excerpt (Ebook); United States Marine Corps, Fire and

Movement; United States Air Force, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-4.6 AS: Active Shooter (AS); Greene, Anti-Sniper Awareness; U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group, Sniper Awareness and Counter-Sniper Tips.

105

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A Study in Police Preparedness to Respond to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Learning Environment in the Schools of Bergen County, New Jersey Jeffrey T. Dino Seton Hall University

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A STUDY IN POLICE PREPAREDNESS TO RESPOND TO ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATIONS TO PROVIDE A SAFER LEARNING ENVIRONMENT IN THE SCHOOLS OF BERGEN COUNTY,

NEW JERSEY

JEFFREY T. DIN0

Dissertation Committee

Charles Achilles, Ed.D., Mentor Daniel Gutmore, Ph.D.

Reverend Christopher J. Hynes, D. Min Daniel Simone Jr., Ed.D.

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Education Seton Hall University

SETON HALL UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF EDUCATION AND HUMAN SERVICES

OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

APPROVAL FOR SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE

Doctoral Candidate, Jeffery Dino, has successfully defended and made the required

modifications to the text of the doctoral dissertation for the Ed.D. during this Spring

Semester 2009.

DISSERTATION COMMITTEE (please sign and date beside your name)

Mentor: Dr. Charles Achilles 5-l–

Committee Member:

Committee Member:

External Reader:

The mentor and any other committee members who wish to review revisions will sign and date this document only when revisions have been completed. Please return this form to the Oftice of Graduate Studies, where it will be placed in the candidate's file and submit a copy with your final dissertation to be bound as page number two.

O Copyright by Jeffrey T. Dino, 2009 All Rights Reserved

ABSTRACT

The research in this study was conducted to explore the influence that the Bergen

County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of

all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter

situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is

mandatory for children to the age of 16 in New Jersey it becomes imperative that the

police departments of the state, and more specifically for the purpose of this study the

police officers in Bergen County, are able to provide a safe learning environment while

children are in attendance.

The survey used in the study was sent to all municipal police departments in

Bergen County, New Jersey (N = 68). Voluntary participation was requested from the

administrators of each police department.

This study can be described as cross-sectional descriptive non-experimental

research. There were three research questions which guided the study. The researcher

used descriptive statistical methods to address guiding questions one and two. To answer

guiding question three the researcher used Chi-Squared ( ~ 2 ) statistical analyses. The

analyses were conducted to determine what relationship the independent or predictor

variables (total budget, total dollar amount of seized funds, number of sworn law

enforcement officers, and total calls for service each from the calendar year 2007) had on

each of the two dependant variables (the number of police officers designated to train

others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being conducted).

Those analyses indicted two statistically significant relationships. The first was

between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by municipal police departments and the

number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response

tactics. The second statistically significant relationship found was between the total

operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the amount

of training being done in active-shooter response tactics.

The study has contributed to decision making in the area of police training in

active-shooter tactics and training.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The following words are offered as my sincere thanks to all of the people that

made this effort possible for me to complete. Some contributed more than others but no

one's advice, caring, knowledge and influence went unnoticed.

To Dr. Charles Achilles my mentor in this project, you have continuously made

my work better by your direction, enthusiasm for my topic, editing and command of the

written word. You took what I wrote and made it better each time you advised on it.

Thank you.

To Dr. Daniel Simone Jr., we started as classmates; you became my friend and

soon became a strong academic influence of mine. You have been there for me for a long

time and never got annoyed with my constant emails and questions, some of which were

in a panic. You always gave good advice, up to and including as a member of my

committee. I can not thank you enough.

To Dr. Daniel Gutmore, my committee member and student advisor, thank you,

and structure does influence behavior.

To Reverend Dr. Christopher Hynes, my committee member and friend, thank

you for always being there when I needed your help.

To Dr. John Collins, for your mastery of statistics and never ending assistance,

my eternal thanks.

To all of the people who provided constant encouragement and support, you all

know who you are; I would not have completed this project without the inspiration and

motivation I took from your words, thank you.

DEDICATION

The bloodiest battles are fought within

This work is dedicated to my wife Kendra and my children Rachel, Jake and

Christopher. I love you and thank you. Without your help, patience, and caring I would

never have been able to do this. No accomplishment really means anything unless it is

shared with those that love you.

Table of Contents

……………………………………………………………….. Acknowledgements Dedication ……………………………………………………………….. List of Tables ………………………………………………………………..

………….. Chapter I INTRODUCTION. PROBLEM AND PURPOSE Introduction ………………………………………………….. Background ………………………………………………….. Statement of the Problem ……………………………………. Purpose of the Study ………………………………………….

………………………………………… Guiding Questions ……………………………………. Significance of the Study

Delimitations of the Study …………………………………… ……………………………………… Limitations of the Study

…………………………………………. Definitions of Terms Organization of the Study …………………………………….

Chapter II

Chapter 111

Chapter IV

REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE. RESEARCH AND THEORY …………………………………………….. Introduction …………………………………………………… Background ……………………………………………………

……………………………….. Historical Summary of Events Traditional Police Tactics …………………………………….

…………………………………. Legal Mandates for Change ………………………………………….. New Police Tactics

……………………………… Problems with the New Tactics School Resource Officer …………………………………….. Research and Theory Related to Police Administrators ……… School Violence ……………………………………………… Theoretical Framework. ……………………………………… Summary ………………………………………………………

DESIGN AND METHODS …………………………………. Purpose ………………………………………………………. Design ………………………………………………………… Methods ……………………………………………………… Population …………………………………………………… Instrumentation ……………………………………………… Conclusion ……………………………………………………

……… PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA Introduction ………………………………………………….

……………………………………………. Collection of Data …………………………………………… Data and Findings . . . .

Descr~ptwe Statlstlcs ……………………………………..

vii

Chapter V

References

Appendixes

Reliability Estimates ……………………………………… Answering Research Question 1 …………………………….. Answering Research Question 2 …………………………….. Answering Research Question 3 …………………………….. Summary ………………………………………………………

INTRODUCTION. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS. DISCUSSION. CONCLUSIONS. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICIES AND PRACTICES. AND FUTURE STUDY ……………………………………………………… Introduction ………………………………………………….. Summary of Findings ……………………………………….. Discussion …………………………………………………… Conclusions ………………………………………………….. Recommendations for Policies and Practices ………………… .Future Study ………………………………………………….

………………………………………………………………… Appendix A . Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Memo (05-01) Active-Shooter Policy Initiative ……………………. Appendix B -List of Municipal Police Departments in Bergen County. New Jersey …………………………………. Appendix C -Approval Letters; Bureau of Justice Statistics. Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. IRB Approval Form. IRB Approval Letter …………………………………………. Appendix D – Survey Questionnaire ………………………… A ~ ~ e n d i x E – Solicitation Letter …………………………….. .. Appendix F . Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) Statistical Analyses …………. 119

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1

Table 2

Table 3

Table 4

Table 5

Table 6

Table 7

Table 8

Table 9

Table 10

Table 11

Table 12

Table 13

Table 14

School Violence Incidents, 1999-2008, – Requiring a Police Response to a Private Residence or School, Either to Thwart an Attack in Progress or Intervene in the Implementation of a Planned Attack.. …..

Frequency Distribution by State on Events Provided in Table 1 (April ………………………………………….. 20, 1999 to February 2008).

Bergen County Police Departments with Response Plan Prior to Prosecutor's Office Training Mandate of September 1,2005.. ………

Bergen County Police Departments with Existing Response Plans that have Mutual Aid Agreements for Joint Responses.. …………………

Radio Communications Interoperability Between Neighboring Police Jurisdictions in Bergen County following Active-Shooter Planning.. …

Tactical Response Gear Acquired after Training Mandate of ………………………………………….. September 1, 2005 (N = 45)

Training Exercises Participated in by Bergen County Police Departments for Active-Shooter Training (N = 45) Multiple Choices Possible.. ………………………………………………………………

Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active- …………………………………………………… Shooter Response..

Recoded Responses: Police Departments Reporting the Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter Response.. ……………………………………………………………..

Frequency of Active-Shooter Training Required at Police ……………………………………… Departments in Bergen County.

Recoded Responses: Amount of Required Training by Bergen County Police Departments.. …………………………………………………..

(7a) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for Adopting BCPO ……………………………………………………… the Model Policy..

(7b) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for not Adopting the BCPO Model Policy.. ………………………………………………….

Number and Frequency of Police Officers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen County, NJ.. …………………………………

Table 15 Recoded Responses: Number and Frequency of Full-Time Police Officers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen County. NJ ……. 73

Table 16 Recoded Responses: Total (2007) Operating Budgets of Police Departments in Bergen County. NJ …………………………………… 74

Table 17 Recoded Responses: 2007 Forfeiture Program. Seized Funds as Reported by Police Departments in Bergen County. NJ ……………… 75

Table 18 Recoded Responses: 2007 Annual Service Calls as Reported by Police Departments in Bergen County. NJ …………………………………… 76

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION, PROBLEM AND PURPOSE

Introduction

Police departments across the United States have made changes to the way they

will respond to critical-incidents that occur at schools located within their jurisdictions.

The attack at Columbine High School (April 20, 1999) has served as a catalyst for the

changes made by police agencies all over the country. In Bergen County, New Jersey

changes were mandated by a directive, Directive 05-01 Active-Shooter Policy Initiative,

from the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office in a memo dated April 11,2005 (see

Appendix A). The memo clearly states that as of its distribution, it will become the

policy of the county to have a unified and consistent active-shooter response policy. This

policy, entitled the Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter

Situations, was developed by and a final version was agreed upon by the Chiefs of Police

at their February 24, 2005 Bergen County Chiefs of Police Association meeting, and

became mandatory training for all sworn police officers in the county. Also contained in

the directive was a completion of training date of September 1,2005 for all sworn police

officers in the county.

The basis for this type of county-wide response policy is in the understanding of

the Chiefs of Police and other members of the law enforcement community in Bergen

County that critical incidents are likely to produce multi-agency responses. Thls

understanding includes critical incidents that occur in jurisdictions of small to mid-sized

police departments throughout the county, and will most likely require the use of mutual-

aid from neighboring municipal, county, state, and federal agencies to bring the event[s]

to a resolution. Therefore, when police officers of different agencies are working

together toward the successful resolution of a critical incident, they need to be trained in

similar tactics. For police officers from multiple agencies to work safely and swiftly

together in a critical-incident response they need the same basic awareness of tactics.

Experts agree that violence in schools has become more of a problem since the

late 1990s (Peterson & O'Neal, 2002). Society is increasingly exposed to violence and

police officers must respond to more and different types of violent situations. One type

of situation that is sadly becoming more common is the active-shooter in schools.

Routine-activities theory by Kautt and Roncek (2007) reveals schools as criminal

hotspots. The theory states that schools are likely locations for violence and criminal

activity due to the familiarity of the location to the juvenile actors (Kautt & Roncek,

2007). Active-shooters are not limited to education institutions; they are just as common

in the work place and in other venues. Police must develop policies and tactics fluid and

flexible enough that they may be employed in diverse locations.

As a first-responder to an active shooting in a school, police must quickly assess

and react to events taking place. To do this, police first-responders must have training in

making assessments and formulating plans to enter schools and save lives. After the

development of the Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter

Situations by the Bergen County Chiefs of Police Association, and distribution of this

policy by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office, police officers in Bergen County will

now respond to a critical incident like an active-shooter situation in a school setting in a

unified manner.

Although the terminology appears in the definition of terms section, it is fitting to

define this phrase now that has been coined by law-enforcement professionals and that is

used often in this analysis. The phrase is "Active-Shooter." An active-shooter is defined

as a suspect[s] whose activity is immediately causing death and serious injury. The

activity is not contained and there is an immediate risk of death or serious injury to

potential victims (Borelli, 2005).

Background

Prior to the mid 1960s, police responded and resolved many types of potentially

violent situations. These situations created a need for change in police tactics. The

catalyst for this change was the deadly event at The University of Texas (August 1,

1966), where Charles Whitman killed 15 people and wounded 31 others from the top of a

clock tower. After this event, the modern Special Weapons And Tactics teams were born

(Borelli, 2005). These new and specially trained groups of police officers responded to

critical incidents of active-shooters in the process of killing innocent people; suspects

barricading themselves into dangerous situations, and hostage takers holding innocent

people captive. The new teams were trained in tactics that allowed for the successful

resolution of these situations.

Police officers not assigned to these specialized response teams were now being

trained to respond and secure the scene to allow time to pass when specialized teams

could respond. Time was considered the ally of the police to calm situations and allow

for the response of special teams and negotiators who came along.

Police departments everywhere again received a wake up call on April 20, 1999 in

Littleton, CO. The lesson that day was that the days of police responding to an incident

and waiting for S.W.A.T. to arrive were no longer acceptable when a violent actor was

already taking lives. The police tactic of buying time was not a viable strategy against an

actor[s] who had no intention of surrendering (Egan, 1999). A goal of the actors at

Columbine High School was not to get out alive, as is frequently the case with this kind

of event. In an active-shooter situation, suicide is often a part of the plan from the start

(Scanlon, 2001).

Police have now modified their assessment of what is expected by first-

responding police officers to a critical or violent incident at a school. The new ideas are

now taught in police academies all over the country that police are to respond, assess,

plan, and engage. Allowing time to pass is the opposite of what responding police

officers should do because violent events do not typically last more than 5 to 7 minutes

(Wood, 2001). Calculating the average number of people shot during these active-

shooting situations and the typical duration of the shooting, shows that once the shooting

starts, someone is shot every 15 seconds (Tactical Response, 2008). If responses are

divided into 15-second intervals, it is easy to see why police first-responders must not

wait to take action to stop the killing.

Statement of the Problem

Because the study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy

and only now has begun to be seriously studied, there is a lack of information available

on police training for active-shooter situations (O'Brien, 2008a). Although violent crime

in schools and in general has been on the decline since the early 1990's (Kleck, 1999)

police agencies must adapt to changing societal trends where violent critical incidents are

becoming more common. In this adaptation, society should expect police officers to

respond to violent situations and resolve the issues they are confronted by. One such

issue is the active-shooter situation in a school, which is the foundation of this study.

In this study the researcher attempts to determine if police officers in Bergen

County are adequately prepared to respond and resolve an active-shooter incident in a

school quickly.

Purpose of the Study

The researcher's purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the

Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future

preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to

active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in

schools is mandatory for the children of New Jersey it becomes imperative that the police

departments of the state, and more specifically for the purpose of this study the police

officers in Bergen County, are able to provide a safe learning environment while children

are in attendance.

Guiding Questions

Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding

to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children

since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's

Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b)

How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?

Question 2 . Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the

Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model

policy?

Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers

designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being

done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

Significance of the Study

Up to this point, the literature in this field has presented an incomplete view of

police response to shootings, active-shooters, and critical incidents in schools. Much of

the literature and most studies this researcher has located on the topic are from the

perspective of the school administrators' response to these situations, attempts at

psychological profiles of the shooters and how the media interprets these events.

Therefore, what can be uncovered from a study of this kind can assist police

administrators in their preparation efforts to combat instances of dangerous and deadly

violent situations at schools to better maintain a safer learning environment in the schools

of Bergen County, NJ. As education administrators make the school facilities available

for police training, police become better prepared to respond to crisis situations in

schools.

Most police departments in Bergen County, New Jersey are similar in their

command structure. At the top, the chain of command has a Chief of Police or civilian

Police Director. Outside the internal command, each police department operates under

some direction by the county prosecutor's office, as the county prosecutor is the chief

law-enforcement officer appointed by the governor for that county. Although staffing

and area distinguish one police department from one another they are alike in many ways.

How they differ in their preparedness to respond to an active-shooter situation is the

foundation of this study.

Many different methods are available to train for critical-incident responses, and

experts in the field have not identified one method as better than any other. Each method

is similar in its make-up and basic goal – respond and save lives by confronting and

stopping the violent actor.

Delimitations of the Study

This study was designed to explore what police departments in one county

(Bergen) in New Jersey are doing to prepare themselves better for a critical-incident

response at a school after the distribution of, the Standardization of Patrol Based

Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy by the Bergen County Prosecutor's

Office. The delimitations of the study were: only the 68 municipal police agencies in

Bergen County, NJ listed on the Bergen County Prosecutors office website were included

in the population (N=68), information to answer the guiding questions was derived from

the survey instrument provided to the Chiefs of Police the Civilian Police Directors or

their designees, the agencies provided with the survey instrument were also asked to

return the completed instrument in three weeks.

Limitations of the Study

Limitations identify potential weaknesses in the study that derive from the design

and methods of a study. The scope of this study focuses on the 68 municipal police

departments in Bergen County, New Jersey. All 68 municipal police departments were

included on the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office website. Since all municipal police

departments in the county were included as participants, the research methodology can be

considered a census. The number of agencies that return the completed survey

instrument is a limitation of the study. The survey instrument used to solicit data was

modeled after the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law

Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics survey. The survey instrument,

along with original questions related to active-shooter preparation prepared by the

researcher was reviewed by a jury of experts in the field.

Since this study is focused on one county in the state of New Jersey which has a

total of 21 counties, the results of the study may not be indicative of the level of

preparations by the police departments in the rest of the state. Therefore, any conclusions

drawn from the study to apply to other municipal departments in the other counties,

county or state police departments, are the responsibility of the reader.

Another limitation of this study is that it is primarily focused on police response

to active-shooter and critical incidents in primary, middle, and secondary schools.

Although some mention is made of events that occur[ed] on college campuses, the study

is limited to how police are responding to the school incidents. College and university

active-shooter and critical incidents are mentioned to establish for the reader some key

events that were either a catalyst for change or an especially violent incident where police

had responded in the same manner as they would have to a lower grade level school.

A section on higher education or college campus violence would not be practical

in this study, as it would need its own study to truly report valuable information. Higher

education institutions are not considered to be schools in terms of law enforcement,

because the student body is comprised of adults. In addition many colleges and

universities have their own police departments or security agencies and these agencies

report to the FBI's Uniform Crime Report differently than a police department within a

countylstate as per the Clery Act for reporting campus crime. The law enforcement

agencies of state and private institutions may fall under the jurisdiction of the state

attorney general's office rather than the county prosecutor's office. This too would

eliminate campuses from the scope of this project as the present study is focused on

municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. As a result it would not be

appropriate for the researcher to draw conclusions about the training and preparations of

campus police agencies when they work under different authority than those at the

foundation of this study.

Definitions of Terms

The following are definitions that are relevant to this study:

Active-shooter: "A suspect(s) activity is immediately causing death and serious

bodily injury. The activity is not contained and there is a risk of death or serious bodily

injury to potential victims" (Borelli, 2005, p 2.).

Active-Shooter Team (AST): A team of three or four armed police officers tasked

with finding and stopping an active-shooter.

Critical incidents: terrorist activities, hostage taking, mass causality events, high-

risk repetitive crimes, riots, or bombings

Jurisdiction: The territorial range of authority or control.

Police Officer: Any sworn member of a state, county, citylmunicipal police

department empowered to uphold law and order with the power to arrest offenders for

crimes, misdemeanors, and infractions of law.

S. W.A.T. team: A team of police officers trained in Special Weapons And Tactics,

equipped to respond to a variety of dangerous situations.

Organization of the Study

Chapter I has presented an introduction of the problem behind the study, a

background, a statement of the problem, a purpose of the study, guiding questions,

significance of the study, delimitations of the study, limitations of the study, definitions

of terms, and a description of the organization of the study. Chapter 11 presents a review

of pertinent literature, research and theory whlch contains; an introduction, background, a

historical summary of events, traditional police tactics, legal mandates for change, new

police tactics, problems with the new tactics, related research and theory to police

administrators, school violence, a theoretical framework, and a summary. In Chapter 111

the researcher describes the design and methods of the study by discussing; purpose,

design, population, methods, instrumentation, and a conclusion. Chapter IV presents the

collected data and the analysis of the data collected by frequency distributions and Chi-

Square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analyses. Chapter V includes a summary of findings, discussion,

and conclusions and recommendations for policy, practice and future research.

Chapter I1

REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE, RESEARCH AND THEORY

Introduction

The purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County

Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all

sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter

situations in their jurisdictions. This chapter presents a review of necessary adaptations

police agencies, both in New Jersey and the United States have made to allow them to

respond to critical incidents in school settings effectively, tactically and efficiently.

These adaptations were based on the education the law enforcement community received

from studying the events of April 20, 1999 at Columbine High School in Littleton,

Colorado as well as from studying other critical incidents around the country. Although

the shooting at Columbine was not the first time a United States school had been the

scene of a deadly attack by either a student or an adult, it did however, have a lasting

effect on the law enforcement community. The attack effectively showed law

enforcement professionals that they were not adequately prepared to respond to this type

of situation and to gain control quickly.

Until the Virginia Tech massacre (April 16,2007) where 33 people were killed

and another 30 were injured (Shapira & Jackman 2007), the Columbine High School

incident was the most deadly shooting to take place in a school setting in the United

States, with 15 fatalities (Egan, 1999). The Columbine High School incident forever

changed how the law enforcement community will plan for, train for, and react to a

critical incident. In light of such an eye opening for U.S. law enforcement, police tactics

have been revised and have been adapted to allow police to respond more appropriately

to a critical incident of this nature. These new tactics lend themselves for a response not

only in a school setting, but in the work place, a private home, a night club or other venue

that may come under attack by a would be killer.

In chapter I1 the researcher reviews the history of the formation of police tactics

and what event was instrumental to the establishment of these traditional tactics. The

analysis addresses school settings including the Columbine High School tragedy, which

served as the catalyst for changes in tactical responses by police departments all over the

country. Historical events are an important component of this review because they show

how traditional police tactics to respond to critical incidents began, how they changed

and how they were sometimes inadequate. An understanding of what police response

tactics were is vital to understand how and why they need to evolve to be more effective.

The researcher then provides a description of traditional police response tactics,

why they are in need of revision and what these revisions include. Developing an

understanding of what the traditional tactics of police response were helps the readers

gain insight into why they have become ineffective in many situations. The researcher

next discusses legal mandates for change at the local, state and federal levels. A

description of the new police tactics to respond to critical incidents demonstrates how

police react to critical situations, in a post-Columbine era. An indepth description of

these new tactics, some dubbed Active-Shooter Response or critical incident response,

suggest the path the law enforcement community has followed to update and make

responses more tactically sound to respond rapidly and save more lives. Columbine and

other school settings have shown the need for cooperation among agencies in critical

incidents. The school backdrop remains a main theme in the present study because tax

dollars are used to fund both police and educational institutions. Because children are

required to go to school they become potential targets at the very institutions where their

attendance is mandatory.

The review then turns toward training, with a focus on the benefits of training for

preparedness and providing police officers with the necessary skills to complete their

mission to save lives. The problems associated with training police officers with the new

critical incident response tactics are explored. Some of these difficulties are getting

police officers to act like tactical teams and focusing on what is most important; the

mission at hand.

Related research and theory as they relate to both police and school violence are

discussed. Numerous theories and studies are critiqued as they form the foundation of

police response and why school violence happens and if there are effective indicators as

to who is committing it.

The analysis contains a summary followed by a section in which the researcher

describes how the evolution of these new tactics should progress so that police can

continue to be effective and relevant to our rapidly changing and ever more violent

society. If police are going to be challenged with resolving these types of critical

incidents they need training, training and more training.

The effectiveness of these new response tactics is crucial for police to be able to

protect the lives of children who are mandated to attend school, and the safety of all

citizens in all types of venues. Therefore an analysis of where police tactics were and

where they are going to be in the future is important to maintain the safety of our society.

Without periodic reviews of how police are preparing for their jobs, in an ever changing

society, the police become stagnate and ineffective. A review of response plans,

strategies and tactics allows for changes to be made for police to become more proficient

in their job performance. As more police agencies are exposed to these situations the

more the law enforcement community has the opportunity to study how to resolve the

situations in the safest manner.

Research and theory are presented through the use of relevant articles, studies,

professional journals, legal mandates, periodicals and books, as well as first hand

knowledge of the researcher and others, to provide the basis for this analysis.

Background

Until the mid 1960s all situations that required a response within a police

department's jurisdiction were handled by the department's patrol-first responders. This

meant that the "ordinary police officer" on a beat was called to handle whatever

happened while the officer was on duty. All calls for police service, such as drunk and

disorderly people to domestic violence to robberies and shootings, were taken care of by

the patrol squad on the street.

This changed on August 1, 1966 in Austin, Texas. Events on this date served as a

catalyst for change in American policing practices at the time. On August 1, 1966,

Charles Whitman, trained to shoot by the United States Marine Corps, forced entry into a

clock tower building at the University of Texas. In tote with him were three rifles, two

handguns, a shotgun and hundreds of rounds of ammunition. Oddly enough he also

brought with him a five gallon bucket of drinking water and some sandwiches. He had

obviously planned to be there for some time (Borelli, 2005).

From the top of the clock tower, Whitman killed 15 people and wound 3 1 others,

some as far as two blocks away. Prior to his assault on the university he had also killed

his mother and wife. The first two responding police officers on the scene at the

university, who incidentally just happened to be on campus, teamed with other

responding police and a civilian and made a brave move to launch their own assault.

This ad hoc team advanced on the tower from an underground passage and made their

way inside to confront Whitman. Armed with handguns and a shotgun the team was able

to draw Whitman's fire so he stopped shooting at innocent people on the campus. In the

gun battle that followed, the team killed Whitman and ended his killing spree (Borelli,

2005).

As with most critical or serious incidents that law enforcement professionals face,

there were both a debriefing and a subsequent study of the scene as well as the outcome.

Debriefings and studies of events are tools used to tweak tactics to make them more

effective in the future. This incident was no different. The University of Texas shooting

showed law enforcement personnel that there was a need for highly skilled professionals

to handle these types of situations in the future. The team of officers who came on scene

was courageous enough to take the battle to the killer, hut all situations like this may not

be handled in as brave a manner. Law enforcement professionals who reviewed the

incident concluded there was a need for tactically minded police officers to be specially

trained and equipped to handle a variety of situations. Born out of this incident were the

modem Special Weapons And Tactics teams, known as S.W.A.T. teams (Borelli, 2005).

Since the early 1970's, S.W.A.T. teams and similar teams with their own

interesting and unique monikers like Emergency Services Unit (ESU) and Emergency

Response Team (ERT) began to he formed in police departments all over the country.

This was also a time when military veterans were returning from the Vietnam Conflict

and there was an abundance of tactically trained and battle tested young men to form

tactical teams (Borelli, 2005). The term "men" is used here because at the time policing

in the United States was a maledominated profession. In 1971 after the end Vietnam

Conflict, only 1.4% of all police officers in the United States were women (Home, 2006).

Decades later females became more of a factor in law enforcement. Females in policing

by 2006 made up about 13 – 14% of sworn law enforcement officers in the US (Home,

2006).

The newly formed professional teams were tasked with responding to various

types of critical incidents. Team members became the experts on responding and

handling situations, although not in every agency were these professionals assigned to

this task exclusively. Most team members were assigned full-time to other areas of

policing and to the special team on a part-time basis. From the 1970s to the 1990s special

teams were called upon to handle situations that were above and beyond the capabilities

of patrol-first responders.

In the decade, from 1996 to 2006 there have been at least 80 incidents where guns

were either brought to schools to take hostages, or kill students andlor teachers and

principals in the United States (School Violence Resource Center, 2007). Until April

2007 on the campus of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute (more commonly known as

Virginia Tech or VT) in Blacksburg, VA, the most deadly assault on a school was at

Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999 (Shapira & Jackrnan 2007). The

result of this incident was 12 students and one teacher dead, at least 24 wounded and two

killers who committed suicide (Borelli, 2005). The Columbine High School tragedy took

the breath away from the American public. Not because they had not seen school

violence before. They certainly had, in the 3 years prior to the Columbine tragedy there

were at least 16 school violence incidences, most of which ended with deadly

consequences (School Violence Resource Center, 2007). However, this incident

highlighted the vulnerability of schools and campuses around the country.

What America saw the day of the Columbine High School tragedy, live via the

news media on scene, were police agencies and their officers respond to the school

campus and secure a perimeter. Some estimates are that approximately 120 police

officers responded to the scene (Shepard, 2006). None of the responding police

immediately entered the building to confront and/or stop the killing of students and a

teacher. Why did some of the 120 armed police officers a enter a building where lives

were being taken by two high school students?

Was this what was expected of police agencies, to sit and wait for a safe situation

to enter? In fact it was. The S.W.A.T. era had brought new policies for police responses.

Police officers were no longer being taught to act on and take care of every situation as

they had in the past. At one point in time the police were the last line of defense, now the

police called on their S.W.A.T. teams to be their last line of defense.

Historical Summary of Events

According to the School Violence Resource Center (2007) and an Infoplease

(2008) internet document, the attacks described in Table 1, were carried out or were

planned to occur in schools across the country (in 30 of the 50 states) since the attack at

Columbine High School in April 1999. Each item in Table 1 required a police response

to a private residence or school, either to thwart an attack in progress or to intervene in

the implementation of a planned attack. Table 2 is a compilation or frequency

distribution of occurrences listed in Table 1 by state.

Klein (2005) asserted that popular discourse addressed school shootings almost

obsessively, but continued to omit the role gender plays in these crimes. New research

has suggested that this omission was ignoring a key element: a significant number of the

boys' own stated reasons for this violence clearly pointed to premeditated violence

specifically involving girls (Klein, 2005). A review of Table 1 shows the absence of

absolutes in the events. It is important to note a quote from George Santayana, that

"those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayana, 1905, p.

13). Therefore, similar events need to be positioned together to he able to form a

complete picture of what could happen at any time.

Although the events were primarily staged and carried out by males, the event on

October 4,2002 in San Antonio, TX describes a female actor. Most attacks occurred

inside schools in hallways, classrooms, gymnasiums, and bathrooms; however, some

occurred outside of the schools on the grounds and in parking lots. The events took place

in urban, suburban, and rural settings across all socio-economic strata. When seen

through the lens of masculinity theory, the killings of girls who had rejected assailants

can be explained as an effort to reverse the feelings of subordination and inadequacy the

assailants experienced as a result of being rejected (Klein, 2005). Victims were teachers,

students and sometimes bystanders, both male and female. Actors in the events ranged

from children (6 years old) to adults.

Table 1

School Violence Incidents, 1999-2008, – Requiring a Police Response to a Private Residence or School, Either to Thwart an Attack in Progress or Intervene in the Implementarion of a Planned Attack

1. April 20, 1999: Littleton, CO. Two boys, ages 16 and 17, shoot 35 students and 1 teacher before committing suicide. Twelve students and 1 teacher die.

2. May 13, 1999: Port Huron, MI. Two 14 year-olds plotted to kill at least 154 people at school in an attempt to outdo the shooting at Columbine High School. They were stopped when fellow students reported them.

3. May 20, 1999: Conyers GA. A 15 year old wounds six classmates.

4. October 28, 1999: Cleveland, OH. A 14 year old and three 15 year olds planned on killing mostly black students, then die in a shoot out with police. The plot was reported by a parent.

5. November 19, 1999: Deming, NM. A 12 year old shoots a classmate in the head. The victim died the following day.

6. December 6, 1999: Fort Gibson, OK. A 71h grade student brings a handgun to school and opens fire. Four students are wounded.

7. January 29,2000: Cupertino, CA. A 19 year old planned to attack his high school with guns and explosives. He took photos of himself and his arsenal of weapons. When the photos were developed the drugstore clerk called the police.

8. February 29,2000: Mount Morris Township, MI. A 6 year old boy brings a .32 caliber semi auto handgun to school and kills a first grader.

9. March 10, 2000: Savannah, GA. Two students killed by a 19 year old student while leaving a high school dance.

10. May 11,2000: Prairie Grove, AR. A 13 year old seventh grade student who left the Prairie Grove Junior High in a fit of rage and a police officer were wounded after shooting each other in a hay field north of the school.

11. May 18,2000: Millbrae, CA. A 17 year old with a history of threatening other students with guns was reported to officials by fellow students when he threatened to do a "Columhine" type shooting.

12. May 26,2000: Lake Worth, FL. A 13 year old sent home from school returned with a handgun and kills a teacher.

13. September 26, 2000: New Orleans, LA. A student fought with another student, went home, returned with a gun, and killed the student he fought with earlier.

14. October 24, 2000: Glendale, AZ. A teenager held a teacher and 32 students hostage for an hour before surrendering.

15. January 10,2001: Oxnard, CA. A 17 year old entered school and took a girl hostage in an attempt to commit "suicide by cop." After S.W.A.T. arrived he was shot dead.

16. January 17,2001: Baltimore, MD. A student was shot and killed in front of Lake Clifton Eastern High School.

17. February 5,2001: Hoyt, KS. Three students, ages 16, 17, and 18 planned to do a school shooting. An anonymous caller reported the boys to the police using a tip line. When the homes of the three were searched police found guns, bombs and white supremacist drawings.

18. February 7,2001: Fort Collins, CO. A 14 year old and two 15 year olds plot to "redo Columbine." Several classmates alerted the police after overhearing them talking about it.

19. February 11,2001: Palm Harbor, FL. A 14 year built a bomb having a kill radius of 15 feet. The parents of another student alerted police of the bomber's plans.

20. February 14,2001: Elmira, NY. A high school student's plans for a school shooting were foiled after students brought the fact that he had weapons on him to the attention of the teacher. He carried 14 pipe bombs, 3 smaller bombs, a propane tank, a sawed off shotgun, and a .22 caliber pistol into the school by a duffel bag and also a book bag full of ammunition.

21. March 5,2001: Santee, CA. A 15 year old opens fire from inside a school bathroom shooting 15 and killing 2.

22. March 7,2001: Twentynine Palms, CA. Two 17 year old boys were arrested after police were tipped off by another student about a planned attack of their high school. A search of the boys' homes revealed a gun in one home and a plan in the other.

23. March 7,2001: Williamsport, PA. A 14 year old brings his father's handgun to school and shoots a classmate in the shoulder.

24. March 22,2001: El Cajon, CA. Three teens and two teachers were wounded at Granite Hills High School by gunfire.

25. March 30,2001: Gary, IN. A student was shot in the head while waiting for class to begin.

26. January 15,2002: New York, NY. A teenager wounded two students at Martin Luther King Jr. High School.

27. October 4,2002: San Antonio, TX. A 13 year old female middle school student fatally shot herself in the temple with a h a d g u n in the parking lot in front of a group of friends.

28. November 19,2002: Hoover, AL. Two 17 year old males were reportedly fighting in a hallway when one student pulled a knife and stabbed the other to death.

29. November 22,2002: Dallas, TX. A 15 year old male student was shot as he and fellow students try to wrestle a gun from another 14 year old student.

30. December 12, 2002: Seattle, WA. A 13 year old male fired a rifle in a middle school, injuring two students with broken glass, and then used the gun to kill himself.

31. December 16,2002: Chicago, IL. An 18 year old male high school student was fatally shot outside of Englewood High School, while trying to protect his sister from two other male students.

32. January 22,2003: Providence, RI. A 1 2 ' ~ grade student was arrested for firing a .22 caliber gun inside the school's cafeteria after an assistant principal broke up a fight.

33. January 27,2003: Cresent, OK. Three eighth grade middle school students were arrested for allegedly carrying pipe bombs into their school.

34. January 30,2003: St. Paul, MN. A 14 year old middle school student was stabbed in the shoulder. Two teenage males were arrested for the incident.

35. January 30.2003: Jenks. OK. A 17 vear old male student armed with a 9 mm – . handgun climbed onto the roof of the school's gym and threatened suicide. The student also had pointed the gun at an assistant principal.

36. February 5,2003: Westminster, CO. After several shots being fired in a high school courtyard, a 14 year old student was taken into custody.

37. March 1 I, 2003: Gilbert, AZ. Six youths were identified by police as plotting to do a "Columbine-style massacre" at their high school. Police and school officials found notes and plans for bombs as well as other violent plans.

38. March 17,2003: Guttenberg, IA. A 17 year old walked into his high school principal's office to thank the principal for listening to his problems. The boy then pulled a rifle out of his coat and shot himself in the stomach.

39. March 21,2003: Lawndale, CA. Two teenage high school males were arrested after police learned of a list the two had with names of students and teachers who were targets. An unfinished pipe bomb and directions to make the bomb downloaded from the internet were found in one of their homes.

40. April 1,2003: Washington, DC. A 16 year old male high school student was shot in the leg during a lunch time argument with another student.

41. April 16,2003: Addison, TX. A 12 year old student committed suicide by shooting herself in a private school bathroom.

42. April 23,2003: Houston, TX. A 16 year old male student received a 7 inch slash across the chest in a fight outside his high school during lunch period.

43. April 24,2003: Red Lion, PA. A 14 year old junior high student shot and killed the principal inside a crowded cafeteria then killed himself with a second gun.

44. May 23,2003: Texas City, TX. A bomb was found in the home of a 16 year old high school student who had plans to kill the school districts' chief of police.

45. September 18,2003: Atlanta, GA. A 14 year old Lovejoy High School student was arrested after police said he planned a "Columbine-style massacre" at his school.

46. September 24,2003: Cold Spring, MN. One student dead and another injured after a shooting in the high school. A teacher was able to talk the shooter into surrendering.

47. August 14,2003: Columbus, GA. A 14 year old girl went back to her middle school to visit old teachers. A fight broke out behind the school. As a crowd gathered one of the boys fighting took out a gun and started to shoot. The girl was killed.

48. August 30,2004: Maywood, IL. A 22 year old waiting to pick up his younger brother was shot and killed in a high school parking lot in an apparent gang related crime.

49. September 14,2004: Memphis, TN. A 15 year old male was killed in a gang initiation "jump in" fight in a school bathroom that got out of hand.

50. October 7,2004: Newburyport, MA. A 15 year old male high school student shot and killed himself outside of his high school. A result of an argument with a female student.

51. November 17,2004: Hempstead, NY. A 17 year old was stabbed to death blocks from school in a lunch time gang related fight.

52. November 22,2004: Philadelphia, PA. An 18 year old former student was shot and killed as two others were injured in a shooting that occurred outside a high school.

53. November 24,2004: Valparaiso, IN. A 15 year old wielding 2 knives stabbed 7 classmates. No one died.

54. December 10,2004: Nine Mile Falls, WA. A 16 year old student shoots himself in the head in the entryway of h ~ s high school. He later died from his wound.

55. March 21, 2005: Red Lake, MN. A 16 year old kills his grandfather and companion at home, then a teacher, a security guard, 5 other students and himself at school for a total of 10 dead.

56. August 25, 2006: Essex, VT. A gunman looking for an old girlfriend bursts into an elementary school and kills a teacher.

57. September 13,2006: Van Nuys, CA. A student is shot and killed in a crosswalk in front of school in an apparent gang-related crime.

58. September 25, 2006: Las Vegas, NV. After getting off a school bus a student opened fire at the bus. None of the 34 students on board was injured.

59. September 27, 2006: Bailey, CO. An adult male sexual predator enters a school, assaults 6 female students, kills a girl trying to flee, then kills self as police make entry to stop him.

60. September 29,2006: Cazenovia, WI. A 15 year old student, disciplined the day before, enters school with multiple weapons and shoots the principal.

61. October 2,2006: Nickel Mines, PA. An adult male sexual predator enters a one room Amish school and kills 6 female students and self.

62. October 9,2006: Joplin, MO. A Columbine copy-cat, a 13 year old male, fires one round into the ceiling of the school as his gun jams. A teacher talked him into leaving.

63. October 18,2006: Orlando, FL. In a fight that began in lunch period over a girl, a 15 year old student was stabbed multiple times with a serrated knife. The student later died.

64. January 3,2007: Tacoma, WA. An 18 year old student shoots 17 students in hallway of Henry Foss High School

65. October 10,2007: Clevelmd, OH. A 14 year old student at Cleveland High School shot and injured two students and two teachers before shooting and killing himself.

66. February 11,2008: Memphis, TN. In a gym class a 17 year old Mitchel High School student shot and wounded another student.

67. February 12,2008: Oxnard, CA. A 14 year old boy shot a student at Green Junior High School causing the victim to become brain dead.

(School Violence Resource Center, 2007; Infoplease, 2008)

The researcher assembled Table 1 to highlight what was (and is) happening at

schools all over the country. Cohen and Felson (1979) wrote that several conditions

need to be present for some types of predatory violations to occur. They claim that for a

predatory violation to be successful an offender must possess criminal inclinations and

have the ability to carry out those inclinations, there must be a suitable target, and the

absence of a guardian capable of prevention of the criminal act must also be present

(Cohen & Felson, 1979). Cohen and Felson (1979) continued to assert that the absence

of any one of the conditions described is normally sufficient to prevent predatory

violations. According to Small and Tetrick (2001) students are less likely to be victims

of serious violent and nonfatal crimes at schools than away from them. American

schools are relatively safe places for children to be. Beger (2003) contended that widely

publicized incidents of juvenile violence in public schools have created the public

misconception that such behavior is commonplace. Although there are not deadly violent

acts at schools every day, these examples are an indication of the need for police to be

specially trained to respond to and handle serious assaults and killings on school campus'

around the country. Certain areas are more subject to crime because they have suitable

targets, and offenders subjectively perceive these areas as feasible locations for criminal

acts (Knautt & Roncek, 2007). Columbine became a wake up call for police who need

to be prepared for this type of incident (Associated Press, 1999).

Table 1 does not account for shootings on college campuses. College campuses are

likely to be patrolled by either campus police departments or campus security

departments. Although other police agencies would likely respond to a college campus

during a crisis in a mutual aid capacity, the focus of this research is the municipal police

departments' preparation. Violent situations, active-shooters, or critical incidents on

college campuses would be an excellent topic of a future study or research project.

Table 2 was assembled to reiterate for the reader that there is no one state in the

United States that is more susceptible than another to host violent events in schools or

private residences. Table 2 shows that events are just as likely in rural, suburban, urban,

wealthy, middle-class, and poor areas of the country.

Table 2

Frequency Distribution by State on Events Provided in Table I (April 20, 1999 to February 2008) State Freauencv State Frequency State Frequency State Freauency

AL 1 AR 1 AZ 2 C A * 10

CO 4 D.C. **1 FL 3 GA 4

IA 1 IL 2 IN 2 KS 1

LA 1 MA 1 MD 1 MI 2

MN 3 MO 1 NM 1 NV 1

NY 3 ,OH 2 OK 3 PA 4

RI 1 TN 2 TX 5 WA 3

WI 1 VT 1

* The city of Oxnard, CA had two reported incidents ** Washington D.C.

Traditional Police Tactics

Prior to the birth of the S.W.A.T. concept, ordinary police officers handled every

situation. The teams would respond to an incident, gather intelligence, formulate a plan

of action and execute the plan. After the arrival of S.W.A.T., patrol officers were taught

they need not be as aggressive and assume the risk of encountering armed gunmen or

assailants: professionals would handle that type of situation (Borelli, 2005). This became

the new and what is referred to from this time on in this study as the "traditional

response," in which the policing personnel were to respond and wait.

Police administrators began to advocate the training of patrol officers in a support

role for the specially trained teams. Police began to train for responding to critical

incidents, setting up perimeters and securing the area for the special response. Patrol's

response edict became to isolate, contain, and negotiate. These methods were used as a

sort of clock-stopping mechanism to buy time for the "specials" to arrive (Baker, 2005).

Present for the Columbine School siege was a School Resource Officer or SRO, a

police officer who is stationed at the school to handle whatever problem that may arise on

campus. Normally, this is the police officer who knows the layout of the school the best

and is most familiar with the school and how to move around in it. While stationed at the

school, this officer should be continuously gathering intelligence about the school, the

teachers, staff, and the students. This intelligence may be used for purpose of detection

and prevention of problems before they arise and deterrence of violent attacks. However,

this officer remained behind cover, safe, while students were still being killed in the

building, rather than to enter and confront the shooters (Kopel, 2006).

The traditional practice of containment of the situation and waiting for S.W.A.T.

to arrive had been in practice since the 1970s. Hostage takers and barricaded suspects

were very adequately handled by securing an area and calling for negotiators to come and

try to resolve the matter. Some events can be controlled by buying extra time and

allowing for reasoning with the aggressor to take place (Scanlon, 2001).

S.W.A.T. tactics are normally slow and deliberate movements made to insure the

safety of the team members. Once a team has made entry into a building or other facility,

members move slowly as a cohesive unit. The team members clear every space they

occupy and pass by before moving on to the next possible threat. The time needed by a

single S.W.A.T. team to clear a building the size of Columbine High School methodically

could be hours. At Columbine, three teams were eventually inserted into the building.

However, if there is an active-shooter, who is seriously wounding andlor killing

people, the first responding officers need to make a rapid assessment of the incident and

make entry to stop the suspect[s] (Scanlon, 2001). The breakdown of the traditional-style

police response at Columbine was that the first arriving officers responded, but then held

and waited for S.W.A.T. The S.W.A.T. team arrived and began its assessment and

eventual entry into the building. This entry was criticized by some as being too slow and

methodical, which is, incidentally, what these teams are known for, slow and methodical

searches (Egan, 1999).

The shooting in Columbine High School was over in 16 minutes, more than

double the average amount of time these types of situations last, which by some estimates

is between 5 to 7 minutes (Wood, 2001). The first-entry team entered the building at

approximately 46 minutes after the shooting had begun, or 30 minutes after the killing

had stopped. A review of the incident and its many hazards including the multiple bombs

and IEDs (improvised explosive devices) can certainly justify the type of slow

methodical response that S.W.A.T. used (Marx & Mayhood, 2001). However, to

horrified parents or concerned citizens watching the media coverage, the thought

certainly was that the police should go into the school and save the kids inside.

This slow response by a tactical team would be warranted by the information

police were developing about the numerous explosions that had already gone off inside

the school. They were also receiving information about the location of other explosive

devices planted in and around the school and in cars located in the parking lots. Police

were being told by students who escaped the school that there were as many as eight

gunmen in the building, snipers on the roof and gunmen in the ceilings (Associated Press,

1999).

The rule of thumb in most police circles is that the police cannot help anyone if

they are injured themselves. Had the S.W.A.T. team just rushed into the building they

very well may have been the next set of victims in the massacre. Bombs squads had also

responded and begun to make their own evaluations of the scene.

Police, prior to 1999, had been trained to make assessments, gather information,

set up command posts and make the proper notifications. There was no textbook

response for a situation like this one because this was a relatively new type of incident

(Associated Press, 1999). In this case police were just reacting.

For police to begin to deal with this situation effectively other resources were

needed to be requested to handle various parts of the job. Responding units need updated

and timely information on which location is the safest to respond. Officers need to know

the location of the command post so they will know where to report in once on scene.

The one aspect of this response that was glaringly absent was a determination by

someone, a leader, a supervisor, a ranking officer to give the order to make entry to the

facility and confront the shooter[s] to stop the killing of innocent people. This way of

thinking only came as a result of the Columbine tragedy. In the aftermath, the incident

was reviewed and dissected, and in doing so law enforcement professionals realized that

something needed to happen. These traditional police response tactics had been shown to

be ineffective for the Columbine type of crisis. Tactics that police were using needed to

change, was the conclusion recognized on the federal, state and local levels of law

enforcement.

Legal Mandates for Change

Following highly publicized campus shootings law makers have had to make

school safety more of a priority (Beger, 2003). In the wake of Columbine, the United

States government response to the issue of critical incidents in schools and on college

campuses has been to make grant monies available so that school administrators could

work with law enforcement personnel to implement safety programs (Bethel, 2005).

These anti-violence campaigns are useful in prevention and in the education of students

and educators.

Through the many pages and documents this researcher has reviewed to collect

details for the literature review, most of the literature in professional journals on this

topic was found to be directed toward school preparation and response: The law

enforcement element of this topic was not as widely discussed or researched. There

seems to be a failure to address the issue of the successful resolution of a violent andlor

critical incident in a school or on a college campus. Since the Virginia Tech massacre the

federal government made additional monies available for the training and equipping of

campus police officers to respond to critical incidents on campuses.

In January of 2002 the State of New Jersey passed legislation which created a

School Violence Awareness Week. This legislation was intended to make it known that

it is in the public interest of the state to designate a week in October of each year as

"School Violence Awareness Week" to provide students, parents, school district and law

enforcement personnel with an opportunity to discuss methods to keep schools safe from

violence, to create school safety plans, and to recognize those students in need of help.

In Bergen County, New Jersey a directive (Directive 05-01) was distributed to all

Police Chiefs within the county mandating basic training for all active sworn law

enforcement officers employed therein in a uniform and consistent active-shooter

response. This training was required to be completed by September 1, 2005. Bergen

County distributed a model policy to police agencies, to adopt as their own or modify as

necessary to suit the needs of their respective jurisdiction.

Not until July, 2007, did the State of New Jersey follow suit by mandating that all

police departments have and maintain a policy and procedure for an active-shooter

response. This directive created mandatory training of all police recruits in the topic area

of active-shooter response while recruits are engaged in a police academy training

curriculum (NJ Attorney General Directive 2007-01).

In September, 2007, a report, "K-12 School Security Task Force Report" was

presented to New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine. This report discussed the topic of safer

schools throughout the state and concluded with recommendations for a distribution of

model policies on topic areas such as: active-shooter, bomb threats, lockdown, evacuation

and a public information officer (School Security Task Force, 2007). (As of late 2008,

the researcher has not located the model policies to have been distributed).

Progress is being made in school safety. A U.S. Department of Education survey

found that 96% of public schools required visitors to sign in before entering the school

building (National Center for Education Statistics, 1998). According to Garcia (2003) the

good news is that school homicide and violence is down, however the bad news is that

the number of rare multiple victim school shootings had increased in the mid 1990s.

New Police Tactics

Environment is a powerful inhibitor or facilitator of crime and situational

prevention strategies can affect its likelihood of occurrence (Cohen & Felson, 1979;

Weisburd et al., 2006). American schools have had to alter how they do business and

how they protect their students (Harper, 2000).

Active-shooters typically work within a plan they have developed. These plans

arc normally tactically laid out and well developed. These plans typically will include

rmdomly shooting victims, as many as they can, before committing suicide. Not many

of these actors are motivated by "getting out alive" or eventually having their day in

court; suicide is usually a part of the plan (Scanlon, 2001). Time, which had always been

the ally of the responding specialized teams en route to the crisis, is now worlung against

them (Egan, 1999).

The first responding police to the scene of an active-shooter situation are now

responsible for making a rapid assessment of not only all of the previously mentioned

criteria, but now they must decide whether to form up into teams and launch an assault of

their own. This assault goes by many different names. In New Jersey it is called Active-

Shooter Response by law enforcement, in Ohio it is called QUAD or Quick Action

Deployment, in other areas of the country it is known as Immediate Action Rapid

Deployment (IARD). Regardless of the name of the deployment tactics, most are nearly

identical in practice. They all are based upon the first responding police officers to a

scene, equipping themselves and forming up into three or four-person teams. These

teams are sometimes known as ASTs, short for Active-Shooter Teams. The officers or

teams then make an entry into the structure or facility that is under attack and as quickly

as possible find the aggressor[s] and stop them.

These types of tactics are situation-dependant though. They are not the answer to

every situation. If the officers are responding to a hank robbery or to a hostage situation,

these tactics are not appropriate. Police rushing into these types of events may cause

more harm than good. Time has always proven to be an asset when dealing with an event

in the absence of gunfire or killing. That being said, if there is shooting going on or if

people are being assaulted or killed the police have a moral obligation to make entry to

try to save innocent lives (Lloyd, 2000).

The premise behind the new system of tactics is quite simple. After an initial

assessment is made and information is provided to the police that there is an active-

shooter in a building or facility, the police will enter to locate and stop the shooting. This

is done in a rapid but organized manner and with tactics that have been shown to be

effective. The officers will form into three or four-person teams, preferably the latter. If

they have special equipment, they equip themselves as such. Some special equipment

may include: breaching tools (tools used to open doors and windows forcibly), assault

type rifles /long guns, extra gear such as ballistic helmets and tactical vests that carry

extra handcuffs and magazines loaded with ammunition or first aid equipment.

The team leader – whoever in the group is the most tactically minded or the best

thinker under pressure, regardless of rank – will direct the team to the chosen entry point.

In this regard the mission has the greatest chance for success; ability is put before ego

(Giduck, 2005). Safety is always a concern but speed is important. The team will stack

(a single-file formation) prior to entry into the building and perform a quick gear check to

make sure all team members have what they need. The team then enters the site.

Team members each have specific responsibilities. Once inside a structure the

team spreads out into a diamond formation. The front or first person inside is responsible

for all threats that are ahead of the team. The second person or the right side in the

diamond-style formation covers threats to the right of the group. This is typically the

team leader position. The threats may include windows or doors the group will pass.

The left side or third person will cover all threats to the left. The last or fourth person is

responsible for the rear safety, essentially to protect the group from any threat from the

rear and everything the group has already passed. This position is very difficult for two

reasons; this operator is (a) wallung backward and trying to keep up with members of a

team walking forward at a rapid and stressful pace, and (b) is walking blind into battle

with total reliance on other team members to cover their assignments.

One major difference between this type of entry and a S.W.A.T.-type entry is the

rapid movement past un-cleared areas. S.W.A.T. operators are taught to pass areas

they have not checked and cleared. An AST will move past everything until they

encounter, confront, and stop the shooter because they are moving to the sound of the

gunfire, or attack.

What makes this group so effective is that they are constantly moving toward the

actor or shooter. The group is directed either by updated intelligence from the command

structure outside the building or by intelligence they have gathered on their own inside

the building. Intelligence inside the building comes from various sources, such as from

students or teachers or employees running away from the source of violence to save

themselves, or from their own eyes, ears, and observations. Either way, the group's plan

is to move to the violent actor, confront him, contain him, stop him, arrest him, or engage

him in battle. There are basically three ways these situations end (a) suicide, (b)

surrender, or (c) termination (Borelli, 2005).

Problems with the New Tactics

These tactics may seem simple when explained in lay terms. The police respond,

assess the situation, and enter to stop the shooter. This sounds like an easy sell to police

officers. However, some parts of these tactics are very difficult to train for. The most

difficult aspect of this is to train the responding police officers that they must pass injured

victims and walking wounded: step over or around them if necessary to meet their

objective.

Yes, pass and leave the wounded: walk right past injured teachers and students

alike. The reason behind this unappealing and certainly unorthodox method of rescue is

to put an end to the shooting quickly. The primary way to reduce the number of potential

victims is to neutralize the shooter (Scanlon, 2001). One bright side to the new tactics is

that the team will communicate the location of the injured and any other available

information to the command post outside. The incident commander will decide to form a

rescue team specifically to retrieve the wounded.

If the inserted police officers who make up the ASTs get tied up with evacuation

efforts, with trying to treat and rescue the injured occupants of the building or by

searching rooms prior to passing, precious time is lost and the shooter is creating more

victims (Scanlon, 2001). A school or workplace could house hundreds of potential

victims. An effective use of the first responders is to install them into the area as

"hunters": they must hunt the aggressor, pass by all others, and focus on their mission to

stop the killing of innocent victims.

Acting as hunters is a difficult concept to train to a group of people who have

sworn to protect the citizens they serve. Most of a municipal police officer's job is

service-related. Police respond to more medical calls then they do to crimes in progress.

Police are accustomed to rendering first aid in a multitude of situations, from aid calls to

car accidents to slip and falls. Medical treatment would come more naturally to most

police officers than acting in a combat capacity.

The thouglit process behind this seemingly violent transition between police

officer and combatant is that people are dying waiting for you, the responding police

officer, to stop the person[s] doing the killing. To accomplish this, police must act more

like a military unit than a municipal police department. They must train to act fast and

with a maximum level of violence in order to take control of a bad situation therefore

saving lives (Giduck, 2005). Police have to be trained to think of these situations more as

a battle ground than a crime scene (Giduck, 2005). During the heat of battle, the focus

must be to stop the enemy by getting to and engaging the enemy quickly to end the

conflict.

The researcher acts as a trainer of these new tactics in a mid-sized municipal

police agency and along with a partner and co-trainer, identifies those police officers in

that agency who should never join the battle. Those that were identified should sooner be

sent to where nothing violent is occurring rather than risk their incompetence getting

brave police officers, willing to risk their own lives to save others, hurt or killed. These

police officers either lack the requisite skills to be a part of an ad hoc tactical team or just

cannot handle the stresses associated with this type of situation. Before the shooting

starts, is the time to take a realistic inventory of what human and material resources are

available to supervisors who will staff the command posts.

School Resource Officer

Many reports on the choice of a School Resource Officer (SRO) call for a

rigorous selection process for those who will be assigned to the schools. It just so

happens that these police officers are typically the first on scene at a school shooting

incident (Fairburn & Grossman, 2000). These police officers are stationed at area

schools and are positioned to be a vital part of a team inserted into a school. They should

have the best knowledge of the layout of the school and may also be able to identify the

actorlstudent doing the killing when only being provided with a name.

An SRO needs to be able to switch into a combat mode at the drop of the hat

because they have trained hard for this very type of situation. Let the teachers do the

teaching at the schools and have the police do the policing. The job of the SRO should

be to continuously be alert, prevent and react. In the absence of prevention they should

be able to switch gears and react to be the front line in the battle, bringing the battle to the

potential killer, whoever it may be (Fairbum & Grossman, 2000).

To provide high quality protection for our children takes training and more

training. The training requires time in the schools practicing for these very types of

events. The training has to include planning for other aspects that go along with critical

incident response, such as setting up perimeters, evacuation routes, staging areas for other

responding services and the like. The agencies that fail to plan for this type of event to

occur in their jurisdictions will have the most difficulty dealing with violence when it

happens. And it could happen anywhere.

One difficulty in training police is that all police executives are not sold on the

costs and benefits of this training. Some police executives have been in policing for

many years. Therefore, it is highly likely that they came into police work with a different

mindset, one devoted to old-style policing where police responded and waited to secure

the area. Justification for spending money on new equipment and training for their police

departments when they had always relied on the local, regional or county S.W.A.T. team

to handle tough situations may be difficult for them. The rationale behind this sentiment

is that S.W.A.T. teams train for critical incidents, so let them handle it. It is their job.

The problem with this mentality is the time that is lost while S.W.A.T. is responding

cannot be reclaimed; as more time goes by more victims are likely to be injured or killed.

As stated in chapter 1, every 15 seconds another victim is shot during an event of this

kind (Tactical Response Staff, 2008) so time cannot be spent waiting.

Research and Theory Related to

Police Administrators

There is an assumption among organization leaders and theorists that structure

influences behavior (Ouchi, 1977). According to Mintzberg (1979) action planning

specifies method and time frames for decisions and actions. Perrow (1986) described

rules that govern conditions of work and specify standard processes for carrying out

tasks, will help to ensure that similar situations are handled uniformly. Bolman and Deal

(2003) stated several of their assumptions of the structural frame; organizations: achieve

established goals and objectives; increase efficiency and enhance performance through

specialization and division of labor; and coordination and control ensure diverse efforts

of individuals and units mesh, through the use of structure.

Mintzberg's (1979) theory of action planning is a clear fit for police preparedness

because it accounts for how the job is done rather than specifically relying on the

outcome of the operation. In the type of police operation at the foundation of this study,

there will not always be positive results. Innocent people will lose their lives as police

move to their target. The police may have to pass by injured people on their way to

achieve their action plan. This tactical decision to save more lives by stopping the

shooter rather than to save the lives of the already injured can be applied to the heart of

Mintzberg's theory. The objective of success is more difficult to measure so it becomes

necessary to assess how the job is done. When innocent people die, it is difficult to call a

mission a success. However, using Mintzberg's action planning theory as a gauge,

persons in a debriefing session could look at the result of the mission: If lives were saved

by stopping the shooting was the mission a success?

The theory of rules discussed by Perrow (1986) can also be applied to police

training. This theory again allows for interoperability of police departments that

normally do not work together. If all agencies are training in the same tactics then the

likelihood of an operation that is jointly undertaken (interoperability) will be successful

greatly increases.

The theories that are a part of the foundation of the structural frame as discussed

in Bolman and Deal (2003) lend themselves rather neatly to the field of policing. Police

officers work under very structured conditions that are rule oriented. In the field of

policing there is a very clear chain of command and the structure of police departments

and their level of preparation will determine the outcome of the situations they face.

The assumptions described by Bolman and Deal (2003) that people in

organizations achieve established goals and objectives can be applied to police training

because there must be a clear and concise plan established to determine what tactics will

be taught. The assumption concerning increased efficiency and enhanced performance

through specialization and division of labor (Bolman & Deal, 2003) applies to police

training for critical-incident response in that specialization and division of labor allows

police to train for specific tasks and excel in their performance. The more successful the

police officer is at their assigned task the more likely the mission will result in success.

To date, most research on school shootings has been conducted by psychologists

who have focused on mental illnesses and problems of the offenders however; little

attention has been paid to the social and cultural contexts of these incidents (Fox &

Harding, 2005). Less attention has been paid to the law enforcement aspect of this

problem. This researcher has found no studies focused on the best method for law

enforcement officers to respond and deal with a school shooting.

School Violence

According to Currie (1985) many theories on juvenile violence were flawed because

they were somehow separate from social policies, inequality, racism, unemployment and

neglect. Currie called the failure to address these other issues the "fallacy of autonomy"

(Currie, 1985, p. 185).

In their general theory of crime, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) stated that low self

control in the pursuit of self interest causes crime. Their assumption is based on

parenting deficiencies for those that are more likely to express themselves defiantly and

in criminality.

Organizational deviance occurs when events that are created by or in

organizations do not conform to an organization's goals or expectations and produce

unanticipated and harmful outcomes (Vaughan, 1999, p273). After a 2 year study,

O'Toole (1999) concluded that no research exists that has identified traits and

characteristics that can reliably distinguish school shooters from other students.

O'Toole's (1999) study asserted that many studies of school shootings were based

predominantly upon media accounts of the events. These accounts would often be flawed

because the media did not enjoy access to confidential law enforcement and school files

(O'Toole, 1999). O'Toole (1999) identified personality and behavioral traits that many

school shooters possess; although O'Toole stressed that none of the traits should carry

more weight than the other. O'Toole concluded the report with the recommendation that

school and police administrators use threat assessment to thwart possible attacks. A

threat was defined as an expression of intent to do harm or act out violently against some

one or something. The threat can be oral, written or symbolic (O'Toole, 1999).

The U.S. Secret Service (2002b) advocates responsible bystander behavior where

students with knowledge of events or threats should inform responsible adults. This

would allow for problems to be addressed before they end in potential school violence.

Coordination and control help to ensure that diverse efforts of individuals and

units mesh (Bolman & Deal, 2003). This theory is the premise behind having a unified

response plan for police first responders to violent school incidents. Through the use of

s t ~ c t u r e , police officers from various agencies are able to work safely and effectively

together.

Fox and Harding (2005) studied organizational deviance as a factor of school

violence. According to Fox and Harding (2005) rampage school shootings fit Vaughan's

definition of organizational deviance because the violence deviates from formal design

goals and normative standards or expectations.

Kurtz and Nofziger (2005) stated that using routine-activities theory and or a

lifestyle model to study juvenile exposure to violence is a useful tool. In their study, data

from a nationally representative sample demonstrates that routine-activity of lifestyles

that expose juveniles to violence serve as and important risk factor for juveniles

offending violently (Kurtz & Nofziger, 2005). However, Kurtz and Nofziger (2005)

pointed out that many studies of juvenile violence tend to focus on friends, family and

violent juveniles. The gap in the research appears to be that routine activities or lifestyle

create a situation where the juvenile may be an innocent bystander to violent crime

(Kurtz & Nofziger, 2005). Juveniles become at risk because of the violence they witness

rather than the violence in which they are a participant.

According to Gottfredson, Gottfredson, Gottfredson and Payne (2005) recent

attempts to prevent serious violent crime in schools have been focused on identifying the

characteristics of the offenders. The study had been undertaken to try to successfully

identify potential shooters before they act (Gottfredson et al., 2005). A more accurate

way to track school violence is to identify the schools with elevated crime rates and

violent incidents (Gottfredson et al., 2005). The basis for this theory is that prior studies

on school characteristics as predictors of deviant or violent behavior have shown that

community characteristics, school structural characteristics along with variables outside

of the control of school administrators are effective predictors of the level of disorder in

schools (Gottfredson et al, 2005).

Optimistic bias (Chapin & Coleman, 2006; Weinstein, 1980) refers to the

perception that bad things happen to other people. Reduction of optimistic bias in regard

to school violence is an important step in creating an understanding in students' personal

risks, getting them to take threats seriously and taking self-protective measures (Chapin

& Coleman, 2006). The Chapin and Coleman (2006) study was the first study of

optimistic bias in the context of school violence. Other studies have used optimistic bias

to study violence in the context of violence against women and child abuse (Chapin &

Coleman, 2006). The validity of direct application of results the study may be

questionable in that it was conducted on a small scale in one county in Pennsylvania.

Policy recommendation for both police and school administrators may require the study

to be replicated on a larger scale.

Routine-activities theory (Kautt & Roncek, 2007) revealed that schools can be

criminal hotspots. The theory states that schools are likely locations for violence and

criminal activity due to the familiarity of the location to the juvenile actors.

Pies (2007) called for a "distant early warning" system of indicators to identify

troubled students. This can only be done when the full resources of doctors, parents,

schools, and communities are combined to reduce the plague of violence in our culture

(Pies, 2007).

This information is equally as important to school administrators as it is to police

administrators that are trying to understand violence in schools. School administrators

can work toward intervention strategies when armed with knowledge of what types of

students have the potential to he violent and from what set of circumstances they come

from. This is not a be all and end all. There is no crystal ball to predict the future acts of

school violence. School administrators can work toward putting measures in place when

they become aware of students that may be in crisis mode as defined by the numerous

theories previously discussed. The true benefit of a mutual knowledge shared by both

police and school administrators is that information can be shared in a symbiotic

relationship to ensure a safer learning environment for all students.

Theoretical Framework

To establish a strong relationship between the number of police officers trained to

provide active-shooter training to other police officers and the frequency of training

police are doing to be better prepared to respond to active-shooter situations in the

schools and the variables that may have an effect on the training, consideration should be

given to theory and research in the field of study. Theories of organizational structures,

goals, and planning are part of the theoretical framework for the present study.

Organizations are designed to achieve established goals and objectives; increase

efficiency and enhance performance through specialization and division of labor; and

coordination and control ensure diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh, through the

use of structure (Bolman & Deal, 2003). Therefore, when police agencies establish a

structured environment where training, planning and goal setting are stressed the result is

better preparation for critical incident response.

At the foundation of the present study is the Standardization of Patrol Based

Response to Active-Shooter Situations. In this standardization policy, the appropriate

response strategy involves immediate action and quick deployment by patrol forces to

stop deadly actions of criminal actor[s]. For police to delay deployment under these

circumstances may result in additional death or serious injuries (BCPO, 2005).

Summary

Parents and citizens are entitled to have their police agencies, at the municipal,

county, state and federal levels make adaptations to do more to enhance their quality of

life. To accomplish this, these agencies must work hard to prepare for events that have

become all too common in our society. School violence, work place shootings and

potential terrorist activity on US soil is now more than ever a reality.

School safety training and critical-incident drills have become mandated in New

Jersey and other states. As much as had been done to prevent fire deaths in schools,

needs to be done to prevent death at the hands of a violent adult or student in a school.

With fire sprinklers and alarms in every school, and fire drills and evacuation routes

preplanned, the likelihood of a student dying in a fire in a school in the US is minimal at

best. In fact, no child has died in a fire in the last 25 years in an American school.

However in the school year 2004/2005,48 people were killed at the hands of a violent

aggressor in schools (Fairbum & Grossman, 2000).

Training and safety have a long way to go toward prevention of these types of

incidents. In the mean time there has to be more done for police to be able to effectively

minimize the causalities in our nation's schools. School adrmnistrators are more alert and

aware of potential problem students. Schools are being equipped with surveillance

devices to protect the potential victims contained therein. More needs to be done to

prepare for the most likely threat that may come to those in the building. To prepare for

the violent people who are allowed access to the facility.

This has to come from the police and their stepped up efforts of training and

planning for potential attack. With the initiation of tactics such as active-shooter training

and all of its kind, there needs to be a follow through. This will come at the hands of

forward thinking police executives that realize that there is a need for getting their

officers into schools to become more familiar with the interior layouts of the buildings.

Executives that understand that the officers that are assigned to schools in the capacity of

the SRO, are truly the best qualified to thwart or fend off an attack on the school. Police

executives must understand that the time of setting up and waiting for S.W.A.T. is no

longer an option. They need to realize that all of their police officers must be tactically

trained to be able to make a difference. They need to act in spite of any lack of help by

school administrators.

In 2004, a Columbus, Ohio police officer had stopped a deadly attack at a night

club concert. A gunman had entered the club and killed a band member on stage while

he was performing. An alert police officer trained in QUAD, (the Ohio version of active-

shooter training) entered the night club, encountered the suspect and shot him dead,

stopping the shooter's deadly assault before any more lives had been taken (Marx &

Mayhood).

In 2005 in Red Lake, Minnesota a 16 year old student killed a grandparent and the

grandparent's companion. The student went to his high school and shot a teacher, a

security guard, and five other students before killing himself. The Red Lake Police

Department had prepared for an event like this and trained for it at the school. They

relied on their training and made immediate entry into the school (School Violence

Resource Center, 2007). Their response time and school entry was 2 minutes. The police

officers found, confronted, shot, and wounded the violent student who then retreated into

a classroom and killed himself (Freed, 2005). Their training had paid off. Although

innocent lives had been lost, many more people could have been killed without the

immediate response by the police.

These two incidents have shown that rapid police response to a scene and

immediate police action will save lives. Violence can happen anywhere and if the police

have not prepared for it there is the potential for many lives to be lost.

This researcher believes plans need to be developed now for all facets of these

critical incidents. Road closure plans, staging areas, triage locations, debriefing sites,

contact lists and the like. During the mayhem of these encounters there is too much to do

to just wing it. Responses may need to be to a degree scripted to get as much essential

work done with a minimum level of thinking about the various contacts that may need to

be made. If a response plan exists some things on scene can become automatic and more

attention can be focused on other areas of concern that may need more attention.

Chapter I1 has presented a review of pertinent literature, research and theory

which contained; an introduction, background, a historical summary of events, traditional

police tactics, legal mandates for change, new police tactics, problems with the new

tactics, related research and theory to police administrators, school violence, a theoretical

framework, and a summary. Chapter 111 will include a description of the design and

methods of the study by discussing; purpose, design, population, methods,

instrumentation, and a conclusion.

Chapter I11

DESIGN AND METHODS

Purpose

This chapter provides an overview of purpose, design, methods, population,

instrumentation, and conclusion. The purpose for this study was to explore the influence

that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and

future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response

to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in

schools is mandatory for the children of Bergen County, New Jersey it becomes

imperative that the municipal police departments of the county are able to provide a safe

learning environment while children are in attendance. Bergen County has 68 municipal

police departments that were included as participants in the study. The researcher

obtained a complete list of municipal police departments in Bergen County on the Bergen

County Prosecutor's Office website, www.bcpo.net, then added the number of police

officers employed by each municipality with information derived from the FBI's 2006

Uniform Crime Report, New Jersey full-time law enforcement employees (see Appendix

B).

The researcher was guided by the following questions:

Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding

to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children

since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County b rose cut or's

Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b)

How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?

Question 2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the

Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model

policy?

Question 3. What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers

designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being

done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

Because there is relatively little research in the field of police tactics and only

some theory, most of which is concerned with the psychological characteristics of the

actor[s], the researcher relied heavily on related literature and the descriptions of prior

events. The study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy and

only now has begun to be seriously studied and therefore, there is a lack of information

available on police training (O'Brien, 2008a). The importance of this study is based in

the knowledge of "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it"

(Santayana, 1905, p. 13).

Design

A survey instrument was assembled to gather information in several topic areas:

descriptive information, personnel, operations, specialized units, emergency preparedness

for Active-Shooter 1 Critical Incident response, equipment, and policies and procedures.

Six of the eight sections of the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice

Statistics Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey

were borrowed with permission (see Appendix C). The survey instrument then

comprised of 58 questions which were assembled to gather descriptive information. A

total of 51 questions were borrowed from the LEMAS survey instrument and 7 original

questions designed by the researcher. Permission was granted via telephonic and email

contact with Dr. Brian Reaves, the lead statistical administrator of the survey for the

Bureau of Justice Statistics. Specifically, Dr. Reaves stated in an email correspondence

that permission was granted to use certain questions from the original LEMAS survey

tool. The original survey instrument was not a copy-written document and was therefore

public domain. However, a request was made from Dr. Reaves that the Bureau of

Justice Statistics not be mentioned in the new survey instrument: a request which was

honored by the researcher.

A pilot study was then conducted to determine face validity of the survey

instrument. Some comments received from the respondents of the pilot study included

that the survey was lengthy and time consuming. See the instrumentation section of this

chapter for more information on the results of the pilot study and specific comments

made by the participants for the revision of the survey instrument.

As a result of the feedback generously provided by the participants of the pilot

study of this project, a total of four questions were used from the original LEMAS survey

instrument. Questions originally designed to gather information about the number of

full time police officers working for a law enforcement agency, total dollar amount in

operating budget of the agency, total dollar amount in seized funds made by the agency,

and total calls for service responded to by the agency. All questions were based on the

2007 calendar year, the last complete year of operation of the agency prior to this study

taking place. After further review of the research tool, the researcher realized the survey

tool distributed in the pilot study gathered a large amount of information that shared little

relevance to this research project. Several of the topic areas previously mentioned were

deleted to comply with the suggestions of the participants of the pilot study.

The remaining eight questions included in the revised survey instrument for this

research project were developed by the researcher in conjunction with a jury of experts.

The final survey instrument used in this study comprised of 11 questions (see Appendix

D). These questions were specifically tailored to provide answers to the guiding

questions of this research project.

The present study is a type 2 design, that Johnson (2001) calls a cross-sectional,

descriptive study. It is cross-sectional because the data are collected from participants at

a single point in time. According to Johnson (2001), if the researcher is describing

phenomenon and documenting the characteristics of phenomenon then the study is

descriptive non-experimental research. The data directly apply to each case at a single

time and comparisons are made across the variables of interest (Johnson, 2001, p. 9).

The present study sought to answer the following questions:

Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding

to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children

since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's

Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? (b)

How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? Question 2.

Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization of

Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? Question 3. What

factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train

others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police

departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

This study can be described as a cross-sectional descriptive non-experimental

research by the use of the Johnson (2001) descriptions. According to Witte and Witte

(2004) the present study collected qualitative data because when a single observation is a

word or a code that is representative of a class or category, the data are qualitative. Witte

and Witte (2004) also suggest that descriptive statistics such as tables, graphs and

averages can be used to organize and summarize information about a collection of

observations. The researcher proposed to use descriptive statistical methods to address

guiding questions one and two of this project. Through the use of frequency distributions

the researcher addressed the data gathered from the survey instrument to answer the

guiding questions.

To answer guiding question 3 the researcher used the Chi-Squared (@) statistical

method. Analyses were then conducted to determine what relationship the independent

or predictor variables (total budget, total dollar amount of seized funds, number of sworn

law enforcement officers, and total calls for service each from the calendar year 2007)

had on each of the two dependant variables (the number of police officers designated to

train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being conducted).

Methods

This study relied solely on self reported data by agents of police departments.

According to Kerlinger (1986) "It can even be said that non-experimental research is

more important than experimental research.. ." (p. 359). Gall, Borg, and Gall (1996)

stated causal -comparative methods are the easiest quantitative approach to looking into

cause and effect relationships between phenomena. One of the objectives of this study

was to find which of the independent variables discovered in the survey instrument had

the most effect on the type and frequency of training being done in municipal police

departments of Bergen County. Because all of the 68 municipal police departments in

the county were included in the study it was considered a census. The researcher

proposed to have all 68 of the municipal police departments existing in Bergen County,

NJ participate in the study. A letter asking for permission to send each of the police

agencies a survey was sent to the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. The researcher

received a letter from the prosecutor's office granting permission to send the survey to

the municipal police agencies (see Appendix C). In the permission letter was a request

for the researcher to share the findings of this project with the prosecutor's office.

Furthermore, in a follow up phone conversation the researcher had with First Assistant

Prosecutor William Galda, it was made known that this research project stimulated

interest in a topic that had been put aside for a period while other important topics were

being handled. The project sewed as a catalyst for the prosecutor's office to look into all

the policies that municipal police agencies had submitted since the distribution of the

training memo at the foundation of this study. This leads the researcher to conclude that

prior to any data collection this research project has been a useful tool in reigniting

interest in an area that may have been forgotten.

The rationale for soliciting participation from each of the municipal police

departments in the county is in the similarities and differences of the police departments.

Responses to the survey instrument from police departments of varying staffing levels,

economic prowess, and setting (urban 1 suburban) will paint a more accurate picture of

what training is occurring within the county in the realm of active-shooter response. The

primary objective of this study was to determine what influence the Bergen County

Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations of all

sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter

situations in their jurisdictions. Each identified municipal police department in the

county was sent a survey instrument (N=68) along with completion instructions and a

cover letter requesting the Chief of Police, civilian Police Director or their designee

complete and return the survey to the researcher.

The final survey instrument comprised of 11 fact based questions was sent to a

jury of experts in the field. The experts agreed that the survey was easy to understand,

easy to complete, and took very little time to locate the information to answer the

questions. The original questions borrowed from the LEMAS survey come with a

reported 90% reliability estimate as provided by the lead statistician for the survey, Dr.

Reaves of the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The LEMAS survey is distributed to police

agencies across the United States every three years and has been determined to be both a

valid and reliable tool.

All information being requested by the survey is accessible to the researcher

through the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), however it is the contention of the

researcher that in the form of a survey instrument the most current and accurate data will

be collected which will make the resulting information more timely and relevant. If the

researcher were to request all information being sought in this study through OPRA the

information gathered may not be the most current as record updating is not a daily

occurrence in governmental agencies, and this process would add a significant amount of

time to the project as well.

Once the voluntary participant police agencies return the surveys to the researcher

a Cronbach's Alpha test will be conducted to determine a reliability coefficient.

Cronbach's Alpha is a test reliability technique to provide a unique estimate of the

reliability for a given test (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). This will be reported in more detail in

chapter IV.

Prior to mailing the surveys, they will be coded with a control number known

only to the researcher to track the responses as they are returned. No questions will be

asked to specifically identify any agency based on the responses provided by the

participants. No personal or identifying information will be asked of the person or

representative of the police agency that has completed the survey. This is another layer

of anonymity built in to the present study. All surveys as they are returned to the

researcher will be stored in a locked fire resistant safe in the home of the researcher to

maintain the security of the data. This information will be maintained for a period of no

less than three years. The survey is also completely voluntary in nature. The study was

approved by the Seton Hall University Institutional Review board on December 17,2008

(see Appendix C).

Population

All of the police agencies used in this study are located in Bergen County, NJ, and

each falls under the direction of the Bergen County Prosecutor's office jurisdiction.

There are a total of 68 municipal police departments included in the study. Some of the

distinctions of the police agencies are: number of sworn officers, square mileage

patrolled by the agency, equipment, and specialized services available by the agency.

Police departments were approved to participate in this study through a permission letter

approved by the Bergen County Prosecutor, John L. Molinelli. Police departments were

then sent a cover letter with an explanation of the study and survey instrument to

complete and return to the researcher.

Instrumentation

The LEMAS survey instrument was adapted to the specific needs of this research

project. Wording of selected questions was changed to reflect the timeframe under study.

Section V community policing and section VI emergency preparedness which is specific

to terrorist activity were not used. A new section V with original questions formulated by

the researcher along with a jury of experts in the field of policing, emergency

management, and tactics was substituted to help the researcher answer the guiding

questions of this research project. The researcher developed questions which replaced

the original section V of the study and sent them electronically to Dr. David Klinger of

the Criminology and Criminal Justice Department of The University of Missouri – St.

Louis; Dr. Stephen Hoptay, Lieutenant with the New Jersey State Police, Office of

Emergency Management, Special Operations Section; Dr. Daniel Simone, Captain with

the Hohoken (NJ) Police Department; Sergeant David Champerlain of the Modesto (CA)

Police Department, Special Victims Unit; and John Gnagey, Executive Director of the

National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) for feedback. With feedback and expert

advice from the aforementioned experts in the field, questions were developed and

accepted for use in the study.

A pilot study was then conducted on August 1,2008 with the survey instrument in

three municipalities in New Jersey that are in neighhoring counties to Bergen; Morris and

Passaic. In Passaic County the researcher contacted Chief Joseph Borell of the

Bloomingdale Police Department, and Lt. Paul Dring of the Wayne Police Department.

In Morris County the researcher contacted Chief Brian Spring of the Pequannock Police

Department. The aforementioned police departments were selected for the pilot study for

two reasons; (a) they are in neighhoring counties to Bergen, (b) they are a representative

sample of the number of police officers in municipal police departments in Bergen

County. The Bloomingdale Police Department has 16 full-time police officers,

Pequannock has 30, and Wayne has 116. These numbers are very similar to the Bergen

County staffing levels for small, medium and larger sized agencies listed in the 2006 FBI

Uniform Crime Report (FBI, 2006).

Each of these police administrators was provided with the survey instrument and

asked to complete it using the attached directions. They were then asked to contact the

researcher via email as soon as it was completed to provide constructive feedback and

make any necessary revisions or recommendations to make the survey instrument

stronger. The pilot study was conducted from August 1,2008 to August 6,2008.

Chief Borell suggested that the overall appearance of the survey seemed a bit

cluttered and lengthy. Once the Chief began to work on the study, the cluttered feeling

disappeared and the ease of the survey questions became apparent. A comment was

forwarded that the survey seemed a bit too long, with 58 total questions. The Chief stated

the survey instrument was well written and it was clear to the reader what was being

asked. Chief Borell stated the survey took an estimated 45 to 50 minutes to complete.

Chief Borell suggested shortening the survey to include only the information that was

most necessary for the study. With a completion time estimated at approximately 60

minutes, the survey taker may lose interest. Chief Borell made one last comment that was

especially important; the survey should be completed by an agency head. The necessity

of this was born out the type of information being sought, that is budget items, training

hours, and salaries.

Lt. Dring also suggested the survey be completed by a member of the police

department's administrative staff, in the Lieutenant's words, "upper command staff'.

The Lieutenant cited some of same the reasons Chief Borell did for this need. Lt. Dring

stated the survey took approximately 60 to 90 minutes to complete which was even

longer than the time taken by Chief Borell. This estimation was closer to the latter due to

malung several in-house phone calls to gather information that was not immediately

available to the Lieutenant. Lt. Dring also recommended the survey be shortened to

maintain the interest of the participant.

Chief Spring estimated the completion time for the survey at about 90 minutes.

This was consistent with the prior two responses. Chief Spring did not feel as though any

one question was too difficult to answer, and that they were all very clear in what they

were asking. Chief Spring's final comment about the questionnaire was that no revisions

were necessary and all of the questions were clear, concise and relevant but the survey

took a substantial amount of time to complete.

The time to complete the survey was estimated at approximately 60 to 90 minutes

by each of the pilot study participants. This was a duration which seemed to be too long

for each of the participants. Each participant in the pilot study did recommend that an

upper level or command staff member such as the Chief or top administrator complete the

survey as they would have the easiest access to the information requested. The result of

the pilot test was that significant revisions were made.

The survey was pared down from 58 questions to 11 in total. The 11 total

questions were those that would specifically be used to answer the guiding questions of

this research project. The new survey instrument was then sent to four new participants

that agreed to answer the survey and provide feedback. The information gathered from

the new participants, all administrative level police officers; was that the survey was well

written, the questions were clear and concise, the survey took about 10 to 15 minutes to

complete, and the survey should not be an imposition on a police administrator to

participate in the study due to the ease of the completion of the survey instrument.

The final survey instrument coded with a control number was mailed along with a

cover letter of explanation, and a self addressed stamped envelope to facilitate a more

likely return mailing of the completed survey to the researcher. The researcher mailed

the surveys on December 18,2008 and asked the participants to return the 1 1 question

survey by January 7,2009. The researcher allowed a third week for any late mailings

before beginning any statistical processes.

By using frequency distributions the researcher will demonstrate to the reader;

how many police departments in Bergen County, NJ had an active-shooter response plan

in effect prior the training mandate established by the county prosecutor's office, how

many agencies share radio interoperability with neighboring and bordering jurisdictions

since the training mandate, which kinds of equipment purchases were made by police

departments to facilitate forced entry into structures since the mandate, what kind of

training is being done to practice for a future active-shooter event, how many officers

have been trained to instruct other police officers in this type of response tactics, how

often police are training for these kinds of events, how many police departments have

adopted the model policy distributed by the county prosecutor's office or created their

own policy and why. Then the information collected on the number of sworn police

officers, total budget, total in seized funds, and number of calls for service will be used as

variables in a Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis to see which has the most influence on

the number of police officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the

frequency of training being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in

schools in Bergen County, NJ.

Conclusion

In Chapter 111 the researcher described the design and methods of the study by

discussing; purpose, design, population, methods, and instrumentation. Chapter IV will

present the collected data along with an analysis of the data collected by using frequency

distributions and Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analyses to determine which variables have

the most influence on Active-Shooter preparation being done by police departments in

Bergen County, NJ.

Chapter IV

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

Introduction

The researchers' purpose for conducting thls non-experimental study was to

investigate the influence that the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office Directive 05-01 had

on the training and future preparations of all sworn police officers in Bergen County,

New Jersey in response to active-shooter situations in the schools of their jurisdictions.

The investigation was narrowly focused on answering the following guiding questions:

Question 1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding

to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children

since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's

Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments? @)

How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic? Question 2.

Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization of

Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? Question 3. What

factors account for the variability in the number of police officers designated to train

others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being done in police

departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

Collection of Data

Table 1 provides a list of events complied by the researcher that were carried out

or planned to occur in schools across the country (in 30 of the 50 states) since the attack

at Columbine High School in April 1999. Each item in Table 1 required a police

response to a private residence or school, either to thwart an attack in progress or to

intervene in the implementation of a planned attack. A review of Table 1 shows the

absence of absolutes in the events. It is important to note that "those who cannot

remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Santayana, 1905, p. 13). Therefore,

similar events need to be positioned together to be able to form a complete picture of

what could happen at any time.

Although the events were primarily staged and carried out by males, the example

which occurred on October 4, 2002 in San Antonio, TX, describes a female actor. Most

attacks occurred inside schools in hallways, classrooms, gymnasiums, and bathrooms;

however, some occurred outside of the schools on the grounds and in parking lots. The

events took place in urban, suburban and rural settings across all socio-economic strata.

Victims were teachers, students and sometimes bystanders, both male and female. Actors

in the events ranged from children (6 years old) to adults.

For this study, a survey instrument was developed with the assistance of a jury of

experts in the field of law enforcement. The survey was revised through a continuous

flow of back and forth dialogue between the researcher and the jury of experts until a

final version was selected. This process was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 111.

This final survey instrument, consisting of 11 questions, was then distributed as a

pilot study for feedback. After the determination that the final 1 1 question survey was to

be distributed to the target population (N = 68), it was mailed with permission from the

Bergen County Prosecutor's Office to all of the municipal police departments in Bergen

County, NJ. The mailings took place on December 18,2008 and in the attached letter of

solicitation it was requested that the voluntary participants return the survey to the

researcher by January 7,2009 (see Appendix E). The researcher then allowed for another

7 days for returns to account for the large volume of mail during the holiday season.

In total 68 surveys were mailed on December 18,2008, one to each of the 68

municipal police departments in Bergen County as listed on the Bergen County

Prosecutor's Office website, www.bcpo.net. On the January 14,2009 cut off date for

returned surveys, 46 surveys were returned to the researcher resulting in a return rate of

68%. Of the 46 returned surveys, 1 was returned with all of the questions crossed out and

no responses selected with a notation added which read "This causes me concerns on

security issues." Therefore, all descriptive statistics and analyses are based on 45 returns

(N = 45).

Data and Findings

Descriptive Statistics

Survey question l a was designed to learn if, prior to the September 1,2005

mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office for active-shooter response

training, police agencies had a written plan that specified actions to be taken in the event

of an active-shooter in a school. Table 3 indicates that slightly more than half of the

responding police agencies did not have a written plan which specified response actions

to an active-shooter situation in a school of their jurisdiction. Therefore, a mandate to

either develop their own plan or adopt the response plan as distributed was a step in the

right direction toward getting police departments in the country to plan for this type of

critical incident response.

Table 3

Bergen County Police Departments with Response Plan Prior to Prosecutor's Office Training Mandate of September 1,2005 Response n %

Yes 21 46.7 No 24 53.3 Total 45 (N) 100.

Survey question i b provided information on the number of police departments

(21) that indicated they did have a written response plan, and had a mutual aid or

cooperative agreement between neighboring and or geographically bordering

jurisdictions. Table 4 shows that of the 21 police departments that indicated they already

had a response plan prior to the prosecutor's office mandate, 18 had an agreement with

neighboring police departments for mutual aid responses. These results showed that

administrators in police departments that did develop a response plan saw the need to

work cooperatively with neighboring departments.

Table 4

Bergen County Police Departments with Existing Response Plans that have Mutual Aid Agreements for Joint Responses Response n %

Yes 18 86. No 3 14. Total 2 1 100.

–

Survey question 2 was developed to find out if respondents had, after the

September 1,2005 training mandate, radio communications interoperability with

geographically bordering jurisdictions. Table 5 shows that of the 43 responses to

question number 2,40 police departments did have radio communication interoperability

with geographically bordering jurisdictions. This is another success of the distributed

response model policy. The response model policy created awareness for radio

communications interoperability between agencies that will respond to a crisis together.

Table 5

Radio Communications Interoperability Between Neighboring Police Jurisdictions in Bergen County following Active-Shooter Planning Response n 9%

Yes 40 93. No 3 7. Total 43 100.

Survey question 3 was created to find out what types of tactical response gear the

police departments of Bergen County either purchased or acquired since the September 1,

2005 mandate. Table 6 indicates the types of response gear and the number of police

departments reporting they acquired the respective items. The table shows that ballistic

shields and carbine or patrol rifles were acquired more than other response gear items.

Table 6

Tactical Response Gear Acquired after Training Mandate of September 1, 2005 (N = 45) Gear Item Police Departments that Acquired Gear

n % Ballistic Helmets 34 76. Ballistic Shields 42 93. Battering Rams 19 42. Bolt Cutters 29 64. Carbine or Patrol Rifles 36 80. Hallagan or Pry Bars 32 71. Sledge Hammers 24 53.

Survey question 4 provided information on the types of training activities the

respondent police departments participated in to prepare their officers better to respond to

an active-shooter event in a school in their jurisdiction. Table 7 displays which types of

training exercises and the number of agencies that participated in those exercises. The

table includes percentages of Bergen County municipal police departments that

participated at least once in each training category (multiple choices were possible). Of

the various types of training listed, 39 police departments (87%) participated in active-

shooter training in empty schools. This training is helpful for familiarization with

response tactics and acclimation to the interior of schools. When police officers become

familiar with the areas they may need to respond to in a crisis situation they may perform

better under stressful conditions in those settings. The number of responses shows that,

on average, responding police departments participated in 2.8 types of training.

Table 7

Training Exercises Participated in by Bergen County Police Departments for Active- Shooter Training ( N = 45) Multiple Choices Possible. Type of Training Number of Police Departments

n % Table TOD 15 33. ~ u l t i – ~ e ' p t . Table Top 9 Training in Empty School 39 Training in School wl Actors 24 Multi-Dept. Training in Empty School 26 Multi-Dept. Training in School w/ Actors 15

Survey question 5 was created to learn from the responding police department

administrators, the number of police officers in their agencies who were trained to train

other police officers in active-shooter response. Table 8 reports the frequency

distribution of responses. Question 5 responses were then statistically collapsed into

logical groupings for later statistical analysis. The collapse was done using natural and

logical break points.

Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter Response Number of Officers Trained n %

0 2 4.4 1 1 2.3 2 16 35.5 3 13 28.8 4 8 17.7 5 2 4.4 6 1 2.3 7 1 2.3

20 1 2.3 Totals 45 (N) 100.

Table 9 displays the recoded data from survey question 5. Data recoding was

done to logically develop the groupings into a low number of officers trained (0-2

officers), a medium number of officers trained (3 officers), and a high number of officers

trained (more than 3 officers) to train other police officers in active-shooter response.

– —

Table 9

Recoded responses: Police Departments Reporting the Number of Officers Trained to Train Other Police Officers in Active-Shooter Response Officers Trained n % Low Number of Officers Trained (0-2 Officers) 19 42.

Medium Number of Officers Trained (3 Officers)

Hi& Number of Officers Trained 13 29. Total 45 (N) 100.

Table 8 shows one outlier police agency that reported 20 police officers trained to

train other police officers, otherwise the scale of responses ranged from 0-7. Of the 45

police department administrators who responded to this question 29 (or 64%) reported

that their agencies had either 2 or 3 officers trained to train other police officers in the

active-shooter response tactics.

Survey question 6 was created to learn how often police administrators, since the

September 1,2005 training mandate, required their police officers to participate in

training for active-shooter response whether it was practice scenarios, table-top exercises

or roll-call discussions. These responses too were reported as frequencies then recoded

and re-reported in statistically collapsed groups for later statistical analyses. These

groups were also created using natural and logical break off points. Table 10 shows the

frequency distribution of responses to the amount of training that is being done for

municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. As indicated in Table 10, of the 45

police department administrators that answered this survey question, 29 answered that

they required their officers to participate in training either bi-annually or yearly.

Table 10

Frequency of Active-Shooter Training Required at Police Departments in Bergen County

Training Frequency Agencies Reporting (n) %

Monthly Quarterly Bi-annually Yearly Never

Total 45 (N) 100.

Shown below, Table 1 I reports the recoded responses from survey question 6

reported in Table 10. These responses were later used for statistical analyses.

Table 1 1.

Recoded responses, Amount of Required Training by Bergen County Police Departments Training Frequency Agencies Reporting (n) %

Once a Quarter or Monthly Bi-annually Once a Year or Never

Total

Survey question 7a provided information on whether or not police departments

had adopted the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) Standardization of Patrol

Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy and the reasons which led to

the adoption. Table 12 lists the responses provided by agencies that did adopt the model

policy.

Reoccurring themes developed from the responses provided for why agencies did

adopt the model policy were either standardization, or having all police officers in the

county being trained in the same tactics. Table 13 displays (question 7h responses) the

reasons police administrators indicated why they did nor elect to implement the BCPO

policy as written.

Table 12

( 7 a ) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for Adopting the BCPO Model Policy R e s ~ o n s e s n

Response checked but no comment added Added agency specific material Adopted their policies and created additional policies All All officers on same page Allowed numerous agencies to utilize the response procedures with generic roles for each officer Already studied and used Bergen County Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) policy was sufficient for our needs Consistency through out area agencies Everyone then operates the same Felt BCPO policy worked best for our agency Good S.O.P. Helped develop the plan It was deemed sufficient and appropriate It was our intent to remain consistent with the agencies in Bergen County It was very similar to our original policy and would prevent conflict Policy fit our needs and was crafted by Bergen County Police Chiefs Association Policy was a good fit for our department Presumably much time and effort and input was acquired to make the policy one of the best possible Standard through the county Standardization Standardization with other agencies we would expect to work with Standardized policy with contiguous police departments The model policy allows us to be on same page as surrounding departments The policy fit our requirements with minor modifications To best conform with BCPO To conform to standardized countywide training, realizing mutual aid would be necessary To maintain uniformity with surrounding jurisdictions and county police Took model and modified it to meet needs of our jurisdiction We have the same training and procedures of the other agencies responding We will provide the minimum mandated training to comply with the BCPO directives

Total 32

Table 13

(7b) Responses: Reasons Provided by Agencies for not Adopting the BCPO Model Policy

Responses n

Response checked but no comment listed BCPO policy allows for 3 person teams, we mandate minimum of 4 person teams BCPO policy and added National Tactical Officers Assoc. (NTOA) techniques Created from other agencies models but similar to BCPO policy Formulated to borough schools, used several parts of BCPO policy Had a similar policy in place Had standard NTOA policy in effect prior to BCPO policy In effect prior to BCPO mandate, covers all relevant training equipment etc.. . To better our own immediate needs To conform to the department size and availability

Total 10

Although the responses in Table 13 were provided as reasons why agencies did not adopt

the model policy, most respondents indicated their original policy was as least similar to

the BCPO model policy or they used parts of the model policy to form their own.

Survey question 8 was developed to learn the number of sworn, full-time police

officers in the police departments of Bergen County, NJ. Table 14 shows the number of

sworn police officers and the frequency of agencies reporting that number of personnel.

Table 14

Number and Frequency of Police Oflcers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen County, NJ. Police Officers n %

12 2 4.5 13 4 8.9 15 3 6.7 16 1 2.2 17 1 2.2 18 5 11.1 20 4 8.9 21 1 2.2 22 5 11.1 24 1 2.2 26 1 2.2 28 1 2.2 3 1 3 6.7 32 2 4.5 37 2 4.5 43 1 2.2 44 1 2.2 45 1 2.2 46 1 2.2 48 1 2.2 50 1 2.2 63 1 2.2 65 1 2.2

109 1 2.2

Total 45 (N) 100.

Table 15 shows the responses listed in Table 14 which were derived from survey

question 8 that have been recoded for statistical analyses. Recoding was done using a

statistical collapse with natural and logical break points to create a grouping system of a

small number of police officers (1-20), medium number (21-30) and large number (31 or

more). Recoded responses were used for later statistical analyses.

Table 15

Recoded Responses: Number and Frequency of Full-Time Police Officers in Municipal Police Departments of Bergen County, NJ. Number of Police n %

-Number (1-20 Full-time Police Officers)

Medium Number (21-30 Full-time Police Officers)

Large Number (3 1 or More Full-time Police Officers)

Total 45 (N) 100.

Survey question 9 provided information on the (2007) operating budgets in U S

dollars of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. Given that each of the

police departments surveyed listed a different dollar amount, only the recoded data were

reported in the current study. Original data were collapsed into low total operating

budget ($0.00 – $250,000.00), medium total ($250,000.00 – $3,000,000.00), and high

total ($3,000,00 1.00 or more).

Of the 45 responding police administrators 40 (89%) answered survey question 9.

Of the 40 responses, 31 (78%) of the operating budgets were in the low and medium

ranges. This represents almost 78 % of the responses. Only nine of the agencies reported

having a budget in the high range of $3,000,001 .OO or more, representing approximately

22.5 % of the responses. Table 16 shows the recoded data from survey question 9.

Recoded Responses: Total (2007) Operating Budgets of Police Departments in Bergen

Total Operating Budget ($0.00 to $250,000.00)

Medium Total Operating Budget ($250,001.00 to $3,000,000.00)

H&& Total Operating Budget ($3,000,001.00 or more)

Total 40 100. * no response n = 5

Survey question 10 was designed to learn the amounts in U.S. dollars that each

municipal police department in Bergen County, NJ reported in asset forfeiture funds in

the year 2007. The year 2007 was selected because it was the last complete year prior to

this study being conducted. Agency administrator who responded to this survey question

listed varying amounts that were specific to their agencies only. For that reason, the

responses were collapsed into manageable categories using natural and logical break

points.

The categories used were low forfeiture program ($0.00 – $200.00), medium

forfeiture program.($201 .OO – $10,000.00) and high forfeiture program ($10,000.00 or

more). Table 17 shows the response to survey question 10. Of the 45 responding

agencies, 4 4 (98%) provided data.

Table 17

Recoded Resuonses: 2007 Forfeiture Proaram. Seized Funds as Reuorted bv Police – , Departments in Bergen County, NJ Forfeiture Category n %

Low Forfeiture Program – ($0.00 – $200.00)

Medium Forfeiture Program ($201.00 – $10,000.00)

H~J& Forfeiture Program ($10,001.00 or more)

Total

Survey question 11 was created to determine the number of calls for service that

each municipal police agency reported they had received or responded to in 2007. For

reporting purposes each of the agencies reported a different total of calls for service.

These numbers were broken into workable categories, again using a statistical collapse

based on natural and logical break off points. These new categories were low annual

service calls (0-10,000), medium annual service calls (10,001-15,000) and high annual

service calls (15,001 or more). Table 18 shows the recoded data only for responses to

survey question 1 1.

Table 18

Recoded Responses: 2007 Annual Service Calls as Reported bv Police Departments in

Service Calls n %

Low Annual Service Calls – (0- 10,000)

Medium Annual Service Calls (10,001-15,000)

Annual Service Calls (15,001 or more)

Total 45 (N) 100.

Reliability Estimates

After the completed surveys were returned to the researcher and the descriptive

statistics were derived from them, a Cronbach's Alpha test was used to determine a

reliability coefficient for responses to survey questions 8,9, 10 and 11. The questions

were grouped to perform the internal reliability because according to Gliem and Gliem

(2003) single-item reliabilities are generally very low. The resulting Cronbach's Alpha

was .75. Cronbacb's alpha reliability estimate normally ranges between 0 and 1.

Although there actually is no lower limit to the coefficient, the closer Cronbach's Alpha

coefficient is to 1 .O, the greater the internal consistency of the items in the scale (Gliem &

Gliem, 2003).

George and Mallery (2003) provided the following rules of thumb in reference to

Cronbacb's Alpha scores: "- > .9 -Excellent, – > .8 – Good, – > .7 – Acceptable, – > .6

– Questionable, – > .5 -Poor, and < .5 -Unacceptable" (p. 231). Thus, for the current

work, with the low N (45) the .75 is considered highly acceptable.

Answering Research Question 1

Research question 1 asked how have training efforts changed for police

preparedness in responding to active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer

learning environment for children since the September 1, 2005 training mandate issued

by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers

to realistic environments? (b) How have police departments augmented response

capabilities on the topic?

Descriptive statistics reported earlier in this chapter have shown that training

efforts have changed for police preparedness to respond to active-shooter situations in

schools to create safer learning environments since the September 1,2005 training

mandate, in the amount of training required by police department administrators. Of the

45 surveys returned to the researcher with survey question 6 answered, 43 (96%)

indicated that the police agency required training in active-shooter response either

monthly, quarterly, bi-annually or yearly. Only 2 of the 45 reporting agencies responded

that it was never required to train in these response tactics.

Research question l(a) asked how training efforts are exposing officers to realistic

environments. This was answered by survey question 4. Of the 45 responding police

department administrators 39 (87%) indicated that their officers had participated in

training in empty schools. This type of training is realistic as it is places officers into a

real setting and creates familiarity for the police officers for responses during emergency

conditions.

Question l(b) asked how police departments have augmented response

capabilities. Survey question 3 was designed to answer this question. It was learned that

42 of the 45 responding police department administrators indicated that their agency had

purchased ballistic shields to augment their officers' response to a critical incident of this

sort. Thirty six of the 45 responding agencies reported their agencies had purchased

carbine or patrol rifles to further enhance response capabilities. At a reduced percentage

agencies reported purchasing other equipment items such as; ballistic helmets, battering ,

rams, bolt cutters, Hallagan or pry bars, and sledge hammers.

Answering Research Question 2

Research question 2 was also answered using descriptive statistics. The question

asked why are police departments implementing or not implementing the Standardization

of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy? This question was

answered by responses to survey question 7. Reoccurring themes developed from the

responses showed why agencies adopted the model policy: (a) standardization or (b)

having all police officers trained in the same tactics. It is apparent that police department

administrators are aware of the importance of having standard practices that all officers

can be taught. The reality of a critical incident is that neighboring jurisdictions will also

respond to supplement the response capability of the municipality suffering the crisis.

The additional responding officers need to know the same fundamental tactics the

officers in the jurisdiction in crisis know. In this respect police officers from various

municipalities can form ad hoc teams to respond to the crisis appropriately.

Reasons stated for not adopting the model policy as distributed were that police

departments already had a similar policy in place prior to the distribution of the model

policy. Other agencies created similar policies that were more specifically tailored to the

need of their specific jurisdiction. And lastly others stated they used parts of the model

policy to develop their own policy.

Answering Research Question 3

To answer research question 3 the researcher used Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical

analyses to determine which factors account for the variability in the number of police

officers designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training

being done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools (see Appendix

F) .

After recoding all data in the responses to survey questions 8,9, 10, and 11 into

three categories, those responses were independent variables for Chi-square ( ~ 2 )

statistical analyses. The responses to survey questions 5 and 6 were also recoded to

provide the researcher with dependant variables for analysis. According to Witte and

Witte (2004) an independent variable is manipulated by the investigator, and a dependant

variable is measured, counted, or recorded by the investigator.

In the first statistical analysis completed, the number of sworn full time police

officers was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to

train other police officers was used as the dependant variable. The Chi-square (;O)

statistical analysis results indicated a value of 2.47 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,650

(no statistical significance). In other words, the number of full-time sworn police officers

in a municipal police department in Bergen County, NJ does not seem to have an effect

on the number of police officers in the agency that are trained to train other police

officers in active-shooter response tactics.

In the second statistical analysis completed, the total operating budget of a police

department was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained

to train other police officers was used as the dependant variable. A Chi-square ( ~ 2 )

statistical analysis indicated a value of 2.72 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,604 (no

statistical significance). Results show that the total operating budget of a municipal

police department in Bergen County, NJ does not seem to have an effect on the number

of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics.

In the third statistical analysis completed, the number in U.S. dollars in forfeiture

funds reported from municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ for the year

2007 was used as an independent variable and the number of police officers trained to

train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics was used as a dependant

variable. The Chi-square (@) statistical analysis results were statistically significant,

unlike the other two analyses. Results indicated a value of 17.68 (df = 4) and a p value of

(sig.) ,001. In much social science research, statistical significance is indicated at p I .05,

so .001 indicates statistical significance (Witte & Witte, 2004).

It appears that the amount of dollars reported by the police agencies in asset

forfeiture influences the number of police officers the agency has trained to train other

police in active-shooter response tactics: This seized money seems to be used for

additional police training. As is normally the case in asset forfeiture at the municipal

police level, seized money is maintained in an account by the county prosecutor's office

for approved usage by the municipal police department. This money can be approved by

the county prosecutor's office to be allocated for items and expenditures outside the

normal operating budget of the agency. Training typically falls under this realm. Based

on this finding one can assume that training in municipal police departments may he paid

for by seized forfeiture funds.

In the fourth statistical analysis completed, the number of annual service calls for

the year 2007 was used as the independent variable and the number of police officers

trained to train other police officers in active-shooter response tactics was used as a

dependant variable. Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis results indicated a value of ,868

(df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,929 (no statistical significance). The number of calls for

service in 2007 had no effect on the number of police officers trained to train other police

officers in active-shooter response tactics.

In the fifth statistical analysis, the number of sworn full-time police officers was

used as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter

tactics was used as the dependent variable. The Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis

indicated a value of 7.38 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,117 (no statistical significance).

The p value indicated a lack of statistical significance. The number of full-time sworn

police officers had no effect on the amount of required training in active-shooter response

tactics.

In the sixth statistical analysis, the total operating budget of a police department

was used as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter

tactics was used for the dependent variable. The Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis

indicated a value of 11.95 (df = 4) and a p value of (sig.) ,018 which was statistically

significant. Again, the result of the statistical analysis is showing a relationship between

available money and training. There appears to be a relationship between the total

operating budget and the amount of training being done by police officers in active-

shooter response tactics in Bergen County, NJ.

In the seventh statistical analysis, the amount of dollars reported by the police

agencies in asset forfeiture was used as the independent variable and the amount of

required training in active-shooter tactics used for the dependent variable. The Chi-

Square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis indicated a value of 5.36 (df = 4) and a p value (sig.) ,252

(no statistical significance). The statistical analysis showed that there is no relationship

between the amount of dollars in forfeiture funds reported and the amount of required

training in active-shooter response tactics.

In the eighth and final statistical analysis, the number of calls for service reported

for the year 2007 was used as the independent variable and the amount of required

training in active-shooter response tactics was used as the dependant variable. The Chi-

Square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analysis indicated a value of 8.93 (df = 4) and a p value (sig.) ,063

(no statistical significance). However, the p value being within ,013 of an indication of

statistical significance does warrant some explanation. It appeared that although there is

not a statistically significant relationship between the number of calls for service reported

by police officers and the amount of active-shooter tactics training being required it does

seem that a relationship on some level does exist. The number of calls for service does

seem to have a relationship at some level to the amount of training being done. Busier

police departments are going to be less available to do as much training as those that are

not as busy. If the number of calls for service is greater in one agency, their officers are

needed to respond to calls for service and would be unable to become unavailable to

participate in training.

Summary

In Chapter IV, the researcher used several sections such as an introduction,

collection of data, data and findings, descriptive statistics, reliability, answering research

question 1, answering research question 2, answering research question 3 to present

information. The reported descriptive statistics learned from the survey instrument that

had been distributed to all of the municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ

presented an interesting look at the types of equipment purchases, training being done

and policy changes made as a result of the distribution of the model policy discussed

throughout.

The researcher also reported on the Chi-square ( ~ 2 ) statistical analyses done to

determine any relationships between the indicated dependant and independent variables

of this study. Those analyses indicted two statistically significant relationships. The first

was between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by municipal police departments

and the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter

response tactics. The second statistically significant relationship found was between the

total operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the

amount of training being done in active-shooter response tactics.

Chapter V will include an introduction, summary of findings, discussion,

conclusions, recommendations for policies and practices, and future study.

Chapter V

INTRODUCTION, SUMMARY O F FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS,

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICIES AND PRACTICES, AND FUTURE STUDY

Introduction

This study was developed from the personal interest of the researcher in police

tactics to respond to active-shooter situations. In beginning the study, the researcher

determined that the focus would be on municipal police departments of Bergen County,

NJ. In 2008 the researcher was a police supervisor in a municipal police department in

Bergen County and in this capacity was responsible to train other police officers in these

tactics.

The purpose for this study was to explore the influence that the Bergen County

Prosecutor's Office (BCPO) Directive 05-01 had on the training and future preparations

of all sworn police officers in Bergen County, New Jersey in response to active-shooter

situations in the schools of their jurisdictions. Because attendance in schools is

mandatory for the children to age 16 in Bergen County, New Jersey the municipal police

departments of the county must provide a safe learning environment while children are in

attendance.

The researcher sought a suitable survey instrument designed to gather appropriate

information to answer the research questions at the foundation of the study. These

research questions were:

1. How have training efforts changed for police preparedness in responding to

active-shooter situations in schools to create a safer learning environment for children

since the September 1,2005 training mandate issued by the Bergen County Prosecutor's

Office (BCPO)? (a) How are training efforts exposing officers to realistic environments?

(b) How have police departments augmented response capabilities on the topic?

2. Why are police departments implementing or not implementing the

Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy?

3 . What factors account for the variability in the number of police officers

designated to train others in active-shooter response and the frequency of training being

done in police departments in active-shooter preparation in schools?

The researcher located the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice

Statistics (USDOJ), Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics

(LEMAS) survey instrument. With permission from the USDOJ, the LEMAS survey

instrument was amended and the questions specifically tailored for the needs of the

current study. A revised survey instrument was developed with the assistance of a jury of

experts in the field of law enforcement. The survey was revised through a continuous

flow of dialogue between the researcher and the jury of experts. The survey instrument

consisted of 11 questions and was redistributed as a pilot study for feedback, as was

reported in chapter 111 in greater detail. After the determination that the final 11 question

survey was to be distributed to the target population (N = 68), it was mailed to all of the

municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ. The mailing took place on

December 18,2008 and in the attached letter of solicitation it was requested that the

voluntary participants return the survey to the researcher by January 7,2009. Through

the use of the survey the guiding questions were then answered in chapter IV.

Summary of Findings

The descriptive statistics from the present study developed a picture of what has

been done by police agencies in Bergen County to prepare for an active-shooter event in

a school. Prior to the distribution of the model policy more than 50% of the police

departments in Bergen County did not have any type of plan in effect for dealing with

this type of crisis in a school. This policy then forced the remaining police agencies to

either adopt the distributed model policy or develop their own plan for implementation.

Through this study it was also learned that 86% of the agencies that already had

response plans prior to the distribution of the model policy, had also included a mutual

aid plan to get assistance from neighboring jurisdictions when the crisis occurred. This is

a clear example of forward thinking on the part of the administrators.

In addition, the respondent police agencies also understood the importance of

radio communications interoperability with the neighboring jurisdictions. This was

evidenced by 93% of the police departments creating radio communications

interoperability with neighboring agencies as a result of the distributed model policy.

This allows for multiple jurisdictions to communicate with one another on the same radio

frequency to provide for faster and more direct radio communications.

This study shed light on the types of equipment police departments made as a

result of the model policy distribution. It was indicated that 93% of the agencies that

responded reported purchasing ballistic shields, 80% purchased carbine or patrol rifles,

and 76% reported purchasing ballistic helmets.

As for training, 87% of the police departments reported training in empty schools

in their jurisdictions. This creates familiarization with the interior and exterior of the

schools which could make the difference of saving a life during a crisis situation.

Sadly, only 20% of the police departments reported training as being mandatory

on a quarterly basis, 22.2% on a bi-annual basis, and still only 42% required training on a

yearly basis. This is simply not enough to get good at tactics. At best once or twice a

year can only help to refresh your tactics. It is hardly enough to make improvements and

become skilled in what is being taught and trained.

A Cronbach's Alpha test was used to determine a reliability coefficient for

responses to survey questions 8 , 9 , 10 and 11. The questions were grouped to perform

the internal reliability because according to Gliem and Gliem (2003) single-item

reliabilities are generally very low. The resulting Cronbach's Alpha was .75. For the

current study, with the low N (45) the .75 is considered highly acceptable.

The following relationships were determined to be lacking statistical significance:

(a) the number of sworn full time police officers as an independent variable and the

number of police officers trained to train other police officers as the dependant variable,

(b) the total operating budget of a police department as an independent variable and the

number of police officers trained to train other police officers as the dependant variable,

(c) the number of annual service calls for the year 2007 as the independent variable and

the number of police officers trained to train other police officers in active-shooter

response tactics as a dependant variable, (d) the number of sworn full-time police

officers as an independent variable and the amount of required training in active-shooter

tactics as the dependent variable, (e) the amount of dollars reported by the police

agencies in asset forfeiture as the independent variable and the amount of required

training in active-shooter tactics as the dependent variable, and (f) the number of calls for

service reported for the year 2007 as the independent variable and the amount of required

training in active-shooter response tactics as the dependant variable.

The present study also determined two statistically significant findings. The first

of these findings was the relationship between the amount of forfeiture funds reported by

municipal police departments in 2007 and the number of police officers trained to train

other police officers in active-shooter response tactics. Based on results from this

research, the more seizure funds available to police department administrators the more

police officers in their agencies are being trained to train the other police officers in their

respective police departments in active-shooter response tactics.

The second statistically significant relationship found was between the total

operating budget of municipal police departments in Bergen County, NJ and the amount

of training being done in active-shooter response tactics. Both findings indicate that there

is a direct relationship between available finances and training of police officers in

active-shooter response tactics. Simply put, police departments with larger budgets and

more available money are training more often than agencies with smaller budgets and

less money available. Therefore the assumption can be made that the more money

allocated toward training will better prepare police officers to be able to respond to and

effectively deal with an active-shooter situation in a school.

Discussion

If Ouchi (1977) is correct in the assumption that structure influences behavior, the

conclusion can be made that more training designed to train police officers to respond to

active-shooter situations will create better prepared police. Mintzberg's (1979) theory of

action planning accounts for how a job is done rather than specifically relying on the

outcome of the operation. With this theory in mind the assertion can be made that when

more police officers are designated to train others in essential response tactics then the

responding police should be more likely to he successful in the completion of their

mission, which is to save lives.

Scanlon (2001) described the premise of an active-shooter, who is seriously

wounding andlor killing people, and the need for the first responding officers to make a

rapid assessment of the incident and make entry to stop the suspect[s]. This ability to

rapidly assess and form an ad hoc team is essential to properly ending these types of

crisis situations. However, police departments in Bergen County are not devoting enough

time, energy and resources to training toward this end and if the time comes when the

tactics are needed there will be a break down in their capability to bring the situation to a

quick resolution. There needs to be more frequent training.

Giduck (2005) recommended that police try to change their rnindset from police

officer dealing with a crime scene to a military unit dealing with a battlefield. If 42% of

police departments are training but once a year in the necessary skills and tactics it would

likely be an impossible task to effectively train to appropriately handle these situations as

they may arise. Training once a year serves the officers more as a reminder of tactics

rather than a training of learned skills. Training is a repetitive process where skills are

ingrained through repetition, practice, critique, and correction. Once a year is simply not

enough for officers to become efficient in the necessary skills they will need to possess to

work safely and swiftly to bring a conflict of this nature to an end.

Lloyd (2000) called it a moral obligation for police to make entry and intervene in

an ongoing active-shooter situation. The purchases described in this study of tactical and

entry equipment displays the commitment of Bergen County Police Departments toward

this end. The entry equipment purchased offers the police the ability to make a forced

entry to breach any location to quickly gain access and begin their mission. The tactical

equipment is a testament to properly equipping the officers that will most certainly be

placed in harms way to complete their mission. Although there is no specific

recommendation on equipment purchases the more tools at the disposal of the police

officers the easier it will be to do their job.

Coordination and control as presented by Bolman and Deal (2003) helps to ensure

that diverse efforts of individuals and units mesh. This theory is the premise behind

having a unified response plan for police first responders to violent school incidents.

Through the use of structure, police officers from various agencies are able to work

safely and effectively together. This goal is met by the establishment of the

Standardization of Patrol Based Response to Active-Shooter Situations model policy

distributed by the Bergen County Prosecutor's Office. It seemed to be a priority of the

police administrators when they indicated reasons why they adopted the model policy,

that all police officers are aware of the same basic tactics. The reality is that multiple

jurisdictions will respond to the same scene to assist in bringing the crisis to a resolution.

This can be done by training all police officers who may respond in the same tactics so

each can work with any other.

Conclusions

It seems clear to the researcher that the police administrators that provided

answers to the distributed survey questionnaire at the foundation of this study are quite

aware of what needs to be done in the event of an active-shooter situation in a school of

their jurisdiction. What seems to be lost is that these tactics when initially trained are

perishable skills, and like anything else that is taught, it will go away when not properly

reinforced. What is lacking in Bergen County is the correct measure of reinforcement of

the tactics. Police officers are simply not training enough to become really prepared and

efficient at the necessary skill sets to tackle the situations which have formed the basis of

this study.

Numerous documents have been written based on research conducted on who

commits these violent acts in our nation's schools. Klein (2005) asserted that popular

discourse addressed school shootings almost obsessively, but continued to omit the role

gender plays in these crimes. New research has suggested that this omission was

ignoring a key element: a significant number of the boys' own stated reasons for this

violence clearly pointed to premeditated violence specifically involving girls (Klein,

2005). This researcher has found that aside from a rare exception or two, predominately

young white males from the ages 11 – 18 years old, mostly loners and with relatively

easy access to firearms are the perpetrators (Scanlon, 2001). With the type of

information collected by agencies like the FBI in their July, 1999 paper entitled "The

school shooter: a threat assessment perspective" (O'Toole, 1999) and the International

Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in their "Guide for Preventing and Responding to

School Violence" retrieved from the IACP website in February 2007 (Kramen, Massey,

& Timm, 1999), school officials have been preparing for violent students, with the

assistance of their law enforcement partners. Identification of the potential offenders is

the first step toward limiting this kind of behavior in the future. Prevention can come

from close partnerships between law enforcement and schools in early detection of

potential assaults as well as in sharing information about those identified as having the

potential to be involved in this behavior. Sending better prepared police to respond to

these crisis situations in the schools is a direct result of the amount of money that is being

allotted for training. '

For law enforcement personnel to take their tactics to the next level, they must

begin now to prepare for future acts of school violence and/or terrorism. As a result of

this research project the researcher now knows that the amount of funds allocated toward

training is going to make the difference in sending better prepared police officers into a

potential battle. No one thought it would have been possible for the acts of September

11,2001 to have been perpetrated against the US, on US soil. After the events of

911 112001 occurred, the law enforcement community was left with the realization that the

US was no longer immune from the acts of violence the rest of the world has had to

endure for centuries. Future acts of active shooting in schools and terrorism are a reality

and police officers must be prepared to face them.

Just as the law enforcement community has learned lessons from the Columbine

High School tragedy, so too have the next wave of potential attackers and terrorists been

planning their next attack. Through after action investigations, it is known that school

attackers and terrorists study police responses and know all about tactics the likes of

active-shooter, QUAD, and IARD that have been discussed herein. US law enforcement

must begin now to prepare for potential attacks by active-shooters and terrorists on our

most precious targets, our children (Giduck, 2005). What could make American citizens

feel more vulnerable than an attack at a school? Persons in other countries have been

dealing with this reality for years and are prepared to handle situations like this at a

school. Countries like Israel have placed armed guards on every school bus and in every

school. School buses are armored to minimize potential injuries from an attack. School

campuses are fortified territory (Giduck, 2005). Short of having armed guards on

armored school buses and inside schools, more must be done to train police in response

tactics. To accomplish this goal more money must be directed toward the training of

tactics like those proposed in the Standardization of Patrol Based Response for Active-

Shooter Situations.

Law enforcement policy makers need also to begin cooperative efforts with

military units for training in handling battlefield type conflict, much like they would be

facing in a terrorist attack on a school. Terrorism experts like Giduck who authored

"Terror at Beslan" (2005) conclude that the terrorists will attack the US again. It is also

likely that a potential target will be an unsuspecting school. The terrorists are not at all

like the loner child who brings a gun to school. They come with tested and rehearsed

battle plans, reinforcements, surveillance and counter surveillance measures in place

(Giduck, 2005).

The terrorist's goal is not to he arrested or contained; it is to kill as many victims

and police responders as possible to gain notoriety for their cause (Giduck, 2005). Our

future is now: Policing in the US must adapt now for the threats of the future which will

most certainly be at the hands of terrorists who will, like they have in the past, attack

when and where we are least expecting them to. That certainly could be a school. Law

enforcement personnel need to make more adaptations to their training now to be able to

respond to an event they will face (Giduck, 2005). With one hurdle cleared the next one

is right in front of us.

Recommendations for Policies and Practices

Since police officers may face the need to respond to a critical incident (active-

shooter situation) in the schools of their jurisdictions, the responsibility for training in

response tactics becomes increasingly paramount. In that respect all responding police

officers to an active-shooter situation, must at least be aware of the same tactics. In

Bergen County, NJ this topic was addressed in 2005 when the prosecutor's office

distributed a memo requiring a unified and consistent active-shooter response.

However, this researcher believes that more needs to be done than just blanket

familiarization with a response policy. As was discovered in this research there is

disparity in the amount and type of training being done. Not enough training is taking

place to respond effectively to an active-shooter situation. More training needs to

become the rule rather than the exception. If not enough training is being conducted, the

training and interest will not be sustained. When times get really tough, in a critical

situation the natural tendency is to revert to the original process of how things were done

in the past (Palazzolo, 2009). Here, how thing3 were done in the past simply will not be

enough to save lives effectively.

Because the study of law enforcement tactics and strategy is in its relative infancy

and some situations only now have begun to be seriously studied, there is a lack of

information available on police training for active-shooter situations (O'Brien, 2008a).

The researcher located no research to determine what the best tactics are to respond to

active-shooters in schools and the science of the study police tactics. Since no data are

available to study to make a truly scientific determination to apply to policy the advice of

the experts like Giduck must be followed. More training is certainly necessary to provide

the community with a prepared and capable police department.

Based on the findings of this study more money and effort needs to be directed

toward training budgets. Police departments with more funds available are doing more

training. Since the critical incidents that may present themselves are not specific to

jurisdictions with sufficient training budgets, funds must come from somewhere to

prepare police to respond to crisis situations. If police departments are unable to fund

their own training, a county-wide or state-wide training program should be available to

police departments for continuous training.

The Bergen County Prosecutor's Office should establish and maintain a county-

wide training division. One responsibility for this training division should be providing

standard and mandatory continuing training to the police in the county in mutual aid and

critical incident responses. The training should be provided at not cost to the local police

departments of the county to ensure cost to the agency is not preventing officers from

being trained in the most current tactics available.

Future Study

Numerous research projects and studies have been conducted on the topic of

school violence prevention. But what happens when it happens? What about when the

prevention efforts are not effective to stop the violence before it happens? There needs to

be research on the best practices of police response tactics to school shooter situations.

Special attention needs to be paid to the evolution of tactics and how they are changing

based on prior responses and the successfulness of the police operations in those

incidents. To accomplish this S.W.A.T. tactics should be studied to determine which, is

the best fit to adapt to train to patrol officers.

More research needs to be done in the topic area of police training and the amount

of funds required for that training to be successful. A comprehensive study needs to be

conducted to determine the dollar amount that needs to be allocated per police officer to

allow for similarly trained police in effective tactics. An in depth study should be

focused on tactical equipment and which pieces are best for police to use during crisis

situations.

There should be future studies done to determine what police officers in other

counties in New Jersey are doing to prepare for these types of situations they may face in

schools. There should also be a study done to compare what is being done from state to

state and as a result try to determine which training is the most cost effective, the most

beneficial and which fits best for patrol officers.

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New Jersey Statute 18:36-5.1.

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Wood, D. (2001, September). QUAD, law enforcement's preferred response to "active shooter" situations. Law and Order, 49(9). Retrieved February 15,2007 from: htt~:Nwww.nasta.ws/law & order.htm

Appendix A

BERGEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE

To: All Bergen Cwnty ChiPC(

From: Prostcuror Joha L. Mobad

SmbJe: Dirarthr W01 Active Shooter PnEey ln*irtive

n k DLccrivr shall .)so serve to acknowledge tbe b u d work and effort tk3Lumll Aid and Special Opaadorfl Committee, Tralnlng and Education C m m h c of tat Be- Coruty P o k e Chiefs' AoralmUaa, wboae work w*a iwfrumcntrf in t h ~ fam~xlatloa of rhfr polin;

cc: CblCf M k b U l MWdrgt Btm Aasirtant Prw~rsculor Wllhm J. Gads ExccatCve AI~irtaot Prouccuior Frank Pucdo

Appendix B

List of 68 Bergen County Municipal Police Departments

Agency Number of officers Agency Number of officers

Allendale Alpine Bergenfield Bogota Carlstadt Cliffside Park Closter Cresskill Demarest Dumont East Rutherford Edgewater Elmwood Park Emerson Englewood Englewood Cliffs Fair Lawn Fairview Fort Lee Franklin Lakes Garfield Glen Rock Hackensack Harrington Park Hasbrouck Heights Haworth Hillsdale Ho-Ho-Kus Leonia Little Ferry Lodi Lyndhurst Mahwah Maywood Midland Park ~ o n t v i l e Moonachie New Milford North Arlington Northvale

Nonvood Oakland Old Tappan Oradell Palisades Park Paramus Park Ridge Ramsey Ridgefield Ridgefield Park Ridgewood River Edge River Vale Rochelle Park Rutherford Saddle Brook Saddle River South Hackensack Teaneck Tenafly Upper Saddle River Waldwick Wallington Washington Township Westwood Wood-Ridge Woodcliff Lake Wyckoff

Appendix C

Jell'Ditm 1 ! 7 Knolls Road

Dear Mr. Dino:

'The purpose of this letter is to p n t you p m i s s i o n to use o limited numbcr of questk from the BJS Law Enforcement Maaagement and Administrative Slatistics (I FMAS) survey qwauonuairr firr your study of policc dcpenments in Bcrgsn County. Ncw Jer This pwnissinn is yranlcd fnr the purposcs of rile R q e n Cuunty data collectiuu only and any future &la cullecrions basal un thz I.EMAS survcy instnrrnenl will also requ a request to BJS for permission lo use the I.EMAS questions. If any l i i h c r infnrmali is needed reganling this letter ol'prtuiasion, please contact me by email at .-%tiru~.reave%Nsdqj.~;-or by phone at 202-616-3287.

1 EMAS Program hfanagcr Bureau of histice Statislics I1.S. Damanem of Jumice

September l5.20U8

John L. Molinelli. Prnsecutor k r y e n County P m s ~ u t o r ' s O l l i ~ 10 Main Skeet Ilackensack, SJ 07601

Dear Prosecutor Molinelli.

My name i s Jeiftcy D i m I mn a 1 ; year veteran Police w e a n 1 with thc Mahwah Police Deportment. I .m alsn a &xlciral d d a t c a1 Seton H ~ l l IInivmiQ'. 1 nm paporing my dissertation on police p ~ p a n u l n c s s to rcspond to active shooter situntions in schwls 01'Uergen County, N. Thc dissertation is focl~wd on how thc municipl pulice duparuncnts of Hergen County are preparing to respond lo an activc shouler situation siucc tlw distribution of your directive marked 05-01 Actiw Shootcr Policy Initintive.

The p w p c of this ietkr is lo rqucsl your pcnnission for me tn send each of the 68 municipal police agcncics of Bergen County n copy of a survey qurstio& lo ask hem lo complclc and rcturn tn me. The s w e y contains q w l i o n u borrowed hm the L.sw Enfnrcemcnt Management and ~Uminislrruivr Statistics survey and qucstion~ thmt were prepared with the a s s i s t w e of a jury ol'cxprts in the fields of policing police tactics. and emergency mamgemenl.

I'hiu rlscarch study has k e n approved by Seton I I d University. All information gatherd will be kept strictly confidential and no identifying characteristics of any ngency will be asked for or d i s s e m i ~ t c d .

I ~vould like lo lake 1h1s opportunity to thank you for my and dl considwdliun you give this request. If h r c arc any questions I can he c n n k k d mytine at 973650- IlZh5.

L M O I I N ~ U I Cuvnh Promulor Office of the County Prosecutor

County of Bergen

HACKENSACK. NEW JERSEY 07601 Jolw L. Hmwh UI (201) 646-1300 Tnsl L h ~ t

Joseph Macellam Chmt orlktallvn

October 8.2008

Mr. J e f h y Din0 1 17 Knolls Road Bloomingdale, NJ 07403

Re: Active Shooter Preparedness Survey

Dear Mr. Dino,

In regard to your request to send a questionnaire to the municipal police departments in Bergen County to assess how the departments are prepared to respond to an active shooter situation. that request, and the form proposed by you are approved. It is my understanding that you are sending out this questionnaire in furtherance of your doctoral degree at Seton Hall University. This office approves of the questionnaire that you wish to use, and also is interested in the results that will flow from the responses that you receive. Please provide this office with a summary of your tindings, if possible. I commend you on yow choice of topic, and wish you much success in your efforts to achieve your doctoral degree. If at any time I, or this office, can be of any further assistance to you please do not hesitate to contact me at 201 -226-5104.

William J. Galda First Assistant Prosecutor

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF RESEARCH, DEMONSTRATION OR RELATED ACTIVITIES INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS

PROJECT TITLE: A ShdV in Police hemredness to Resoond to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Lea& Environment in tbe Schools of Bernen Countv. New Jmev.

Dr. C n a b millerr f h G ,Lh& L 1011W RESEARCHER'S ADVISOR ORDEPARTMENTAL SUPERVISOR DATE

1Please pint or type out name below -lurê

DIRECTOR. 0 SETON W UNlVERSlN INSTINTICt+U R M E W BOARD FOR HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH

Jefiky Dino 117 Knolls Road Bloomingdale, NJ 07403

December 17,2008

Dear Mr. Dino,

The Seton Hall University lnstitutional Review Board has reviewed the information you have submitted addressing the concerns for your proposal entitled "A Study in Police Preparedness to Report to Active Shooter Situations to Provide a Safer Learning Environment in the Schools of Bergen County, New Jersey". Your research protocol is hereby approved as revlsed thmugh expedited review. The 1RB reserves the right to recall the proposal at any time for full review.

Enclosed for your records are the signed Request for Approval form, and the stamped Letter of Solicitation. Make copies only of this stamped letter.

The Institutional Review Board approval of your research is valid for a one-year period from the date of this letter. Durina this time. any changes to the research ~rotocol must be reviewed and a~oroved hv the IRB ~ r i o r to their imdementation.

Accodmg to federal regulations, continuing review of already approved research is mandated to take place at least 12 months after this initial approval. You will receive communication from the TRB Office for this several months before the anniversary date of your initial approval.

Thank you for your cooperation.

I n harmony with federal regulations. none of the investigators or research stoffinvolved in the study rookpurr in thejinol decision

Sincerely,

~rciessor Director, Institutional Review Board

cc: Dr. Charles Achilles

Appendix D

3. S h c c 11. S r p ~ m k r 1. am I n i m i . ~ m w h t e . did your a p c y pu.rh.St a, .quire .my d,k 101kri.g lym dtm*.l rownw gar?

Man ,.la11 l h a t q p l )

– Raills<,r hclmca

: H d h c ,hicids

I I. Emer the tof.1 mmmkr a l r d b far umkr rccciwd by your sgemcy duri.8 XW7. lrdsls arc not nrallshlr. prorldc an ~sllmalr nnd mark ,. I *r. mr huhu

Appendix E

SETON HALL I . B .

UNIVERSITY

December 18,2CfJ8

Dear Chief,

MY name is Jefiev Dino and I am a Sergeant of Police with the Mahwah Police ~ e p a r t m e i t . I am also a doctoral candidate a dissertation at Seton Hall University. My study is on Active Shooter preparedness by municipal police denanments in Bemen Countv. NJ. The ournose of this letter is to ask for Your assistance – . . . . with this project.

My request is for you to please spare a few minutes out of your day to complete the attached survey and mail it back to me by January 7,2008. The survey contains 11 questions that should not take very much of your time. I can assure you that no part of this survev will be seen bv anvone other than me and mv dissertation committee.

~ i c r the dam 1s c o ~ ~ ~ ~ c d from all panwpantr & I 68 munlctpal police depanmcnts in Bcrgen Counlyl. the surveys wlll be stored in a locked fire res~slant box in my home for three years as iscustomary in doctoral research. Further, all surveys will be coded with a control number and your agency name will not appear anywhere on the survey. These layers of security are to ensure your anonmitv and reassure vou that vour . . answers to the questions in the survey will be kept private and confidential.

After you complete the survey, please mail it back to me using the self addressed stamped envelope provided with the survey.

.

This shldy has been approved by Seton Hall University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) and bv the Berren CountvProsecutors Office. If vou have anv auestions – . . about the survey or about any of the questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at 973-650-0565 or my mentor Dr. Charles Achilles 973-761-9668. If you have any questions about subject's rights in this research please contact Dr. ~ " z i c k a at the-RB at 973-313-6314.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation in my academic endeavor.

Respectfully

A, 11 Jeffrey T. Dino

Seton Hall UnhremHy InsliMional Review Board

3EC 17 2008 M Date OEC 17 mrJ

Approval Date

Appendix F

Crosstabs

Crosstab

Case Processing Summary

Medium Low Number Number of

of Trained Trained Officers in Officers in

Active Shooter Active Shooter

Q8R ' Q5R Q9R " Q5R Q10R Q5R Q l l R ' Q 5 R

Response (0 – Response (3 2 Officers) Officers)

28R Small Organization (1 – Count I 9 1 5 20 ~ull-time Authorized ~ ~ ~ t ~ d count I 5.8 Positions) % of Total 20.0% 11.1%

Cases

Std. Residual I .2 ( -3 Medium Oraanization Count I 5 1 3 – (21-30 Full-time Expected Count 3.8 2.6 Authorized Positions) % of Total 11.1% 6.7%

Std. Residual .6 .2 ~ ~ ~- Large Organization Count 5 5 (More than 30 Full-time ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ d count 6.8 4.6 Authorized Positions) % of Total

11.1% 11.1%

Total Valid

Std. Residual -.7 .2

rota1 Count 19 13 Expected Count 19.0 13.0 9h of Total 42.2% 28.9%

Missing

N 68 68 68 68

N 45 40 44 45

High Number of Trained Officers in

4ct1ve Shooter Response

(More than 3 Officers)

6 5.8

13.3% .1 1

2.6 2.2% -1.0

6 4.6

13.3%

.6

13 13.0

28.9%

N 23 28 24 23

Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Percent 66.2% 58.8% 64.7% 66.2%

Total 20

20.0 44.4%

9 9.0

20.0%

16 16.0

35.6%

45 45.0

100.0%

Percent 33.8% 41.2% 35.3% 33.8%

I N of Valid Cases I 45 1 1

Chi-square Tests

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.60.

Low Number of Trained Officers in

Active Shooter Res~onse 10 –

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

,650

,600

,490

Pearson Chi-square

Likelihood Ratio

Linear-by-Linear Association

2 Office;) 29R Low Total Operating Count 11

Budget ($0 – $250,000) Expected Count 8.6 % of Total 27.5% Std. Residual I .8

MediumTotal O~erating Count I 4

Value 2.473a

2.753

,475

Budget (5250bol – Expected Count 5.4 $3,000,000) % of Total 10.0%

Std. Residual -.6 High Total Operating Count 3 Budget (More than Expected Count 4.1 $3,000,000) % of Total

7.5%

df 4

4

1

Std. Residual

rota1 Count Expected Count 18.0 % of Total 45.0%

Medium Number of Trained

Officers in Wive Shooter Response (3

Officers) 5

5.7 12.5%

-.3 4

3.6 10.0%

.2 3

2.7

7.5%

.2

12 12.0

30.0%

High Number of Trained Officers in

4C1ive Shooter Response

(More than 3 Officers)

3 4.8

7.5%

-.8 4

3.0 10.0%

.6 3

2.3

7.5%

.5

10 10.0

25.0%

Total 19

19.0 47.5%

12 12.0

30.0%

9

9.0

22.5%

40 40.0

100.0%

Chi-square Tests

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

,604

Likelihood Ratio I 2.777 Linear-by-Linear Association 2.086 a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The

minimum expected count is 2.25.

df 4 ' Pearson Chi-square

N of Valid Cases I 40

Value 2.729"

4

1

I . I 4 9 596 I

Crosstab

Q5R

%if Total I 22.7% 1 4.5% 1 11.4%

Low Number of Trained Officers in

Active Shooter Res~onse 10 –

I 2 officers) I &cers) I officers)

Medium Number of Trained

Officers in Active Shooter Res~onse (3

210R Low Forfeiture Program – Count 2007 ($0 – $200) Expected Count

Std. Residual 1 .O

High Number of Trained Officers in

Active Shooter Response

(More than 3

2 5.0

10 7.3

Program – 2007 ($201 – Expected Count $10,000) %of Total

Std. Residual High Forfeiture Program – Count 2007 (More than $10,000) Expected Count

% of Total

Expected Count I 19'0 I 12.0 %of Total 43.2% 29.5% 27.3%

5 4.6

Medium Forfeiture count I 4 1 9 1 0 -1.3

Std. Residual -.4 -1 .I

Total 17

17.0 38.6%

– 13

13.0 29.5%

– 14

14.0 31 .8%

– 44

44.0 100.0% –

.2

5.6 9.1%

– .7 5

6.0 11.4%

1.6

rotai count I 19 1 13 1 12

3.8 20.5%

2.6 2

4.1 4.5%

3.5 .O% -1.9

7 3.8

15.9%

Chi-square Tests

I I I ~ s y m p . Sig. I I value I df I (2-sided)

Pearson Chi-square 1 17.685a 1 4 ( ,001 Likelihood Ratio 1 19.551 1 4 1 ,001 I Linear-by-Linear Association ( 1 . 1 1 1 5 9 1

Q11R * QSR

N of Valid Cases I 44

Crosstab

I

I

Low Number of Trained Officers in

Active Shooter Res~onse 10 –

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.55.

1 2 office&) 31 I R Low Annual Service count 10

Calls – 2007 ( 0 – 10,000) Ex~ected Count 8.9 %of Total I 22.2% Std. Residual

Medium Annual Service Count Calls – 2007 (10,001 – Expected Count 15,000) % of Total 8.9%

Std. Residual 1 -5 Hiah Annual Service count I 5 ~ a i i s – 2007 ( More than Eqected Count I 5.1 15,000) % of Total 11.1%

Std. Residual

rota1 count Expected Count % of Total 42.2%

Number of of Trained Trained Officers in

Officers Officers Total 21

21 .o 46.7%

12 12.0

26.7%

12 12.0

26.7%

45 45.0

100.0%

Chi-square Tests

1 Likelihood Ratio 1 ,883 1 4 1 ,927

Value

I Linear-by-Linear Association I 3 5 1 1 I 5 i 2 N of Valid Cases I 45

Pearson Chi-square I .86ea ( 4 ( ,929

–

df

a. 4 cells (44.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.47.

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

Crosstabs

Case Processing Summary

Q8R " Q6R Q9R * Q6R Q1OR " Q6R Q l l R ' Q 6 R

Cases Valid

N 45 40 44 45

Percent 66.2% 58.8% 64.7% 66.2%

Missing N

23 28 24 23

Total Percent

33.8% 41.2% 35.3% 33.8%

N 68 68 68 68

Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Crosstab

I Q6R I Once a I Quarter or Monthly Bi-annually

Q8R Small Organization (1 – Count 5 8 20 Full-time Authorized Expected count 6.2 4.4 Positions) % of Total 11.1% 17.8%

Std. Residual -.5 1.7 Medium Organization Count I 4 1 1 (21-30 Full-time Expected Count 2.0 Authorized Positions) Total I 8 . 1 2.2%

Std. Residual .7 -.7 Large Organization Count I 5 1 1 (More than 30 Full-time Expected Count 3.6 Authorized Positions) % of Total

Std. Residual .O -1.4

rota1 Count 14 10 Expected Count 14.0 10.0 % of Total 31.1% 22.2%

Chi-square Tests

I I I I ~ s y m p . Sip. I 1 value 1 df I (2-sided)

Pearson Chi-square 1 7.38Ba 1 4 I .I17 I Likelihood ~ a t i o ( 7.617 1 4 1 ,107 1

Once a year or Never

7 9.3

15.6% -.8

4 4.2

8.9% -.l

10 7.5

22.2%

.9

21 21.0

46.7%

Linear-by-Linear Association N of Valid Cases

Total 20

20.0 44.4%

9 9.0

20.0%

16 16.0

35.6%

45 45.0

100.0%

a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.00.

.478

45

1 I

Crosstab

Quarter or I ( Monthly 1 Bi-annually 1 Q9R Low Total Operating Count I 8 1 2 I

Budget ($0 – $250,000) Expected Count 5.7 3.8 % of Total 20.0% 5.0% Std. Residual 1 .O -.9

MediumTotal Operating Count 2 6 Budget ($250,001 – Expected Count 3.6 2.4 $3,000,000) % of Total 5.0% 15.0%

Std. Residual -3 2.3 High Total Operating Count 2 0 Budget (More than Expected Count 2.7 1.8 $3,000,000) % of Total

5.0% .O%

Std. Residual -.4 -1.3

Total Count 12 8 Expected Count 12.0 8.0 % of Total 30.0% 20.0%

Linear-by-Linear Association

I 1.811 ( 1 I 1 7 8 I

Chi-square Tests

Once a year or Never

9

9.5 22.5%

-.2

Total 19

19.0 47.5%

12 12.0

30.0%

9 9.0

22.5%

40 40.0

100.0%

Pearson Chi-square Likelihood Ratio

N of Valid Cases I 40 I a. 6 cells (66.7%) have expected count less than 5. The

minimum expected count is 1.80.

Value 11 .955a 12.269

df 4 4

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

.018 ,015

Crosstab

Quarter or Once a vear 1 Monthly I Bi-annually I or ~ e b e r 1 Total

QlOR Low Forfeiture Program – Count I 7 1 4 1 6 1 17 – 2007 ($0 – $200) Expected Count

% of Total Std. Residual

Medium Forfeiture Count Program – 2007 ($201 – Expected count $10,000) % of Total

Chi-square Tests

Std. Residual

High Forfeiture Program – Count 2007 (More than $10,000) Expected Count

% of Total Std. Residual

Total Count Expected Count % of Total

5.4 15.9%

.7 3

4.1 6.8%

-.6 4

4.5 9.1%

-2 14

14.0 31.6%

Pearson Chi-square Likelihood Ratio

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.95.

3.9 9.1%

.1 5

3.0 11.4%

Linear-by-Linear Association N of Valid Cases

1.2 1

3 2 2.3% -1.2

10 10.0

22.7%

Value 5.362a 5.578

7.7 13.6%

-.6 5

5.9 11.4%

1.729

44

17.0 38.6%

13 13.0

29.5% -.4

9 6.4

20.5% 1 .O 20

20.0 45.5%

df 4 4

14 14.0

31.8%

44 44.0

100.0%

Asymp. Sig. (Psided)

,252 ,233

1 .I89

Crosstab

I Q6R

%if Total 1 17.8% 1 13.3% Q11 R Low Annual Service Count

Calls – 2007 ( 0 – 10,000) Ex~eCted Count

Monthly 8

6.5

Std. Residual

Medium Annual Service Count Calls – 2007 (10.001 – Expected Count 15,000) % of Total

Std. Residual High Annual Service Count Calls – 2007 ( More than Expected Count 15.000) % of Total

Std. Residual

Total Count Expected Count % of Total

Once a year or Never

7 9.8

15.6% -.9

4 5.6

8.9% -.7 10

5.6

22.2%

1.9

21 21.0

46.7%

Bi-annually 6

4.7

Chi-square Tests

Total 21

21 .o 46.7%

12 12.0

26.7%

12 12.0

26.7%

45 45.0

100.0%

.6 5

3.7 11.1%

.7 1

3.7

2.2%

-1.4

14 14.0

31.1%

.6 3

2.7 6.7%

.2 1

2.7

2.2%

-1.0

10 10.0

22.2%

Pearson Chi-square Likelihood Ratio Linear-by-Linear Association N of Valid Cases

a. 5 cells (55.6%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.87.

df 4 4

1

Value 8.93ga 9.482

5.405

45

Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)

.063 ,050

.020

University of Tennessee, Knoxville Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange

Masters Theses Graduate School

5-2015

Student Perceptions of Institutional Crisis Management, Preparedness, and Response: The Case of the Active Shooter Jared Allen Grimsley University of Tennessee – Knoxville, [email protected]

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected].

Recommended Citation Grimsley, Jared Allen, "Student Perceptions of Institutional Crisis Management, Preparedness, and Response: The Case of the Active Shooter. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2015. http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/3366

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Jared Allen Grimsley entitled "Student Perceptions of Institutional Crisis Management, Preparedness, and Response: The Case of the Active Shooter." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in College Student Personnel.

J. Patrick Biddix, Major Professor

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

Dorian L. McCoy, Karen D. Boyd, Martha C. Dagenhart

Accepted for the Council: Dixie L. Thompson

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Student Perceptions of Institutional Crisis Management, Preparedness, and Response:

The Case of the Active Shooter

A Thesis Presented for the

Master of Science

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Jared Allen Grimsley

May 2015

ii

Acknowledgements

To Dr. J. Patrick Biddix, for chairing my thesis committee and being with me every step

of the way. You had faith this was something I could accomplish and you never backed down. I

look forward to the opportunity to continue learning from you.

To Dr. Dorian L. McCoy, Dr. Karen D. Boyd, and Dr. Martha C. Dagenhart, for

continuing to support me on my committee as well. You all have such unique educational

perspectives that allowed me to produce my best quality work.

To Brandon, for pushing me and encouraging me to write when I may not have otherwise

wanted to. You always checked in to see the progress I was making and have been continuously

supportive over the past year.

iii

Abstract

Institutional crisis management is becoming more relevant with every passing tragedy

and crisis event. This study utilized a modified existing survey to collect quantitative data from

students attending a large four-year public research institution located in the Southeastern region

of the United States. A stratified random sample of commuter students and non-commuter

students was analyzed to compare statistical similarities and differences between the groups.

The largest group of student respondents were full-time, freshmen, female, involved, and

currently live on campus. Students perceived their institutions to be moderately prepared to

respond to both general crises and active shooting situations, although a majority of students did

not know if written institutional plans were in place. Students perceived active shooter protocol

communication as less effective than communication of general crisis management protocol.

Students are generally satisfied with the text messages and emails used to notify students during

a crisis situation, but there are other communication mediums they also believed would be

effective. Analyzing data on students’ perceptions of their respective institutional crisis

management, preparedness, and response helps establish sound practices for extending protection

to the campus community from immediate threats during a campus crisis. While there are

numerous campus crises and forms of preparedness, this study focused on active shootings as the

crisis and emergency notification systems (ENS) as the response.

iv

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………………………..1

Background/Context ………………………………………………………………………………………………1

Statement of the Problem ………………………………………………………………………………………..2

Purpose of the Study ………………………………………………………………………………………………3

Significance of the Study ………………………………………………………………………………………..3

Research Questions ………………………………………………………………………………………………..4

Theoretical/Conceptual Framework ………………………………………………………………………….4

Definitions…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….5

Organization of Study …………………………………………………………………………………………….6

Chapter 2: Literature Review ……………………………………………………………………………………………..7

Crisis Management Plans ………………………………………………………………………………………..7

Perceptions of Preparedness ………………………………………………………………………………….10

Pre-Crisis Safety Strategies……………………………………………………………………………………12

Emergency Notification Systems ……………………………………………………………………………14

Emergency Notification System Participation ……………………………………………….14

Text Messaging and Cell Phone Usage ………………………………………………………..17

Social Media …………………………………………………………………………………………….18

Redundancy versus Urgency ……………………………………………………………………….18

Summary, Limitations, and Considerations for Future Research ………………………………..19

Chapter 3: Methodology ………………………………………………………………………………………………….23

Overview and Research Questions …………………………………………………………………………23

Research Design…………………………………………………………………………………………………..24

v

Research Methods ………………………………………………………………………………………………..25

Site Selection ……………………………………………………………………………………………25

Participant Selection ………………………………………………………………………………….25

Instrumentation …………………………………………………………………………………………26

Modifications to the CCMQ …………………………………………………………….27

Procedure ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………29

Data Collection …………………………………………………………………………………………29

Data Analysis ……………………………………………………………………………………………30

Limitations and Delimitations ………………………………………………………………………………..30

Summary …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….31

Chapter 4: Results …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..33

Perceptions of Preparedness ………………………………………………………………………………….35

Institutional Preparedness to Respond ………………………………………………………….35

Self-Preparedness to Protect ……………………………………………………………………….37

Communication of Crisis Management and Active Shooter Protocol ………………………….40

Effective Protocol Communication………………………………………………………………40

Protocol Communication Mediums ……………………………………………………………..42

Emergency Notification Satisfaction ………………………………………………………………………45

UT Alert System ……………………………………………………………………………………….45

Quantity and Timeliness of Emergency Messages …………………………………………46

Effective Communication Strategies ………………………………………………………………………47

Effective Pre-Crisis Communication Mediums ……………………………………………47

Notification During Crisis …………………………………………………………………………49

vi

Effective Notification During Crisis …………………………………………………………..51

Additional Results ………………………………………………………………………………………………..54

Chapter 5: Summary, Discussion, and Recommendations ……………………………………………………55

Summary …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….55

Purpose of the Study ………………………………………………………………………………….55

Review of the Procedures …………………………………………………………………………..55

Summary of the Findings ……………………………………………………………………………56

Conclusions …………………………………………………………………………………………………………59

Discussion …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..60

Recommendations and Implications for Practice ……………………………………………………..61

Directions for Further Research ……………………………………………………………………………..64

References ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..66

Appendices …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….72

Appendix A: Original Zdziarski (2001) CCMQ Survey Packet ………………………………….73

Appendix B: CCMQ-S (Survey Modified from CCMQ) …………………………………………..80

Appendix C: Online Informed Consent for CCMQ-S ……………………………………………….87

Appendix D: Recruitment Email ……………………………………………………………………………90

Appendix E: Additional Demographic Data …………………………………………………………….92

Appendix F: Additional Raw Data …………………………………………………………………………94

Appendix G: Demographic Analyses, Mean Responses, and Significance…………………104

Vita ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..109

vii

List of Tables

Table 4.1: Collegiate Residency of Student Respondents …………………………………………………….34

Table 4.2: Self-Protection Based on Location of Active Shooter …………………………………………..38

Table 4.2.1: Self-Protection, Non-Commuter versus Commuter …………………………………………..38

Table 4.3: Crisis Management and Active Shooter Preparedness Communication Mediums ……43

Table 4.3.1: Crisis Management Plan Communication, Non-Commuter versus Commuter ……..44

Table 4.3.2: Active Shooter Preparedness Communication, Non-Commuter versus Commuter ..44

Table 4.4: Student Satisfaction with UT Alert System …………………………………………………………46

Table 4.4.1: Student Satisfaction with UT Alert System, Non-Commuter versus Commuter ……46

Table 4.5: Perceptions of Quantity and Timeliness of Emergency Messages ………………………….47

Table 4.5.1: Perceptions of Quantity and Timeliness of Emergency Messages,

Non-Commuter versus Commuter ……………………………………………………………….47

Table 4.6: Perceptions of Effective Pre-Crisis Communication Mediums ………………………………48

Table 4.6.1: Perceptions of Effective Pre-Crisis Communication,

Non-Commuter versus Commuter ……………………………………………………………….49

Table 4.7: Student Notification of a Campus Crisis or Emergency ………………………………………..50

Table 4.7.1: Student Notification of Crisis, Non-Commuter versus Commuter ………………………51

Table 4.8: Perceptions of Effective Notification during Active Shooting ……………………………….52

Table 4.8.1: Perceptions of Effective Notification during Acting Shooting,

Non-Commuter versus Commuter ……………………………………………………………….53

Table E1: Additional Demographic Data …………………………………………………………………………..93

Table F1: Self-Protection from Active Shooter (Open-Ended Responses) ……………………………..95

Table F2: Reasons for Not Signing up for UT Alert ………………………………………………………….103

viii

Table G1: Demographic Analyses by Gender …………………………………………………………………..105

Table G2: Demographic Analyses by Class ……………………………………………………………………..106

Table G3: Demographic Analyses by Involvement ……………………………………………………………107

Table G4: Demographic Analyses by Transfer Status ………………………………………………………..108

ix

List of Figures

Figure 4.1: Perceptions of Institutional Preparedness for Campus Crises ……………………………….36

Figure 4.2: Perceptions of Institutional Preparedness for Active Shooters ……………………………..36

Figure 4.3: Perceptions of Institutional Communication of Crisis Management Protocol …………41

Figure 4.4: Perceptions of Institutional Communication of Active Shooter Protocol ……………….41

1

Chapter 1

Introduction

Background/Context

Postsecondary leaders have had to deal with the topics of campus crisis and post-crisis

management for many years, and especially in the past two decades. The tragic events of

September 11, 2001 were a driving force for leading administrators to think more about the

critical events that potentially could happen on their respective campuses (Catullo, Walker, &

Floyd, 2009). More recently, the most prolific campus crisis has been the active shooter. The

ability to prevent a single active shooter crisis similar to the incident at Virginia Tech in 2007

saves multiple lives in the face of an ever-increasing national trend in student population growth

(Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011).

Crisis management has grown rapidly in recent years, yet the topic of campus crisis is

largely ignored (Coombs, 1995). Numerous college campuses across the country have

experienced active shootings in the past few years, and institutional leaders have responded

differently to each situation. Fortunately, an exponentially greater number of universities have

not experienced the same crisis (Ferraro & McHugh, 2010), and even though active shooting

events are rare, a low—but significant—percentage of students potentially could be in danger or

experience distress associated with the event (Sulkowski & Lazarus, 2011).

One of the biggest criticisms from the handling of the Virginia Tech tragedy was the

institution’s use of emergency notification systems (ENS) and their failure to immediately warn

the campus community (Johnson, 2012; Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008; Schneider, 2010). Due to

the potential for an active shooter on campus, many institutions are looking to improve policies,

promote campus safety, and effectively handle emergency situations more efficiently. These

2

changes include the implementation of mass ENS (Butler & Lafreniere, 2010). It is critical the

immediate community be notified in the early minutes after a crisis or emergency (Johnson,

2012).

National legislation requires institutions immediately to notify students and employees

when an emergency happens on campus (H.R. 5806; Emergency Notification Deployment Act,

2008). Researchers found the two biggest issues driving ENS implementation at institutions

were recent incidents on other campuses and general public safety (Gulum & Murray, 2009;

Kaminski, Koons-Witt, Thompson, & Weiss, 2010; Staman, Katsouros, & Hach, 2009).

Statement of the Problem

Administrators, faculty, staff, but more importantly, students and their families, expect

that reasonable and effective measures be in place to respond more efficiently to a campus crisis,

minimizing student risk (Heilbrun, Dvoskin, & Heilbrun, 2009). Students’ expectations for

college matter; their expectations form a groundwork that begins to set the relationship students

have with their institution (Miller, Kuh, Paine, & Associates, 2006).

Perceptions and expectations are different, but they have the ability to inform each other.

A positive or negative expectation can lead to a positive or negative perception, which ultimately

forms their collegiate experience. Heilbrun and colleagues (2009) note that as changes in

policies and practices surrounding crisis management occur, it is important that these changes be

perceived as effective and responsive. Understanding perceptions is critical. The more informed

the campus community is with regards to emergency preparedness and effective response, the

more efficiently an institution can respond to campus crises, including active shootings.

3

Purpose of the Study

Postsecondary leaders report generally feeling prepared to handle a campus crisis

(Catullo et al., 2009), but there is a lack of similar data specific to active shootings and of general

student perceptions of campus safety. The purpose of this study was to consider student

perceptions of institutional active shooter preparedness and of the effectiveness of ENS used in

the event of an active shooter on campus.

Significance of the Study

Asking a random student what he or she would do if involved in an active shooting would

likely render a silent response, with an ultimate admission towards uncertainty. There has been

an increased occurrence of active shootings on college campuses in recent years, but a lack of

research about student’s fears of being a potential victim of any campus crime (Kaminski,

Koons-Witt, Thompson, & Weiss, 2010). Students make meaning of active shootings before,

during, and after the event, and terror management theory (TMT) looks at how it affects the

student’s perception of their institution (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). If

institutions are unaware of how students would act and respond pre-crisis, the lack of

understanding can affect the way an institution responds pre-crisis, mid-crisis, and post-crisis.

This can be applied toward any campus crisis with the potential for student death, not just active

shootings.

Emergency messages are in competition with a high volume of other messages—Twitter

messages, Facebook posts, text messages, general institutional and academic emails, etc.—to

break through the crowded communication medium that exists in student’s lives (Stephens,

Barrett, & Mahometa, 2013). Institutions must implement ENS systems in ways that maximize

4

understanding and compliance to ensure effective responses to horrific events such as school

shootings (Butler & Lafreniere, 2010; Gulum & Murray, 2009).

Research Questions

This study was designed to explore the following research questions specific to students,

rather than institutional or higher education administrators:

1) What are students perceptions toward their institutional active shooter preparedness

and effectiveness of ENS?

2) To what level do students perceive crisis management plans (i.e. active shooter

preparedness) being communicated effectively?

3) Do students have experience with their institutional ENS? If so, what are students’

levels of satisfaction with emergency notification and ENS used as a response to a

campus crisis or active shooting?

4) What suggestions do students have about effective communication strategies in the

event of an emergency or active shooting?

This knowledge hopefully can inform practices related to the implementation of pre- and

post-crisis management, preparedness, and response strategies that may or may not already exist.

Theoretical/Conceptual Framework

Regardless if universities have policies and procedures in place, a student’s perception of

the institution is his or her reality. TMT, specifically the extension of the theory presented by

Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and Solomon (1999), serves as an additional framework that may help

explain a potential factor in student’s intentional or unintentional disregard to institutional active

shooter and campus crisis preparedness.

5

The research on TMT focuses on two basic hypotheses—the anxiety-buffer and mortality

salience (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). The anxiety-buffer hypothesis posits that self-esteem

provides protection against anxiety, thus, strengthening self-esteem makes one less susceptible to

anxiety-related behavior. The mortality salience hypothesis involves the intangible,

psychological structure that protects individuals against anxiety, and states that reminding people

of the cause of their anxiety increases the need for that structure. Individuals will have more

positive reactions to things that support structure and more negative reactions to things that

threaten it.

Students consciously and unconsciously avoid certain topics that might invoke anxiety or

the notion of death; the suppression of such thoughts allows them to leave death as something

that will happen in the distant future and allows them to live in the present, free of anxiety. TMT

helps makes sense of how certain crisis management, preparedness, and trainings may influence

a student’s thoughts, feelings, and perceptions as compared to a previous time.

Definitions

A campus crisis is defined as “an event that disrupts the orderly operation of the

institution or its educational mission, and threatens the well-being of personnel, property,

financial resources, or reputation of the institution” (Zdziarski, 2001, p. 5).

Crisis management refers to “the plans, protocols, procedures, and processes used by

institutions to manage a campus crisis” (Zdziarski, 2001, p. 5).

This study concerns three distinct phases of a crisis, defined as follows:

 Pre-crisis—actions taken prior to the onset of a crisis (Zdziarski, 2001, p. 6).

 Crisis—actions taken during a crisis event (Zdziarski, 2001, p. 6).

 Post-crisis—actions taken after the occurrence of a crisis (Zdziarski, 2001, p. 6).

6

While there are numerous campus crises and forms of preparedness, this study focused on

active shootings as the crisis and ENS as the response.

An active shooter, as defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2008), “is

an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated

area; in most cases, active shooters use firearm(s) and there is no pattern or method to their

selection of victims” (p. 2).

An Emergency Notification System (ENS) refers to a system organized for the primary

purpose of expediting the efficient one-way distribution or broadcast of messages during a time

of crisis. These messages are distributed through a variety of communication mediums.

Regarding the sample population and student demographic, the researcher created

definitions regarding residency to stratify distinct categories of students:

 Non-commuter student—a student currently living in university-owned housing

(does not include fraternity and sorority houses).

 Commuter student—a student not currently living in university-owned housing

and commutes to campus (includes fraternity and sorority houses).

Organization of the Study

This study is reported in five distinct chapters. Chapter One provided an introduction to

the topic of institutional crisis management, a purpose statement, a statement of the problem,

significance of the study, and the research questions posed. Chapter Two offers a literature

review on issues related to crisis management, with consideration of limitations in the research.

Chapter Three discusses the research design, research method and procedures for conducting the

study. Chapter Four presents the findings from the original research. Chapter Five discusses the

study and conclusions, along with implications for future practice and research.

7

Chapter 2

Literature Review

Crisis Management Plans

Two major events heightened the focus of campus safety and security to different levels:

the terrorist attacks on September 11 th

, 2001, (Catullo et al., 2009) and the mass shootings at

Virginia Tech on April 16 th

, 2007 (Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008). Both events had lasting

impacts on the way postsecondary leaders view and prepare for crises that happen on their

campuses (Catullo et al., 2009). The two periods of time analyzed— post-September 11 th

(2001)

and post-Virginia Tech (2007)—show varying levels of awareness and institutional preparedness

for campus crises not specific to just active shootings.

From 2005-2007, approximately 98% of colleges and universities reported having no

homicides (Ferraro & McHugh, 2010). The Virginia Tech massacre in 2007 created a ripple

effect that was felt throughout the higher education community. Of 331 institutions surveyed by

the Midwestern Higher Education Compact (MHEC), 87% responded that their institution

conducted a review of holistic campus safety and security (Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008). Of

this 87%, almost 90% indicated that positive change was implemented.

Handling institutional crisis situations was not something new that began happening post-

September 11 th

, but the events on that day accelerated the need to be more prepared than ever

(Catullo et al., 2009). In the Zdziarski (2001) study, 129 (88.4% of) participating institutions

reported having some sort of written crisis management plan. Of these institutions, 123 (85.4%)

reported having a specific plan for the university and 77 (53.1%) reported having a separate

student affairs plan. Covington (2013) conducted a study of smaller campuses (with less than

5,000 students) and found a completely different picture: about 93% had a university-specific

8

crisis management plan and only 27% had a crisis management plan specific to the division of

student affairs. Heiselt and Burrell (2012) found that among the responding Christian-affiliated

institutions of higher education (CIHE), 92% had some type of crisis management plan and 95%

reported reviewing these plans annually.

Mitroff, Diamond, and Alpalsan (2006) stated that crisis management does not simply

mean the existence of an emergency preparedness plan. It involves thinking about the types of

crises that may occur and planning for what happens next. Catullo et al. (2007), also modeled

after the Zdziarski (2001) study, show the differences in contingency plans that institutions have

in place from 2001 to 2007. Plans for campus and building evacuations, chemical leaks, loss of

computer data or utilities, terrorist threats, and infectious diseases were prepared at a statistically

significant higher rate than other campus crises (Catullo et al., 2009).

In 2001, the five crises most institutions reporting have plans for were fire, student death,

sexual assault, suicide, and campus disturbance and demonstration (Zdziarski, 2001). There

were no significant changes from 2001 to 2007 in contingency plans for homicide, student and

faculty death or injury, or campus disturbances (Catullo et al., 2009). Active shooting scenarios

are not specifically represented in either Zdziarki (2001) or Catullo et al. (2009) study, but

student deaths and campus disturbances are. According to the same survey, there were

additional statistically significant increases of various forms from 2001 to 2007. These increases

included the addressing of the pre-crisis phase, the existence of written crisis management plans,

and the accessibility of those plans on the internet.

Administrators tend to be reactive, instead of proactive, when dealing with crisis

management (Zdziarski, 2001). This is supported by the research that suggests that the pre-crisis

phase was not addressed nearly the same amount as the crisis and post-crisis phases, yet needed

9

to be (Catullo et al., 2009). Of the 129 reporting institutions in the Zdziarski (2001) study that

had written crisis management plans, only 82 (63.6%) indicated addressing the pre-crisis phase.

Covington (2013) found slightly increased percentages on campuses address the pre-crisis phase

on smaller campuses: 65.5% and 73.4% for the first and second administrations of the survey,

respectively. Heiselt and Burrell (2012) found that 90% of CIHEs with a crisis management plan

addressed the pre-crisis phase, which shows increased percentages from the previously

mentioned studies.

There were certain crises in which more institutions addressed the pre-crisis phase: fire,

sexual assault, sexual harassment, suicide, and evacuation of buildings (Zdziarski, 2001). Again,

active shootings have no specific category, but neither student deaths nor campus disturbances

were at the top of the list of institutional crises that addressed the pre-crisis phase. Catullo et al.

(2009) posed the following question: how does an educational institution prepare for the

unimaginable? Research indicates that while institutional administrators typically focus on crisis

events that are more likely to occur, they need to start looking for unexpected crisis with lower

probabilities of happening (i.e. active shootings). Mitroff et al. (2006) identified criminal acts

(i.e. murders and use of guns) as one of the potential crises that institutions might face.

The literature revealed several references to the crucial need for appropriate crisis

management teams (Mitroff et al., 2006; Sherwood & McKelfresh, 2007; Zdziarski, 2006). With

solid leadership and clearly defined operational plans, crisis management teams are seen as

effective tools in the crisis management process (Sherwood & McKelfresh, 2007); however,

Millet-Willet (2010) believes that many leaders on crisis management teams have not thought

much nor reflected about how their roles would change from daily institutional operations to

periods of crisis.

10

Zdziarski (2001), Catullo et al. (2009), and Covington (2013) suggested that crisis

management protocols—to be effective—must include plans within various divisions that

address different types of crises and ultimately relate back to the plan of the institution. Diligent

care must be taken to not strengthen misperceptions (Fox & Savage, 2009).

Perceptions of Preparedness

Differences in institution types may result in differences in perceptions of preparedness.

In 2001, of the 140 institutions that responded to the question of perceived preparedness, the

overall mean was 7.79 (out of 10) which indicates a high level of perceived preparedness to

respond to campus crisis (Zdziarski, 2001). Catullo et al. (2009) reported that public colleges

rated their level of preparedness somewhat lower than private colleges, and this also held true for

Zdziarski; in 2001, private institutions had a mean rating of 8.71 as opposed to a 7.63 for public

institutions.

The notion that private institutions perceived their campuses to be more prepared than

public institutions was supported by Covington (2013). Perceived preparedness from both types

of institutions increased from 2001 to 2007, but it was not statistically significant. In a different

survey, Rasmussen and Johnson (2008) found that larger universities were more likely to have

conducted a review of campus safety than smaller universities. Burkell (2009) looked at

perceived preparedness at CIHEs, and found that the presidents of participating CIHEs were

prepared to respond to crisis, overall. On the same scale from 1 to 10, 19.5% of CIHEs scored

their institution at 7/10, 35.1% at 8/10, 27.3% at 9/10, and 2.6% at 10/10. Research finds that

regardless of size or type of institution, most perceive their institutions to be prepared (Zdziarski,

2001; Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008; Catullo et al., 2009; Covington, 2013).

11

Similarities still exist in crisis preparedness and management between the two time

periods—2001 to 2007. Although responding institutions still perceive their divisions to be

prepared, Catullo et al. (2009) found no statistical difference in institutional perceptions of

preparedness from 2001 to 2007. Covington (2013) studied smaller institutions—one study in

early 2010 and the other in late 2012—and found that these smaller institutions showed about the

same level of perceived preparedness as the responding institutions in the Zdziarski (2001) and

Catullo et al. (2009) studies. Researchers suggest a need for studies on crisis preparedness to

focus on ways in which smaller, specialized postsecondary institutions are able to prepare for

crises (Catullo, 2008; Hartzog, 1981; Zdziarski, 2001). While researchers have examined

administrator, faculty, and staff perceptions of preparedness, little to no research has been

conducted to study student perceptions of preparedness.

Creation of crisis management plans and continuing to address the pre-crisis phase help

institutions alter public perceptions. Facilitation of different crisis situations can potentially

combat negative perceptions and ensure organizational leaders can positively influence how

outsiders perceive their organization after a crisis has occurred. Preventative policies designed to

protect students on campus and programs created to educate about crime on campus “should be

based on empirical realities rather than (mis)perceptions of risk” (Kaminski et al., 2010, p. 96).

The changes should not only be taking place, but also need to be perceived as being effective and

operational by those the changes are meant to protect (Heilbrun, Dvoskin, & Heilbrun, 2009).

These preventative policies to increase campus safety are one avenue institutions implement to

increase the overall levels of crisis management. Pre-crisis safety should not stop at simple

prevention.

12

Pre-Crisis Safety Strategies

Violence on campus is likely to be the defining moment when the life of that institution is

changed forever (LaBanc, Krepel, Johnson, & Hermann, 2010). The countless changes to

campus safety and crisis management demonstrate the effect that the events of Virginia Tech had

on campus culture and operations across the country.

The mass shootings of Virginia Tech began to shift the focus of campus crises to include

a slight emphasis on active shooter preparedness, instead of just general campus crises, as

previously described throughout this review. A big change in safety protocol implemented post-

Virginia Tech was text message emergency notification systems, especially since emergency

notification was an area for which Virginia Tech officials were criticized (Rasmussen &

Johnson, 2008). Almost 75% of respondents of the MHEC survey who reported not having such

systems stated their universities were in the process of obtaining some sort of similar system.

Postsecondary leaders and administrators began to implement (or considering

implementing) various initiatives that did not exist at their institutions prior to the Virginia Tech

tragedy. Approximately 14% of respondents to the MHEC survey reported that campus

buildings did not have all-call systems, but 1/3 of those institutions planned to change that

(Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008). Additionally, only 51% of institutions reported having

emergency telephones and panic buttons and only 38% reported having security cameras spread

throughout outdoor areas of campus prior to Virginia Tech. Twenty two percent of campuses

that did not have the capacity to lockdown classroom buildings were either planning to acquire

such a system or had already done so (Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008), although Fox and Savage

(2009) believe there is a significant disadvantage to locking down campus buildings during an

13

active shooting. Students, faculty and staff in sealed buildings are safe, but those left stranded

outside may be potential victims.

Zdziarski (2001) looked at how institutions communicate crisis management plans to the

campus community, with no specificity toward active shootings. Only 31% of institutions

communicated through the use of drills and exercises and 15.5% reported their crisis

management plans were not communicated. Twenty six (20.2%) institutions utilized optional

crisis management training sessions and only 21 (16.3%) utilized required crisis management

training sessions. Members of the campus community may view these pre-crisis trainings as a

suggestion of increased levels and threat of violent behavior (Fox & Savage, 2009).

Most surprising, only 36% of responding institutions to the MHEC survey in 2008 had

staged incidents to test their crisis management and emergency response systems in the event of

an active shooting, with larger institutions being more likely to have done so (Rasmussen &

Johnson, 2008). Most institutions of higher education have exercises for evacuations, fire drills,

and tornado and severe weather situations; however, far fewer practice similar exercises for

active shooters (Department of U.S. Education, Office and Elementary and Secondary

Education, & Office of Safe and Healthy Students, 2013).

This low statistic is supported by an extension of TMT, which states that students do

what they can to not think about death or dying (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Fox and Savage

(2009) would agree with universities who choose not to conduct active shooter drills for that

very reason—to prevent placing students in a simulation where death is a potential outcome.

While the intent is there, staged scenarios have the potential to make students much more

anxious about feeling like walking targets; thus, only involving campus police and other

authorities is a more reasonable approach for some institutions.

14

Emergency Notification Systems

Institutions implement crisis management plans with perceived levels of preparedness

from administrators and institutional leaders. Included in some crisis management plans is the

addressing of the crisis before it happens. A large part of addressing the pre-crisis phase is the

institutional use of ENS. According to Staman et al. (2009), the most popular emergency

notification mediums among responding institutions were e-mail, text messages, and websites

(100%), landline phones (80%), cell phones (76%), televisions and video in residence halls

(56%), external sirens and speakers (44%), fire panel alarms with voice enunciation and digital

signage (28%), building public address systems (24%), and social media (20%). Prior to the

mass shootings at Virginia Tech, less than 10% of responding institutions utilized external

speakers, social networking sites, instant messaging, or text messaging as a part of their ENS

systems, according to the Midwestern Higher Education Compact (2008).

A study conducted at the University of Windsor in Southern Ontario, Canada, gauged

student, staff, and faculty perceptions of the use of various ENS technologies (Butler &

Lafreniere, 2010). An overwhelming majority of the participants reported checking their

university email account on a daily basis (Butler & Lafreniere, 2010); about 25% of responders

think campus police can encourage those on campus to regularly check their email by explaining

how important it is, and by advertising appropriately.

Emergency Notification System Participation. The main concern expressed by

students, faculty, and staff involves a need for privacy. A small sample from the University of

Windsor study would approve of such a system only if their privacy was guaranteed (Butler &

Lafreniere, 2010). A classification of emergencies that the ENS systems would be used for was

something students want before opting in. According to the Staman et al. (2009) survey, an

15

average of 40% of students opt-in to the system if given the option, but 92% of students remain a

part of the system if enrollment is required but are given the option to opt-out. Opt-out systems

retain more student participation than opt-in systems; Florida State University has an opt-out

system with 85% participation, whereas the University of California, Los Angeles has an opt-in

system with only 35% participation (Schneider, 2010).

Staman et al. (2009) states that subscription rates to notification services are not

consistently high. Forty percent (40%) of responders indicated high participation (>75% of

students), 12% had medium participation (from 50-75% of students), and an overwhelming 48%

had poor participation (<50% of students). A similar study of 500 campuses found that, on

average, only 40% of students had registered for the ENS system at their institution (Kaminski et

al., 2010).

The National Association of College and University Business Officers (2009)

administered a survey that found 70% of responding institutions offered opt-in ENS systems

where students have the choice to register; unfortunately, the response rate from students is still

unsatisfactory. Even Virginia Tech only had 56% of students registered for their ENS system in

the semester following the shooting (Davies, 2008).

The Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management suggests that a

successful marketing program is one avenue to address the issue of low student participation and

response; however, first-year students do not perceive a need to register for an emergency

notification system, so this approach may be problematic (Johnson, 2012). It is critical to know

how to encourage and motivate students to register because of the low concern for personal

safety that many students have.

16

A few participants wanted to ensure being a part of the system would not cost them any

money, would only be used for emergencies, and wanted to have input in the types of

technologies used to reach them in the event of an emergency (Butler & Lafreniere, 2010). The

concerns can all be successfully addressed if campus police increase their presence on campus

and develop stronger relationships with the community. Over 95% of participants in the

University of Windsor study favored the implementation of an ENS system, with improving

campus safety being one of the main reasons why (Butler & Lafreniere, 2010). Johnson’s (2012)

study found various themes that emerged as to why students did or did not register for the

system—attentiveness to information provided by their institution, personal motivation to

register, preferred methods of notification, and ease of registration.

To increase visibility of the ENS system, one regional southeastern public university

began presenting at first-year student orientation sessions in 2010 and printed information about

the emergency notification system on the hangtag parking permits (Johnson, 2012). The increase

of students who registered for the emergency notification system that year was statistically

significant (p < .05), but the total number of new system participants only represented 11% of

that year’s incoming class. While this study represents only one institution, others are likely

having the same struggles.

Missouri University of Science & Technology (Missouri S&T) ran a test of their ENS

system in 2008 with only a 51% confirmation rate (Gulum &Murray, 2009). The system is well-

designed, but still faces problems inevitable to an ENS system at any institution. Students may

ignore the messages, provide inaccurate information, or simply not be aware of the services

available. The low confirmation numbers from Missouri S&T—and likely from other

17

institutions—is considered unsafe. Low confirmation and participation rates can be attributed to

the issues surrounding text messages and cell phone usage.

Text Messaging and Cell Phone Usage. The infrastructure created for text messaging

was never intended to be used for widespread real-time notification for emergencies, but

realistically only for low-volume person-to-person communication (Latimer, 2008). Although

text message delivery is traditionally fast, delivery cannot be guaranteed; if some messages are

longer than 160 characters, the original messages may be broken up into multiple parts that may

arrive out of order or not at all (Latimer, 2008).

Many faculty members require students to turn off or silence their cell phones in class, so

the effectiveness of these ENS systems during peak academic periods comes into question (Fox

& Savage, 2009). Even if faculty have more liberal in-class cell phone policies, there are some

classrooms in the basements of buildings where cell phone reception is poor or nonexistent; this

lessens the effectiveness of the system if students are not receiving messages in a timely fashion

(Schneider, 2010).

Only 39.4% of students participating in the University of Windsor study indicated they

would be willing to provide their phone number to campus police for emergency notification

purposes and 42.8% of students were explicit in their unwillingness to do so (Butler &

Lafreniere, 2010). About 50% of unwilling participants indicated privacy as the reason, and 8%

said no for monetary reasons. Many students choose not to voluntarily subscribe to these

services, depriving them of essential information in the event of an emergency (Johnson, 2012).

If students choose not to enroll in their institutions ENS system, there is another technological

medium institutions can use to reach their students in times of crisis: social media.

18

Social Media. Social media has expanded access to resources with increased speeds at

which information can be sent and received (Hughes & Palen, 2012). Informal sources such as

social media accelerate the speed at which information is disseminated. This is essential in

urgent situations; however, these messages could spread out of control, creating panic,

contradicting official sources (unintentionally), and threatening the effectiveness of emergency

communication (Hughes & Palen, 2012; Stephens et al., 2013).

For social media to reach students during an emergency, students must have access to the

internet and know how to check the sites and which sites to check. The usage of general

university websites is widely implemented, but the sites can overload and offenders may be able

to see the warnings being broadcast against them (Schneider, 2010).

The public is much more involved with emergency notification and response and plays a

much more important role than ever before (Hughes & Palen, 2012). Individuals who may be

the first to witness a crisis may also be the first to break the news, prior to university officials

having the chance to respond. Since social media can reach larger audiences at faster rates, there

are new demands and expectations by the public as to how institutions respond to emergencies in

the future.

Researchers show that public information officers (PIOs) are still uncertain how to adapt

fully the use of social media outlets into the emergency notification response process (Hughes &

Palen, 2012). Zdziarski (2001) equates PIOs with those working in university relations.

Regardless of which institutional stakeholders have control over outgoing messages, issues of

redundancy and urgency must be taken into consideration.

Redundancy versus Urgency. Repetition of messages is a common way to convey

urgency (Mileti & Sorensen, 1990). “Without a sense of urgency, the awareness itself is not

19

enough” (Gulum & Murray, 2009, p. 1469). If institutions cannot find appropriate ways to send

emergency messages, people might create their own message filters, sending those messages

straight to the trash (Stephens et al., 2013).

While redundancy is inevitable, people begin to feel frustrated if the emergency messages

are overkill; however, if people receive these messages through various channels, they should be

more persuaded to examine the message and should experience less frustration (Stephens et al.,

2013). Stephens and colleagues found that if students receive three notifications, then the

communication channel no longer matters and students will begin to pay attention. This finding

is unique to campus crisis management literature, as no other similar findings have surfaced.

The overuse of drills and informational and test messages may affect the impact that

actual emergency notifications have; it is possible people will start to perceive the emergency

messages to be simply another drill (Schneider, 2010; Stephens et al., 2013). Human

communication as opposed to electronic communication would increase perceptions of urgency

(Staman et al., 2009; Stephens et al., 2013). A better understanding of student reactions to

redundant communication helps institutions more effectively capture student attention; it is

imperative to activate their sense of urgency as quickly as possible (Stephens et al., 2013).

Summary, Limitations, and Considerations for Future Research

There is long history of campus violence in this country (Smith, 1989), including the

shootings at the University of Texas (1966), South Carolina State University (1968), Kent State

University (1970), University of South Carolina (1978), Cornell University (1983), University of

Iowa (1991), Franciscan University (1999), and Arizona State University (2002) (Ferraro and

McHugh, 2010). The events of September 11 th

, 2001, however, coupled with the mass shootings

at Virginia Tech in 2007, ushered in major changes toward campus safety that had long-term

20

effects on institutions everywhere (LaBanc et al., 2010). A majority of responding institutions to

the surveys reviewed in this paper have written crisis management plans, some with a separate

specific student affairs plan that is different from the overall plan of the institution (Covington,

2013; Zdziarski, 2001).

Institutional perceived preparedness has shown no significant statistical increase over the

years, even though postsecondary leaders still perceive their institutions to be prepared to handle

campus crises, with private institutions generally feeling more prepared than public institutions

(Covington, 2013; Zdziarski, 2001). Research shows more institutions need to start addressing

the pre-crisis phase in addition to the crisis and post-crisis phases most are already addressing in

their written crisis management plans (Catullo et al., 2009; Covington, 2013; Zdziarski, 2001).

Pre-crisis preparation trends show the increased use of staged exercises, training sessions,

building all-call systems, emergency notification systems, and security cameras, especially after

the mass shooting at Virginia Tech (Rasmussen & Johnson, 2008).

The most commonly used mediums for emergency notification are e-mail, text messages,

and institutional websites, with an increased use of social media in recent years. Institutions are

struggling with getting high voluntary student participation rates in their ENS systems. The

systems that automatically include all enrolled students retain more students than those who must

opt-in for participation. Institutions continue struggling with understanding why students choose

not to participate in their respective ENS systems, but different tactics—including marketing the

system at orientation—are currently being used to combat student apathy.

Knowing the communication mediums students, faculty, and staff are frequently utilizing

and prefer, as well as knowing their concerns, can aid in the development and implementation of

efficient ENS systems (Butler & Lafreniere, 2012). Effective and successful communication is

21

more than simply inundating an audience with messages (Stephens et al., 2013). Effective

emergency notification is a process, and is not simply the act of buying the best ENS systems

(Gulum & Murray, 2009).

Limitations exist of the various studies included throughout this review. Zdziarski (2001)

focuses mainly on larger institutions (greater than 8,000 students) and only NASPA member

institutions. Covington (2013) focuses on smaller institutions (less than 5,000 students) and

again, only NASPA member institutions. Catullo et al. (2009) analyzes the status of crisis

management at NASPA institutions, exclusively, as well. These studies isolate those institutions

that are not affiliated with the national organization. Heiselt and Burrell (2012) and Burrell

(2009) looked only at institutions of higher education that are Christian-affiliated and the

Midwestern Higher Education Compact (2008) survey was more comprehensive in terms of

institutional size, but neither used NASPA affiliation as a factor. Important themes tend to

emerge from the research; however, the respondents may not be representative of all institutions

across the country due to the response rates across the various surveys and research conducted.

Researchers looked at institutional crisis management and crisis readiness from the

perspective of postsecondary leaders and administrators (Rasmussen et al., 2008; Zdziarski,

2001). However, little research on emergency notification exists within research on crisis

management; there is typically no overlap between the two topical areas.

Studies that analyze the use of ENS systems, cell phone usage, and social media are very

limited in their scope and generalizability, due to the lack of response and limited number of

institutions included. Future research on ENS should examine more institutions and broader

student perceptions and opinions to understand fully the emergency notification culture.

22

The literature on crisis preparedness at postsecondary institutions in the United States

needs continued expansion (Akers, 2007; Catullo, 2008; Hartzog, 1981; Mitroff et al., 2006;

Wilson, 1992; Zdziarski, 2001). Future research regarding overall crisis management should

focus on answering the following question: What are student’s perceptions toward their

institutions crisis management and active shooter preparedness? Perceptions are often reality,

thus, insight into student perception can be an additional resource institutions of higher education

can use to continue to increase crisis management and preparedness strategies to protect further

those in their immediate community.

23

Chapter 3

Methodology

Overview and Research Questions

This study aimed to gain a better understanding and knowledge of student perceptions of

crisis management at their institutions. Various researchers have studied perceptions of

preparedness among institutional leaders, administrators, and presidents (Burrell, 2009; Catullo

et al., 2009; Covington, 2013; Heiselt & Burrell, 2012; Zdziarski, 2001); however, little research

exists regarding student perceptions of preparedness, and little research on crisis management

addresses the use of emergency notification. Therefore, the following research questions were

posed:

1) What are students perceptions toward their institutional active shooter preparedness

and effectiveness of ENS?

2) To what level do students perceive crisis management plans (i.e. active shooter

preparedness) being communicated effectively?

3) Do students have experience with their institutional ENS? If so, what are students’

levels of satisfaction with emergency notification and ENS used as a response to a

campus crisis or active shooting?

4) What suggestions do students have about effective communication strategies in the

event of an emergency or active shooting?

This chapter describes the study’s research design and methodology. Additional topics

include site selection, participant selection, and sample population; instrumentation with original

survey instrument and modifications of original instrument to be used; procedures including data

collection and data analysis; and limitations and delimitations of the study.

24

Research Design

The research design is a descriptive study using survey research methodology. The

purpose of survey research is to generalize from a smaller sample to a larger population as a

means to infer about that population a specific characteristic, attitude, or behavior (Babbie,

1990). The current study employed the survey method to allow students to self-report their

responses on a modified data collection instrument; however, the reliability and value of

collected data depends on the truthfulness of respondents (Shaughnessy, Zechmeister, & Jeanne,

2011). Respondents may feel pressured to respond according to upheld societal beliefs (also

known as social desirability), but responses are accepted as truthful unless given reason to

believe otherwise (Shaughnessy et al., 2011).

Implementing a survey has many advantages. Surveys are well-suited to descriptive

studies, but are used also to explore different sides of a situation, or to explain and offer data for

testing potential hypotheses (Kelley, Clark, Brown, & Sitzia, 2003). As with most quantitative

methods, the turnaround for data collection is fast (Creswell, 2009), as compared with qualitative

methods. Surveys produce large amounts of data in limited amounts of time without incurring

much cost, if any (Kelley et al., 2003).

The nature of this survey is cross-sectional, with data collected at one single point in time

and only studied once (Shaughnessy et al., 2011). The present study could be performed

longitudinally, but currently is implemented as a cross-section of student perceptions at a

singular moment, and not a comparison at different points in time. Ultimately, the survey is the

preferred method of data collection because numerous institutional crisis management studies

have employed this method as well (Burrell, 2009; Catullo et al., 2009; Covington, 2013; Heiselt

& Burrell, 2012; Zdziarski, 2001).

25

Research Methods

Site Selection. The study was conducted at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville

(UTK), a large public four-year research institution. UTK is a land-grant institution and is the

flagship institution of the State of Tennessee. Undergraduate student enrollment is 20,916 and

there are 11 on-campus residence halls with a total capacity of approximately 7,400 students.

Selection of this institution was due to accessibility and current location of the researcher.

Participant Selection. The study enlisted a stratified random sample of undergraduate

students. The study targets both commuters and non-commuters, with a focused analysis to

compare students from those two groups. Commuters and non-commuters may differ on varying

levels: the amount of time spent on campus, exposure to campus crises, and motivation to

subscribe to an ENS, which may ultimately affect their perceptions. An equal random sample of

1000 commuter students and 1000 non-commuter students were selected for inclusion in the

study (for a total of 2000 students). Each student who fell into one of those groups had equal

access to the survey instrument. A small incentive—ten awards of $20 each—was advertised

and offered to students to help increase the number of responses. By Tennessee law, the

incentive has to be offered to all students receiving the recruitment email, even those who choose

not to complete the survey.

The sample size was calculated using a formula involving population size, desired

confidence level, and degree of accuracy (otherwise known as margin of error) (Krejcie &

Morgan, 1970). The approximate number of undergraduate students currently enrolled at UTK

for the fall 2014 semester is 21,000. The researcher chose a confidence level of 85%, with a

margin of error of 5%. According to the formula, the recommended sample size for a population

of 21,000, a confidence level of 85%, and a margin of error of 5% is 205. This represents the

26

total number of responses needed to adequately represent the undergraduate population; the

stratified samples of commuter and non-commuter students are present within the 205.

Instrumentation. The specific data collection instrument was an electronically self-

administered questionnaire modified from a previous study. Zdziarski (2001) designed the

Campus Crisis Management Questionnaire (CCMQ) to highlight critical indicators of

institutional crisis management: types of crises, phases of a crisis, crisis management plans, and

stakeholders. Zdziarski sent the CCMQ to administrators and colleagues at participating

NASPA institutions to assess the preparedness of their student affairs divisions. The current

study modified the CCMQ to account for student perceptions, and to include supplementary

questions with the intent of filling additional gaps in the literature (related to ENS).

The original CCMQ was divided into three parts (Zdziarski, 2001). Part 1 consisted of

14 questions (see Appendix A). Question 1 solicits a perceived perception rating on a scale of

one (unprepared) to ten (well-prepared), while the remaining 13 questions prompt responses

about crisis management plans. Part 2 assesses the existence and involvement of various

stakeholders. Respondents are asked to indicate on a four-point scale the involvement of 22

internal stakeholders and 20 external stakeholders; however; the modified survey for the present

study does not solicit information on crisis management stakeholders.

Part 3 of the CCMQ assesses types of crises for which institutions are prepared and

whether crisis management plans for those types are addressed with each phase of the crisis—

pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis (Zdziarski, 2001). Portions of Part 3 are used in the modified

survey, with questions related to emergency notification added to address each of the three

phases of crisis.

27

Fraenkel and Wallen (2003) stated that an instrument is considered valid if and when the

instrument measures what it was created to measure. To evaluate the CCMQ instrument,

Zdziarski (2001) used content and face validity. Content validity judges on the appropriateness

of content, whereas face validity judges based on face value of the facts (Fraenkel & Wallen,

2003). The CCMQ was validated in several ways:

1) Zdziarski (2001) used comprehensive research of literature to create survey items.

2) A panel of experts reviewed the instrument after items were developed.

3) A pilot study allowed the researcher to make modifications to the instrument.

4) It was posited that the crisis types (human, criminal, facility, and natural crises)

accurately reflects higher education crisis management planning (Catullo, 2008;

Zdziarski, 2001).

The CCMQ was developed and validated from various research and literature on crisis

management. Zdziarski’s (2001) doctoral committee helped to create a first draft of the

instrument before a small panel of experts reviewed its questions for validity and clarity. The

experts offered several changes to the original CCMQ. The questionnaire was then pilot-tested

at select four-year Texas colleges with enrollments less than 8,000 students.

Eight out of ten pilot participants responded to the CCMQ (Zdziarski, 2009). In addition

to the pertinent questions, participants were asked to provide feedback on clarity, organization,

and time it took to complete the survey. Based on responses from the pilot study participants,

various sections of the entire survey packet (questions, cover letter, and instruction sheet) were

revised and refined.

Modifications to the CCMQ. The Campus Crisis Management Questionnaire (Zdziarski,

2001) is the best tool to use as a basis for this research given that responses would provide a

28

transparent view into perceptions of institutional crisis management, preparedness, and response;

however, slight revisions were made to shift the focus of perceptions from institutional leaders to

students. The researcher used Zdziarski’s study and CCMQ solely for scholarship and research,

which, under copyright laws, constitutes fair use, so permission from the author was not needed.

The new survey instrument was given the name CCMQ-S, the Campus Crisis Management

Questionnaire for Students.

The first question of Part 1 of the CCMQ asked respondents to indicate how prepared

their student affairs divisions were to respond to campus crisis. The wording was revised to ask

about institutional preparedness, whereas the general student would perceive the student affairs

division and institution as the same, or might not understand what the student affairs division

includes. This change is visible throughout the entire modified CCMQ-S instrument.

The questions regarding institutional stakeholders from Part 3 of the CCMQ were

omitted, because the present study is not gauging student knowledge or perceptions of

stakeholders. As identified with previous research, there is a lack of synthesis between crisis

management research with that of emergency notification research, so similar questions were

duplicated from the CCMQ with “emergency notification system” replacing “crisis management

plan”.

Part 4 of the CCMQ asks for contingency plans that exist for five types of natural

disasters, seven types of facility crises, 10 types of criminal crises, and 11 types of human crises.

The CCMQ-S focuses on crises where students have the potential to be directly involved, with an

extreme focus on active shooters and active shooting situations. Overall, any portions of the

original CCMQ which are not pertinent to the present study and not relevant to students were not

included in the CCMQ-S.

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Procedure

Prior to beginning the study, the modified survey instrument was retested for validity and

reliability, since original validity and reliability from the CCMQ may not hold true. The survey

was pilot-tested with a group of 25 Leadership and Service Ambassadors and a class of 40

Orientation Leaders at the University of Tennessee; the chair of the researcher’s thesis

committee also aided in the revision process. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at UTK

granted approval for the study on February 5 th

, 2015 (expedited review; UTK IRB-14-01900

XP). The electronic survey instrument was hosted through Campus Labs, a higher education

assessment service provider utilized by over 650 higher education institutions.

Data Collection. The study was conducted February 10 th

through February 24 th

, 2015.

Links to the electronic survey were sent to the email addresses collected from Strategic

Enrollment Reporting and Analysis (SERA) at UTK. This study targeted undergraduate

students, but a stratification of commuter versus non-commuter students was analyzed for

potential statistical significant similarities and differences.

The informed consent form, a text-version of the modified CCMQ-S as well a link to the

electronic version, and a recruitment email regarding the nature of the study encouraging

participation are included in the Appendix. The recruitment email explains the nature of the

research and the significance of the study, and was included in the body of the email sent to

student participants. The first email to students went out February 10 th

, with a reminder email

sent on February 17 th

indicating that the survey would close on February 24 th

.

258 students started the survey, for an overall response rate of 12.9%. Of these

respondents, only 204 completed the survey in its entirety (through the demographic questions),

30

for an adjusted completed response rate of 10.2%. The largest group of student respondents

were full-time freshmen females who are involved and live on campus.

Data Analysis. Zdziarski (2001) originally collected 146 usable questionnaires.

Responses were coded, entered in a spreadsheet, and imported in SPSS Version 10 for analysis.

Descriptive statistical analyses were performed throughout the population study, including

“frequency tables, cross tabulations, and comparisons of the means of different groupings”

(2001). The present study employed the same descriptive statistical analyses, including chi-

squared significance-testing for the quantitative data, and constant comparative coding for the

qualitative data.

Limitations and Delimitations

Similar to limitations from the literature, data collected may not be generalizable due to

the limited scope of the institutional demographics—only one Southeastern institution is

included in the study. In particular, the state where the study took place is considered politically

more conservative and because gun policy is a contentious issue, active shooter preparedness

may be approached differently than in other states and willingness to openly discuss the topic

may vary. Responses from students at smaller or private institutions, or institutions that have

experienced previous campus crises—like a natural disaster, campus disturbance, or active

shooter—may differ significantly. Any data collected may not be generalizable to the

perceptions of students at other institutions across the country.

Delivery of the survey instrument must be carefully implemented to limit issues of

misinterpretation. If participants are unsure of the meaning of a specific question, the nature of a

survey does not allow for communication with the researcher to clarify the question, potentially

resulting in an untrue and questionable response. Another limitation may be encountered if the

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rates of survey participant return are low, which is a likely outcome if the survey is lengthy or if

students do not feel compelled by the subject matter, and decide not to complete the survey, or

complete it without giving careful thought.

Efficiency is the primary reason behind the selection of self-reported electronic surveys

as the instrument. They are cost-effective and easily implemented to large samples across a

variety of institutions not in the local vicinity. The conscious choice to use this instrument

comes with known disadvantages, including exaggeration of answers, social bias, and the

potential to represent only a person’s feelings at the time they completed the self-reported

survey.

The survey (CCMQ-S) was distributed to a stratified random sample of undergraduate

students at UTK, with analysis done to compare perceptions of commuter and non-commuter

students. Specific students may have had unique experiences with campus crises and unique

exposure to emergency notification atypical of other students, and similar to the selection of only

one university in one region of the United States, these students do not accurately represent the

entire student body at their respective institution.

The specific type of crisis in the present study was limited to active shootings, with other

crises lumped together as general campus crises. As students are answering questions regarding

preparedness and communication about campus crises, students may not be thinking about the

same types of crises. Care needs to be taken when generalizing student responses to specific

crises not related to active shooting situations since responses were generalized to all campus

crises. Therefore, results are limited to the interpretations and perceptions of the specific

individuals who completed the survey, which is not the institutional reality.

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Summary

The study used a quantitative research design to gain insight into students’ perceptions of

institutional crisis management, preparedness, and response, specifically in regards to active

shooter preparedness. The research design is a descriptive study. The data collection instrument

was an electronically self-administered questionnaire modified from a previous study to gauge

the perceptions of students as opposed to institutional leaders. The study was conducted at UTK

and targets all undergraduate students, with an additional focus on the similarities and

differences between perceptions of commuter versus non-commuter students. Chapters 4 and 5

present the findings from the original research and discuss the study and conclusions, along with

implications for future practice and research.

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Chapter 4

Results

The purpose of this study was to consider student perceptions of institutional crisis

management, preparedness, and response. More specifically, the study sought to examine

student perceptions of active shooter preparedness and of the effectiveness of ENS used in the

event of an active shooter on campus. An existing survey instrument was modified and sent to

2,000 students at UTK. Pairs of questions were developed to ascertain perceptions of

management and preparedness for both general crises and active shooting situations to analyze

differences.

Zdziarski (2001), in the original study with which this study is modified, focused on the

existence and type of written crisis management plan—either institutional, student affairs

specific, both, or neither—as a basis for analysis and comparison. The focus of the present study

was of overall student perceptions, including perceptions of the existence of those plans, instead

of existence as institutional reality. Because the study only took place at one institution, a

different quantifier delineates students and their responses. The data in the study were analyzed

based on student residency—on or off-campus—in addition to other demographic factors

(located in Appendix G), as well as an overall analysis of the general student respondent.

The survey asked respondents where they currently reside, on-campus (in a university-

owned residence hall) or off-campus, as well as the number of semesters lived on and off-

campus. Of the 204 students who completed the survey through the demographic questions, 121

(59.31%) currently lived on-campus (non-commuters) and 83 (40.69%) currently lived off-

campus (commuters). Table 4.1 provides additional residency information reported for student’s

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entire undergraduate collegiate tenure, while additional demographic information is located in

various tables in Appendix E.

Table 4.1

Collegiate Residency of Student Respondents

On-campus (residence hall) Off-campus

# of Semesters Count % # of Semesters Count %

0 32 15.69 0 115 56.37

1 21 10.29 1 16 7.84

2 93 45.59 2 32 15.69

3 2 0.98 3 7 3.43

4 37 18.14 4 13 6.37

5 3 1.47 5 3 1.47

6 12 5.88 6 12 5.88

7 1 0.49 7 2 0.98

8 3 1.47 8 3 1.47

12 1 0.49

Chapter 4 reports the analysis of the responses to the survey and is organized into five